Operations in the Hurtgen Forest
By Captain Kenneth A Peters
The Brandenberg Attack
Two more objectives, two more villages, were to be the next objectives for the task force of Lt. Col. Hamberg. Brandenberg and Bergstein were situated on a narrow ridge flanked on either side by woods.
The dominating terrain to the east and north of Bergstein were to remain in control of the enemy after the armor's final objective had been taken. The 10th Tank Battalion would again lead the attack down the only possible avenue of approach, the Kleinhau-Brandenberg road. The 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, would remain in CCR reserve in their assembly position at Germeter prepared to assist in the seizure of Brandenberg or to assist in the defense of that village. CCR received the 56th Field Artillery Battalion and a battalion of 155mm guns to reinforce the direct support fires of the 95th Field Artillery Battalion. D Company, 10th tank Battalion was to protect the flanks of Task Farce Hamberg. The 22d Engineers mission was to sweep the road for mine fields.
Progress was slow during the morning; anti-tank fire from Brandenberg and Kommerscheidt dispersed the lead elements forcing the tanks to deploy. Mine fields were encountered in the open fields on either side between the road and the woods. These mine fields were covered by machine gun and other small arms fire that prevented the removal of the mines. A break in the weather permitted the forward air controller to contact and direct two flights of P47's to strafe and bomb the adjacent woods and Brandenberg.
The situation became inactive. A Company, who had lost 4 tanks to mines and anti-tank fire, reorganized, turning their gains over to D Company, which had also lost 4 tanks.
It was then decided by Colonel Anderson to hold the gains and clear a path through the mine field during the night and continue the attack on Brandenberg the following morning. D Company held the forward positions during the night 2-3 December while C Company, 22d Engineers, breached the mine field removing 250 wooden boxed mines.
The married C Companies attacking at 0800 the following day, with the support of fighter aircraft, were on the objective 3 hours later.
The Vossenack Attack
The Vossenack area, in the zone of the 28th Infantry Regiment, had not been taken; at 1200, 3 December, the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion was attached. This area was heavily mined, with the major resistance consisting of a fire trench, located in a rubble pile east of Vossenack. It was planned to smoke the west and north portion of the village with assault guns and mortars of the battalion to conceal the movement while the lead tank, a newly attached "flail tank" using a swinging chain principle to detonate mines, opened a gap in the mine field. It eventually hit a mine and was disabled. Three attacks were launched; one, in the afternoon which had made little progress; the second, an unsuccessful night attack; and the third, on the following morning that was successful.
The failure to seize the objective initially was due to the piecemeal employment of the understrength tank-infantry companies. A thought to be well remembered is that in the attack of an objective, a sufficiently large force should be employed. It this doctrine is adhered to, an objective can be taken with maximum fire support and speedy, with a minimum loss of personnel and equipment.
Plans were then made to attack south and east from Vossenack to mop up resistance with the remaining 4 tanks left in B Company. The infantry of B Company, 47th Armored Infantry Battalion was to accompany two tanks; the infantry of C Company, 28th Infantry Regiment riding the other two tasks. This attack never materialized as the company from the 28th Infantry Regiment could not be rallied and organized to ride the tanks in the attack. At 1600, the same day, Task Force Boyer was relieved from attachment to the 28th Infantry Regiment and reverted to CCR control. Boyer was then alerted to move to Brandenberg and attack, on order, with Hamberg against Bergstein.
