By Captain Robert D. Moore, Infantry

THE SITUATION OF COMPANY C ON 13 NOVEMBER

Following the completion of the relief of the 2nd Battalion the two front line companies of the 1st Battalion, Companies A and B, were near the top of a hill about 1,000 yards southeast of SCHEVENHUTTE, GERMANY. This hill rises abruptly from the floor of the valley to a height of about 240 feet. Company C, the reserve company, was in position near two rock quarries about halfway up this hill and about 200 yards in rear of Companies A and B. (See Map D)

Company C was at nearly full strength with 5 officers and approximately 165 men present for duty. A Technical Sergeant commanded the 3rd Platoon.

The morale and combat effectiveness of the company was at a high peak.

The ground in front of Company C rose abruptly for about 200 yards and then was approximately level in the direction of the advance until about 250 yards in front of the final objective of the Company a gentle slope began which, extended to the top of a small hill on which the objective was located. This entire distance, except for the firebreaks, was covered by alternate growths of large pines, small pines and hardwood trees. Immediately in rear of the company the ground sloped sharply down to the floor of a small valley. One narrow road wound up this hill to the rock quarries where Company C was located and thence to the top of the hill where the line of departure was. One tank had been able to get up this trail.

No other road existed in the zone of attack of Company C until the SCHEVENHUTTE-DUREN road was reached. Due to the lack of roads the only route of advance for vehicles was firebreaks.

The ground was saturated with water due to rain and snow ... (*)

( * Unfortunately page 12 in the orginal document is missing at this point, so there's a gap in the text .)

... of BEND to complete the plan of attack.

The plan was substantially as follows:

1. The tank destroyer platoon from positions near the line of departure would, at H-5 minutes, fire high explosive rounds at the base of the triple concertina wire. This fire would continue until H hour. (The reason for this firing was that previously a tank had been unable to break this wire, and it was hoped that shell fragments would cut some of the wire and thus make it possible for a tank to go through. The 2nd Battalion had lost a large number of men due to anti-personnel mines when they attempted to breach this wire with bangalore torpedoes.) Beginning at H hour the tank destroyers would place automatic fire on the enemy positions on both sides of the point where it was planned to breach the barrier. This fire would continue until the bulk of the company passed the barriers.
2. At H hour one medium tank was to move out and attempt to breach the barrier. If this attempt was successful then the remainder of the medium tank platoon would follow, and all would move in column straight down the left side of the firebreak. If the barrier could not be broken by tanks then the medium tanks would assist the tank destroyers in protecting the engineer squad while it breached the wire with demolitions.
3. The platoon of light tanks was to follow the medium tanks through the wire and then immediately turn to the right and move down the right side of the firebreak. (The reason for the light tanks going down the right side was that the ...

( * Unfortunately page 14 in the orginal document is missing at this point, so there's a gap in the text .)

10. ... until ordered by the Company Commander. (This was necessary since the depth of the minefield was unknown.)
11. No close support mortar or artillery fire would be available. (This was due to the trees preventing it.) Beginning at H hour the mortar platoon of Company D and the 29th Field Artillery Battalion would fire on the firebreaks leading to the company objectives. This intermittent fire would be lifted on call.
12. A Company and B Company plus one heavy machine gun platoon would initially support the attack by fire from their present positions.
13. The line of departure would be the line presently held by Companies A and B.
14. The direction of attack would be astride the firebreak leading to the northeast until the SCHEVENHUTTE-DUREN road was reached when the direction of attack would swing to the right and continue astride this road.
15. H hour would be 0900.
16. When the tanks arrived at the rock quarries extra ammunition of all types plus water and C rations would be placed on them.
17. Battalion would be responsible for widening and marking the breach in the minefield.
18. The Battalion C. P. would be in BEND.
19. The Battalion Aid Station would be at the foot of the hill in rear of the position presently occupied by Company

3. Additional litter teams would be procured.
   This plan was not completed until late at night. It was ...

( * Unfortunately page 16 in the orginal document is missing at this point, so there's a gap in the text .)

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