By Captain Francis D. Linse

ACTION 25 NOVEMBER 1944

High hopes were had for this armored attack. The tankers were very confident and their commanding officer made the statement to Major Hogan that they would be in Hurtgen by 0900 hours.

About 0700 hours the troops of Company I were able to hear the tanks moving along the road toward the neck of the woods. Either the tankers had not been told or else they were taking no chances. The tanks were moving very slowly with all machine guns firing. Elements of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion which were to assist in the attack were moving along through the woods on the east side of the road, keeping abreast of the tanks. Some of their men had walked into the mined wire along the rear of I Company's position before they were aware of the danger. 40

The first tank had almost reached the crater before it was knocked out by antitank fire coming from a gun positioned near the edge of Hurtgen. The next tank bypassed the disabled tank and made an attempt to continue the attack. It too was knocked out in short order. In a matter of a few minutes four tanks were lost and the assault was stopped cold. The tanks shortly thereafter withdrew back up into the woods. 41

The armored infantry accompanying the tanks was not able to accomplish anything. The mined wire had stopped their forward advance and a column of their troops reached back to their I Company Command Post. These men were digging in and apparently were not aware of the danger from artillery that they were exposed to. This situation was quickly brought to the attention of the officers leading these troops. Shortly afterwards they withdrew entirely from our area. An armored combat command had failed to break out of the woods and take Hurtgen. 42

For the rest of that day the enemy artillery was more active than usual. Apparently the Germans thought the tanks had only withdrawn temporarily and were going to try another attack. As a result, in addition to the Company I position, a great volume of fire was placed on the road itself. This fire was maintained for the rest of the day until dusk. Then, as was typical, the fire let up and it quieted down.

ACTION 26 NOVEMBER 1944

Nothing of any consequence happened the night off 25-26 November. By now it had stopped raining. The next morning Captain Melton issued the order for all weapons to be cleaned and checked. In the past six days, due to the rain and mud, the weapons had been badly neglected. The order was also issued to check ammunition and other equipment and to be ready to move on short notice. At this time no definite orders to move had been received. However, the situation throughout the regimental sector looked very good and it was apparent that before long something was going to happen.

The afternoon Company K moved in on the left and Company I had to give way to the right a little to make room for them. While this consolidation and digging in was going on Major Hogan assembled the commanders of Companies I and K and issued the order for an attack to take place next morning. Company I followed by Company K was to attack at 0630 hours to the east from its present position. It was to guide on the draw running generally to the southeast and to secure the wooded area immediately south east of the town of Hurtgen. For this action Captain Melton decided to attack in a column of platoons. 2nd platoon, led by Lt. Hatcher, was to lead the attack, followed by the 3rd and 1st Platoons. Company K was to follow Company I and to keep contact with the rear elements. Patrols had been active in this area and Captain Melton expected to be able to move for at least 200 yards before meeting any resistance. 43

Often dark extra ammunition and water were brought up to the company and the final plans for the attack the next morning were gone over. The morale of the men was very high. To get out of that position was what everyone had been waiting for and when the order was given for the attack every man was ready to go.

The destroyed church of Hurtgen

ACTION 27 NOVEMBER 1944

The weather the next morning was clear and cold with no early morning fog, which usually could be expected in the woods at that time of year.

The attack jumped off on time and progress was very rapid. No opposition was encountered for the first 300 yards. Lt. Hatcher on a patrol the day before found a gap in the minefield to the east. It was through this gap that he lead the attack. Just before reaching the draw, the leading platoon came upon a small group of enemy who seemed to be outposting that vicinity. They had little will to fight and after a few bursts of fire from a Tommy gun surrendered very quickly. After that, the company moved rapidly along the edge of the draw and by 0900 was on its objective. 44

All units of the 121st Infantry were now in position for the final assault on Hurtgen. The 2nd Battalion and Company C of the 13th Infantry had reached the edge of the town from the northeast. On the afternoon of 27 November the 1st Battalion made an attack through the newly won position of the 3rd Battalion and succeeded in reaching the edge of the town. It was not until noon of the 28th of November that Hurtgen was finally cleared and all enemy resistance had been wiped out. 45

The 3rd Battalion remained in the woods along the draw to the south and southeast of Hurtgen with the mission of clearing out the remaining enemy and with an additional mission of outposting this area against possible reoccupation by the enemy.

After continuous attacks by 8th Division since 21 November the town of Hurtgen had been captured and the first phase of the mission assigned to the division had been successfully completed. 46

This farmhouse on the main road through Hürtgen,
served as shelter for the HQ CO. of the 121st Infantry Regiment/8th ID.
It became known as the "Hürtgen Hotel."

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