(4TH INF. DIV.) IN THE ATTACK OF THE HURTGEN FOREST,
GERMANY, 19-21 NOVEMBER 1944
(RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)
By Captain Robert D. Moore, Infantry
GENERAL SITUATION
On 21 October, Twelfth Army Group directed First Army to attack to the east to "reach the RHINE in the vicinity of COLOGNE and BONN and to seize a bridgehead if the situation should permit. Failing a successful crossing of that river, the First Army would clear the enemy from the area between the MOSELLE RIVER on the south and COLOGNE (incl) on the north." (See Map B)
Suitable flying weather and availability of ammunition would determine the actual date of the attack. (10) The date of the attack would be not later than 16 November. (11) The largest air effort ever attempted in close support of' ground troops was to precede the attack. (12)
The First U.S. Army consisted of the V Corps and the VII Corps. The VII Corps was to make the main effort. (13) This Corps was given the mission of seizing COLOGNE. (14) On 10 November the order of battle of the VII Corps was: 1st Infantry Division, 4th Infantry Division, 104th Infantry Division, 47th Regimental Combat Team, 4th Cavalry Group, CCR, 5th Armored Division, and the 3rd Armored Division. (15) For disposition of the VII Corps on 15 November. (See Map B)
The 4th Infantry Division was composed of the 8th Infantry, 12th Infantry and 22nd Infantry. On 10 November, the 8th Infantry closed into an assembly area near ZWEIFALL, GERMANY. (See Map C) This had been a secret move. Some personnel had worn insignia of other units and bumper markings had been obliterated. (16)
The mission of the 4th U. S. Infantry Division was "to seize the crossings of the ROER RIVER in the vicinity of DUREN and south thereof, assist the 1st Division on its left, protect the right flank of the Corps, and continue the attack in the southern section of the Corps zone to seize COLOGNE" . (See Map B) (17)
The plan of attack of the 4th U. S. Infantry Division was to attack with all three regiments abreast. The 8th Infantry, 22nd Infantry and 12th Infantry were to be in order from left to right. (18)
The plan of attack of the 8th Infantry was to attack in a column of battalions in order of 2nd, 1st, and 3rd. The mission of the 8th Infantry was to seize the high ground in the WENAU FOREST. (Part of the HURTGEN FOREST) (19) (See Map C)
The enemy units in the VII Corps zone from west to east were the 29th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division, the 246th Fusilier Battalion, elements of the 12th and 275th Infantry Divisions, the 47th Volksgrenadier Division, and elements of the 116th Panzer Division. (20)
The HURTGEN FOREST covers an area of approximately fifty square miles. It is roughly in the shape of a triangle formed by the three towns of AACHEN, MONSCHAU and DÜREN, GERMANY. (See Map B) (21)
The forest consists of alternate proves of hardwood, large pine and small pine trees. The entire forest is divided into numerous small squares or rectangles with firebreaks approximately forty feet wide separating each square or rectangle. Several narrow valleys run through the forest. The sides of the majority of these valleys rise very abruptly to a height of one hundred to two hundred feet. On top of these abrupt rises the land is generally level for distances up to two thousand yards when another valley begins. Numerous small streams join the larger streams in the valleys. In the more dense portions of the forest visibility is sometimes reduced to as little as ten yards. (22)
During the fall of 1944 this entire area was covered by alternate rain and snow storms. As a result all roads and trails rapidly became quagmires. The ground was completely saturated with water. (23)
At the beginning of the battle the morale and combat efficiency of the 4th Infantry Division was extremely high. The fierce fanatical resistance encountered by the 4th Division was to prove that the combat efficiency and morale of the enemy was equally high. (24)
The main enemy defenses consisted of well dug in and well camouflaged individual and automatic weapons positions which had overhead shelter and were connected by communication trenches. These positions overlooked barriers composed of triple concertina barb wire and minefields containing both antitank and anti-personnel mines that were placed in front of, in, and behind the barb wire. All of the barriers were protected by high angle fire as well as small arms fire. These positions were distributed in depth throughout the forest. (25)
The only serious shortage of supplies or equipment that existed was the lack of adequate winter clothing. Overshoes (arctics) were not available in large sizes. (26) Shoe packs were not available until well after the operation was over. (27)
These shortages resulted in extreme discomfort and caused casualties from trench foot even though every effort was exerted to obtain dry socks as often as possible and to insure that the feet of each man were rubbed daily in order to restore circulation. (28)
