(4TH INF. DIV.) IN THE ATTACK OF THE HURTGEN FOREST,
GERMANY, 19-21 NOVEMBER 1944
(RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)
By Captain Robert D. Moore, Infantry
DISPOSITION AND PLANS OF THE 1ST BATTALION, 8TH INFANTRY
On 15 November the 1st Battalion moved from its initial assembly area near ZWEIFALL to a more advanced assembly area near BEND. (See Map C)
On 16 November the attack which had been delayed since 4 November waiting for good weather for the air effort was launched. The visibility above the target area had improved and at 1145 the air attack began. Although the results of this air attack were not immediately evident to the infantry since the airplanes could not bomb close to the front lines due to the impossibility of definitely marking the front lines through the forest it achieved good results. The enemy suffered extensive damage to his artillery and had at least one division practically eliminated. (29)
At 1245 the 2nd Battalion attacked from its line of departure. (See Map C) It advanced about 200 yards when it was halted in front of an enemy defensive position by intense artillery, mortar and automatic weapons fire. The defensive position consisted of triple concertina wire, anti-personnel minefields and dug in positions. Throughout the remainder of the day the 2nd Battalion vigorously pressed the attack but was unable to progress. The Battalion lost approximately 135 officers and men Including three Company Commanders. On 17 November the 2nd Battalion was still unable to breach the position although it had been able to get one tank up the steep slope immediately In rear of the Battalion to assist it. Again the Battalion sustained heavy casualties. (30)
The 1st Battalion remained near BEND until late in the afternoon of 17 November when it moved to the line of departure from which the 2nd Battalion had attacked, (See Map C)
On 13 November the 1st Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion. This relief was not completed until late afternoon.
The 1st Battalion was disposed with Companies A and B on line and Company C in reserve. (See Map D) The Battalion was ordered to attack at 0900 hours 19 November to seize a road junction about 1500 yards to the northeast. The left flank of the Battalion was generally along the SCHEVENHUTTE -DUREN road and extension thereof. The right flank of the Battalion was about 1400 yards to the southeast of the SCHEVENHUTTE -DUREN road. (31) (See Map D)
The plan of attack of the 1st Battalion was to attack in a column of Companies in order of C, A, and B. The direction of attack would be generally astride the firebreak leading to the northeast until the SCHEVENHUTTE-DUREN road was reached.
The attack would then turn to the right and proceed astride this road to the objective. Companies A and B plus a platoon of heavy machine guns from Company D would, from their present positions, support by fire the attempt of Company C to breach the barrier directly to their front. If this attempt was successful they would then move in column behind Company C. No close support artillery or 81 mm mortar fire would be available since there was great danger of rounds falling short due to the trees. The 29th Field Artillery Battalion and the 81 mm Mortar Platoon of Company D would, beginning at H hour, fire intermittently on the firebreaks leading to the objective. This fire would be lifted on call. Company C would have attached one platoon of medium tanks and one platoon of light tanks from the 70th Tank Battalion, one platoon of tank destroyers from the 803rd Tank Destroyer Battalion, one squad of engineers from the 4th Division Engineer Battalion and one heavy machine gun platoon from Company D, 8th lnfantry. One forward observer from the mortar platoon and one from the 29th Field Artillery Battalion would be with Company C. The platoon of tank destroyers had four tank destroyers for the operation. If Company C succeeded in breaching the initial minefield Battalion would be responsible for further widening and marking the breach. Additional litter teams would be employed. The time of attack would be 0900. The line of departure would be that line presently held by Companies A and B. (32) (See Map D)
Company C was assigned the mission of attacking astride the firebreak to its left front to breach the barrier that had stopped the 2nd Battalion, cut the SCHEVENHUTTE-DUREN road, turn to the right astride that road, and capture the Battalion objective. (33) (See Map D)
Upon questioning the Battalion Staff, the Company Commander, Company C, was Informed that no aerial photographs were available for this operation even though there had just been two days of good flying weather.
