2 October 1944

The battalion was alerted in the morning.

In the morning a patrol from B Company, led by Lt. A. Mayo, went north to see the situation with respect to the enemy, to get to Road Bock 4 if possible, and to contact A company of the 297th Engineers. It reached the area of 0035.

However, at 1400, the battalion minus C Company was alerted, with the mission to go to Road block 4, to relieve the 297th Eng.

(Note: location of Roadblocks: 2: 005367, 3: 007365, 4: 001355, 5: 008338)

The battalion moved at 1430, until it reached the cross roads 003356, which was its point of departure for the attack. B Company led the column, with 1 platoon of Tds, and AT platoon
and was to move down the trail east towards RB 4.  A Company to probe east along the firebreak beginning at 999351.

As B company reached the cross trail, where it intended to turn east, it came under artillery and small arms fire of the enemy.

After personally checking on the situation, Chatfield ordered B Company to attack east, on the north side of the fire break (starting from 003357), while A Company (which had only probed down the parallel fire break to the south) was ordered to attack on the right side of the trail. The TDs were to moved down the trail itself. B company's mortars, and the artillery were left in their rear positions. At 1650, the attack was launched. B Company went east about 800 yards (008356), without meeting serious resistance but taking 12 to 15 prisoners. A Company then moved out, echeloned to the right rear of B Company, with the mission of cutting the road south of RB 4.

The attack was begun and maintained until enemy resistance should become serious in a column of platoons. It had been the experience of the battalion, that in thickly wooded terrain such as this, that any formation of breadth was less effective and more dangerous. The inability to know where the enemy had strong points, and the difficulties of control in such terrain, made a column attack more effective than traditional infantry methods.

As A Company moved up abreast of B, the enemy resistance grew stiffer, and the battalion found itself in a ticklish situation. Knowing the location of the engineer platoon, it could not use mortars or artillery against the enemy. However, the enemy resistance was not sufficient to stop the companies, and just before dark B Company reached the road block and A Company cut the road just south of it. B Company organized a position from 010355 northwest to 006358; A Company on the right tied its left flank into the read block, and established. its right flank at 009351.

Upon arriving at the road block, B Company found the engineer platoon intact, in its fox holes, with only one man wounded. Apparently they had not used outposts or patrols against the enemy who had therefore been able to infiltrate all around without the platoon's realizing it.

A Company had light tanks with it. They tried to push south from road block 3, but were unsuccessful.

3 October 1944

Throughout the night the position had received intermittent enemy shelling and mortar fire. The thickness of the woods in this region made much of the artillery fire burst in the trees and therefore caused greater casualties than would otherwise have been suffered.

In the morning the battalion was first ordered to patrol between road blocks 4 and 5, and to push southwest to 0135, to investigate the road net there. Shortly thereafter, however, the battalion was ordered to hold its present position and not to "pick a fight". One platoon, 1st of B Company, under Lt. Geo. J. Huemmer, did move out. It saw and hit several groups of enemy in the vicinity of 012346?, and observed enemy and minefields near 006341, but it made contact with road block 5.

When A Company pushed a patrol east towards the road net some 500 yards from its position, it received heavy enemy small arms fire and got involved in a close range fire fight, for about one hour. Both patrols had started at 0930. The A Company patrol reached 014349, a bend in the road, where it held and sent back patrols to its original position.

At 1000 the battalion was alerted, but it was informed that it might have to hold if the situation difficult. However, at 1600, it was relieved. It then moved to a new assembly area, vicinity of 999551, where it arrived about 1800.

That evening it was given a new assembly tentatively, in the vicinity of 985354, to which it was to move on order the following morning.

4 October 1944

Early in the morning, the order was received putting the battalion into divisional reserve, but at 1100 it was modified to regimental reserve. The battalion assembled in a new area, at a cross roads three miles southeast of Zweifall (975345). Plans were made for a coordinated a attack by the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 60th Infantry, and elements of the 39th Infantry. The 1st battalion was instructed to reconnoiter for a new assembly area approximately two miles farther south (990327).

The original plan of attack included the following mission for the 1st Bn: It was to follow in the right rear of the attacking battalions (2nd on the left and 3rd on the right), as they struck east. After the 2nd Bn had taken objective A south of Germeter (019324), the 1st Bn was to move to vicinity of 005320, and then prepare to turn south to capture objective C (the crossroad at 005310).

Air and artillery preparations were arranged for the attack. The battalion was informed that the operation would begin the following day if weather conditions permitted.

