Siegfried Line
60th Infantry Regiment, (9th Inf. Div.)
13 Sep - 16 Oct 1944

PATCH 9TH DIVISION

60TH INFANTRY CREST

8 October 1944

The CP of the battalion had to remain in the rear area, since the route up to the forward position was constantly exposed to enemy fire and shelling.

At 0700, the enemy counterattacked between B and C companies, but by 0800, the small arms and infantry of the enemy were definitely repulsed. However, it was still impossible to move forward. The armor (which was supplemented by a platoon of TDs) was still unable to work into effective position. The enemy shelling was continuous. The enemy had established road blocks and mines towards the crossroads at Richelskaul, and the infantry could not get up to clear the path because of the heavy enemy fire. In addition, the supply routes were under fire. The battalion therefore held its position on the hill for the night.

9 October 1944

The battalion planned to attack at 0750. Mortar and artillery fire was laid down in the vicinity of Richelskaul for ten minutes, and at 0800, the actual attack began. A Company was on the right B on the left rear; and C in front. The tanks under S/Sgt Bertier came out fast from the woods on the hill and broke through to the crossroad. The attack was made with infantry on the heels of the tanks and the enemy was cut up and to a large extent destroyed before he could take steps to fight back. The buildings were shot up the crossroads and burned, and one tank was lost to enemy bazooka fire. Fifty of the enemy were killed, while seventy-five were captured. The fire and the tanks kept the infantry in their foxholes until the infantry was on top of them to dispatch them. (Note: on action of 8 October. When C Company tried to move forward it got only 100 yards. A Company moved in to the right of C, in order to protect the southwest flank of the hill against the enemy in that direction. See Capt. J. B. Moore)

The crossroad was secured by 0920, and the three companies moved into a position to hold the crossroad. C took the east flank, A was on the right, while B protecting the southwest.

Things were relatively quiet until noon, when C began to get enemy fire to its left rear. The tanks and TDs, who had held the rear of the position, were able to shoot east across open ground and up the draw (vicinity of 023323), where the enemy was emplaced.

The tanks moved up to join the companies: C having two, A having one (there being one knocked out and one disabled). The TDs and the AT platoon remained in the vicinity of the CR at Richelskaul. At the same time that the enemy fired with small arms and mortars out of the draw to the northeast, he also began to shell the positions of C and B companies. For the rest of the day , therefore, the battalion was harassed by artillery fire, while the potential thrust from the northeast was neutralized by the tank and TD fire.

10 October 1944

The battalion was ordered in the morning to attack objective B, while it was planned that the 2nd battalion turn from its position near 006325 to strike for objective C. In the meantime the 3rd bn. Was brought up an assembly area northwest of the 1st battalion, with expected mission of following the 1st battalion in its drive south in order to protect the east and northeast flank.

The battalion was ordered to jump off at 1200, after having received a ten minute artillery preparation, and to drive down the main road from Germeter to objective C (010305), in order to secure the crossroad and the high ground around it. The LD was to be the present position of the forward companies.

B Company was ordered to swing down and push through C, and to move on the main road. It was to keep a small part of its strength on the east side of the road, in order that the tanks (now four) and TDs could use the road itself, while the bulk of strength were to work down the west side of the road. A Company was to attack cross country to the right of B, while C was to hold at the rear. Up to this time ? Company had been held tight by the enemy opposition, and it could not move.

At 1150, after adjusting the artillery and mortars during the morning, the preparation began, and at 1158, the attack was launched. Meanwhile 1 company of the 3rd Bn, 60th Infantry, got one platoon to the crossroad at Richelskaul, and began to set up a defensive position facing Germeter to the northeast.

As the companies moved out, the enemy at first put up sharp resistance by means of small arms; however, this waned as the attack progressed. B Company took the first pillbox on the left of the road (019317) without difficulty, even though the enemy remained in front and the shelling continued in the area. As A company pushed off, it received heavy small arms fire from the southwest, where a large prong of the enemy resistance stuck up into the regiment’s position. However, since speed was essential in the drive south, Capt. J. B. Moore, the company commander, got permission to bypass the enemy strong point. A Company thus reached a position at 016311, with B Company astride the road to the east, when the battalion commander halted the companies in order to bring elements of the 3rd battalion in on the rear.

The attack was resumed at 1445. B Company reached a position southeast of the crossroads forming the center of the objective, while A Company held the area northwest of the CR. C Company moved to a position on the north of the objective, since there were not large numbers of enemy to the north and northwest of the battalion. This defense was organized just before dark.

In the meantime, the tanks and TDs were held up by a road block at 016309, about a mile northeast along the main road from Germeter. One tank was knocked out by a mine. The 1st platoon, C Company, 15th Engineers, under Lt. Zohrn (?) came up to remove the mines and the road block. The road was at this time receiving some mortar fire. Just before dark, the road block was cleared and the tanks and TDs moved into position behind B Company on objective C. The AT platoon however, held its position north of the road block.

