21-27 NOVEMBER 1944 (RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)
By Captain Francis D. Linse
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
After a study of this operation, it is my opinion that Company I should be commended very highly for the way they carried out their mission. The key to the success of the whole plan for the capture of Hurtgen late in the capture of the narrow neck of woods astride the main GERMETER Road. By controlling this road, the Germans were able to prohibit the use of armor in any attempts to capture Hurtgen. Other units, mainly the 12th Infantry, 4th Division, had paid heavily in men and material in their efforts to capture this position. The constant pounding of this position with artillery by the enemy is ample proof that he too considered this approach very important. Although he was unable to dislodge Company I by counterattack and re-occupy the position, by ever increasing amounts of artillery fire, the enemy made every attempt to deny this route of approach to the attacking forces.
As a whole, the action for the first six days showed a definite lack of knowledge by our troops of the technique of fighting in woods. Especially was this through in regard to control, communication, and evacuation. In this respect, perhaps the Division was too hasty in rushing the 121st Infantry into this attack. It seems that if the attack had been delayed a few days the officers would have been able to contact the units which they were to relieve. By learning of their problems, definite steps could have been taken to remedy them. Thorough briefing, too, of the men might have been very helpful. To my knowledge, no information regarding the coming attack was given to the soldiers until just prior to the attack. As further evidence of these deficiencies, the enemy had this to say of the fighting of the American troops: by the 183rd V.G. Division - "In combat in wooded areas the American showed himself completely unfit."
The 3rd Battalion plan for carrying out the mission assigned to it by regiment was sound. However, a more timely exploitation of the successes of Company I might have been used to great advantage. Company L, on the left, had made constant attacks against a heavily mined area with little success. Had Company L and Company K been used in an attack to the east on 22 November through Company I's position, the whole wooded area from the road to the draw south of Hurtgen might have been taken. When this attack was finally made on 27th November, little resistance was encountered and Company I was on its objective in a few hours.
C C "R" 5th Armored Division failed badly in their attempt to break out of the woods along the GERMETER-HURTGEN Road. This was due mainly to their failure to use their mobility and shock action. Long before the edge of the woods was reached, the tanks were firing their machine guns and any chance for surprise was lost. The movement, too, of the tanks was very slow, approximately two or three miles per hour. This firing was unnecessary, as the road was cleared of all enemy along its sides. If the tanks had been rolling when they broke out of the woods, their momentum might have carried them beyond the bend in the road. After rounding this bend, being a frontal target, the tanks would have been less vulnerable to antitank fire. A fear of enemy infantry in the woods along the road seemed to be their main concern.
Communications too failed badly in this attack, and no workable solution for keeping wire in was found. To start with, in addition to the radios, the plan called for a wire team to lay wire following the attacking platoon. This plan had worked satisfactorily in the past and at the beginning of the action. No reasons were apparent that it would not work in this case. Sound power wire, W120, was used, which was very easily cut by the artillery fire. No doubt had arrangements for a heavier wire been made, the communication would probably have been much better. It is questionable, however, whether this heavy wire would have been the answer to the problem. In the end, radios were relied upon entirely for all communications, the 300 radio being the most dependable. Arrangements for additional 300 radios within the company in my opinion would have been the best solution to this problem.
Thomas W. Gilgore a soldier in the 121st Infantry Regiment,
shows the strain of his time in the Hürtgen during a brief lull,
Germany. December 5, 1944.
Source: National Archives (111-SC-196969)
Evacuation was only possible by hand carry, a condition when casualties are heavy which taxes the medical facilities of a regiment to the maximum. This burden was additionally increased by the fact that all three battalions of the regiment were engaged at the same time, and all suffered heavy losses. After the first day, also is in company aid men created another problem in addition to the one of evacuation. Austin periods of heavy shelling, it was impossible for a few men to attend to all the casualties at once. In one specific case, a man whose leg had been severed just above the knee by a large piece of shrapnel, died from loss of blood before medical aid could reach him.
To sum up this action, Company I did reach its objective in the initial attack. The aggressiveness of the officers and men was the prime factor that made this possible. Had the enemy known of the attack, and been able to occupy his positions, it is questionable that any force of less than a battalion could have taken that objective. In reality, this was the beginning of the end for the German forces attempting to hold Hurtgen. This foothold in the edge of the woods was later extended to place our troops in a ring around the town, and to make the fall of Hurtgen only a matter of time. Losses to the enemy are not definitely known although twenty were killed and approximately 50 were taken prisoners. Casualties to Company I for this period were approximately 140 killed and wounded, to the heavy machine-gun platoon 23 men either killed or wounded. 46 47