5 October 1944

At 0700, the battalion moved on order to the assembly area selected the day before (990327), closing in at 0830. The air support, schedules for that time was postponed to 0930 and then at 1030, at which time it was called off. Between 1430 and 1500, 18 109s of the enemy came over the area; six were shot down. The battalion received no shelling for a change.

6 October 1944

At 0730, the battalion was informed that the air preparations would begin at 0930, but it was again postponed for almost an hour. At 1020, however, the planes arrived and worked over the area in front of the attack until shortly at 1100. At 1115, the battalion was informed that the artillery would commence firing at 1120. The artillery fire a five minute preparation, then waited for three minutes, and again fire for two minutes. At 1130, the attack of the 2nd and 3rd battalion, 60th Infantry, began.

The 2nd Battalion, on whose action the plans of the 1st depended met heavy opposition about 500 yards after it jumped off (vicinity of 993330). Enemy artillery of all caliber, very heavy mortar, and strong small arms fire held up the 2nd Battalion at this point. The 1st continued to follow as planned.

About 1300, however, the 1st battalion was ordered to push around to the right and attack south of the 2nd Battalion. Its point of departure was designated at 994328, and in preparing for the attack it moved down the fire break to 999325. A company led, followed by E and then C, while one platoon of B Company was put out as flank protection on the south. As A Company worked towards the point of departure, it received heavy small arms fire and mortar fire from the front and right front; it therefore began to probe the situation, between 1400 and 1410. By 1450, the leading elements of A Company reached 001324, and were receiving artillery and mortar fire. B and C companies to the rear were likewise coming under enemy fire.

At 1520, the 2nd battalion received a counterattack from the enemy. Chatfield returned to regimental CP, and at 1600 returned with a change in plans. The battalion was ordered to disengage from the enemy, to return to the north, and south fire-break at approximately 995325, and move north to the main road (vicinity of 998348). From there it was to turn east and southeast to work its way to the vicinity of 000340, where it would contact elements of the 39th, to determine a final assembly area. The final area turned out to be three hundred yards southeast of that point, in the vicinity of 220339 (no good). The battalion was to prepared to launch an attack to the east the following morning at daylight, with a line of departure near 011327. The objective was objective A, near Germeter, the road junction at Richelskaul (019324). The 2nd Battalion was to support with fire the 1st Battalion, and the attack was to be preceded by a ten minute artillery preparation.

At 1630, C and B companies began to move back, while A Company was slower in the withdrawal, since it had close contact with the enemy. By 1900, however, the entire battalion got to its new assembly area and all was quiet until 2300, when the enemy began to shell the position with his artillery.

7 October 1944

At 0630, the battalion started to move up to the line of departure in a column of company, C, B, A respectively. The Germans continued to shell the area, and in the approach march eight were killed and twelve wounded. At 0750, however, friendly artillery began to shell the enemy in the vicinity of Objective A, which lessened the enemy pressure on the battalion. (LD at 012327)

At 0800, C company attacked in a column of platoons. It crossed the Weisser Wehe valley and started up to the high ground beyond (017324), when it hit a pillbox not on the map. Two of the enemy came out easily, but the rest would not surrender, and so some men were left there to clean it up, while the rest of C company worked up to the crest of the hill. As the battalion deployed in its attack on the hill, C company was moved to the southeast side, while B company took the northeast side, and A remained in the rear. The plan was to hold the hilltop until the armor could be brought up. This initial objective was reached without unusually difficulty at 0930. The rest of the day, as far as the infantry was concerned, was spend in consolidating the position on the hill, while the elements of B company in the valley reduced the pillbox.

Apparently in this pillbox (013328) the enemy had phone connections with the rear, for it directed artillery fire on to the locations of the American troops. When the tanks attempted to work their way along the same axis of advance as used by the infantry, they were heard by the enemy and artillery and mortar fire came down upon them. The tanks were also held up by a road block alone the trail (vicinity of 011326). Finally the tanks retraced their route, turned north into the sector of the 39th Infantry, and after crossing the stream vicinity of 013334, came down to the infantry position on the hill by dark. It was then too late to launch a further attack that day.

(Note: In order to blow the pillbox, it required three attempts, using TNT up to 550 pounds. The first two blasts apparently did little damage, but the second, which was dug into the ground some six feet beside the pillbox, blew the box up. Five prisoners and one dead enemy were removed from the box; the prisoners were unconscious when found)

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