The 3rd battalion moved in to the north. L Company tied in west of the main road at 018318, with K immediately to the west. I maintained a position against any attack from Germeter.

During the two hours in which the push was made, 115 prisoners were taken. Apparently the enemy had been expecting a drive east rather than south, and the surprise move caught him unprepared.

11 October 1944

During the night the enemy began to shell the area held by the 1st Bn. At daylight B Company received a strong counterattack, with lots of small arms fire. Both companies received intense large caliber mortar and artillery fire (SP and long range guns). C Company made a thrust to the southeast of the cross roads to eliminate resistance in vicinity of 013305. A Company likewise occupied itself with pillboxes, these being vicinity of 009303. The lines of communication and supply north to regiment were constantly being out, and enemy snipers from the west fired on the supply route established from the north.

L Company was therefore sent south and southwest to secure the flank of the position against the enemy in that direction.

At 1700, A Company got a heavy infantry attack from the enemy, who came in with fixed bayonets. Capt. Moore called Lt. Murrary, of the cannon company, to bring fire which was so close (on Moore’s request) that it caused slight casualties to his own men. However, the backbone of the enemy attack was broken, and the enemy dead were thick throughout the area.

In addition to the enemy counterattack, the battalion was faced with the problem of how to get armor up to the position to crack the pillboxes (particularly to the southeast) . All lanes to the position were heavily mined, and an SP gun to the southwest was firing on the area. In addition, the supply problem became acute, since the line to the forward dump was under fire. The SCR 300 radio was wet in the constant rain and would not work, and the shelling constantly broke the two telephone lines to the rear CP.

In this situation the mortars were fired as a battery, without always observation, and would cover 600 yards. Used on personnel and pillboxes. (The losses had been heavy during the periods between attacks. On the hill near Richelskaul, fifty men had gone to C Company, to raise its strength to 150 effectives. Losses again mounted after Objective C taken) The enmy had mortars on both sides of the position, and he sent patrols from the east towards the west (vicinity of 019315, where they cut road). The battalion was thus threatened constantly with being cut off, and the AT platoon along the road did a good job in holding off the enemy to the east. This platoon, with a 50 cal MG, 2 light MGs, and 1 57mm gun, received a small platoon of A company, and the two groups (both badly shot up) held the flank position.

12 October 1944

The 1st battalion held its position throughout the day. The tanks were not yet able to get up (that is, additional tanks to those which had originally came down the road). The enemy continued to throw mortar and artillery shells into the position.

13 October 1944

By 0900, the situation was more quiet than usual. It was planned to have C Company attack to the left of B towards the pillboxes in the vicinity of 013304. (Meanwhile H (?) Company had worked down the road to a position 400 yards northeast of the crossroad) One TD was left, which it was planned to use in the attack.

At 1200, the attack jumped off. C Company moved from its position north of the crossroads, southeast to the left of B Company, and across the open fields towards the pillboxes. The progress was slow, and the enemy rained in mortar and artillery fire on the area.

By 1415, it had taken the nearest pillbox (013304), and began to move on the second, some 100 yards farther southeast. C Company was without tank support now, since they were held up nearer the crossroad, and both from the pillbox and the woods to the east it got heavy cross machine gun fire. It was able to reach the second pillbox, but without any heavy weapons it could not crack it open. C Company thereupon held this position for the night, while B Company withdrew towards the crossroads, sending one platoon to outpost the position formerly held by C Company.


14 October 1944

At approximately 0500, the enemy worked up to the first pillbox, where C Company was emplaced and had men inside. The Sgt. and 6 men, when the enemy attacked, had the group dash out shooting, and escaped without casualties. Sgt. Driskoll, with his brand new replacements, worked his men back to the pillbox, but enemy fire on the open prevented them from reoccupying it.

The company then planned a new attack not to take place until armor had come up to support the effort. When the 2 tanks managed to reach the general area, only one tank was found able to attack. At 1600, therefore, C Company moved off, while B thrust in the direction of a third pillbox to the south (013303). Again the enemy cross fire prevented the infantry from reaching the pillboxes. As the two companies began to pull back, about 1730, the enemy laid into the area with such a heavy concentration of artillery and mortars, that the casualties were heavy in B and C companies. This fire lasted until 2100, and the strength of the companies by then averaged approximately one-third of the T.O.


  • Pillbox #22 covered with dirt
    at map reference 013303
    (click for larger image)

  • Trench leading towards
    pillbox #22
    (click for larger image)
HORIZONTAL FLOURISH LINE



Source: N.A.R.A. Archives

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