Operations in the Hurtgen Forest
By Captain Kenneth A Peters
The Hurtgen Attack
During the night 24-25 November, the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion married formation, moved from the assembly area at Roetgen on order of the Commanding General, 8th Infantry Division, to the attack positions. The impenetrable woods and narrow roads canalized the lead tanks of B Company down the main axis of approach, the Germeter-Hurtgen road. The lead tank came upon a large unpassable crater in the road. This crater had been previously reported as bridged, with treadway bridge, by the 8th Infantry Division. There being no other passage of this obstacle, engineers of CCR began spanning construction of the crater which were completed at 1000 hours, two and one half hours after the ordered time of attack. The lead tank starting to push forward struck a mine, the tank was then demolished by anti-tank fire, again blocking the road. While B Company tanks were attempting to progress, the infantry of B Company moved forward to the line of departure under the continual smoke screen placed on the southern part of Hurtgen. The area to the line of departure had not been cleared as reported. This company was soon to experience the bloodiest set-back it had encountered to this time. Owing to a relatively stable situation for several weeks prior to this attack, the enemy had had ample opportunity to prepare his defenses. A large number of SCHU mines in the forested area and HOLTZ mines along the roads and in the open fields had been prepared.
Artillery preparation, fire trenches, and gun emplacements were among the defensive measures assumed by the Germans. Tree bursts from artillery and mortar fire, and numerous anti-personnel mines reduced the combat efficiency of B Company well over fifty percent. The tanks unable to move because of the blocked road, mine fields, and direct antitank fire, compelled the Commander of CCR to withdraw the tank elements until passage could be accomplished. The infantry of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion was immediately regrouped for a concerted attack, with tank support, to seize the initial objective, Hurtgen. This attack jumped off at 1430 hours with little progress attained. The superior firepower of the enemy and his defensive organization had proved too strong; the element of surprise was lost.
The first defeat for CCR was acknowledge. It's proud and cocky infantry was to reassemble in Roetgen to rest, reorganize, regroup, and to lick their wounds.
The reason for the failure of CCR to take Hürtgen was the premature employment of the command. The line of departure had not been cleared to the edge of the woods to permit the passage of the infantry, as reported. The only possible avenue of approach for tanks had not been cleared, nor the crater bridged, as reported. This necessitated the forward elements of CCR to battle for the line of departure under the most disadvantageous conditions. It must be borne in mind that the surprise element, so necessary, was lost.
From 26 to 28 November, CCR, now regrouped as before, prepared plans for operations against Kleinhau. The CCR engineers in conjunction with divisional engineers of the 8th Infantry Division, filled the crater, cleared the road and mine field. The 121st Infantry Regiment had succeeded in taking Hürtgen.
The original plan of Task Force Hamberg, 10th tank Battalion, to seize and hold Kleinhau was put into effect at 0806, 29 November. The 47th Armored Infantry Battalion was in CCR reserve. It was planned that the 1st Battalion of the 13th Infantry Regiment would relieve Hamberg at Kleinhau upon its consolidation. The married C Companies led the attack, following an artillery preparation, with the 3d platoon forming a base of fire; the 2d platoon marching on the objective; and the 1st platoon attempting to flank the village from the west by moving cross country. The 1st platoon soon became bogged down on terrain that had been cultivated with in the previous growing season and due to continual and heavy rainfall, was too soft to insure good support for tank maneuver. Infantry on foot, accompanying the tanks, had difficulty keeping abreast because of the accurate well observed artillery fire the Germans were laying down on the attacking echelons. After one hour's fighting, the 2d platoon reported taking the objective, but without their married partner, the platoon of infantry.
this endangered the tanks to some extent as enemy bazooka men were still to be flushed out of the buildings. Shortly after, the C Company infantry and the remaining tanks were in the village consolidating their positions and mopping up. Direct fire was being received from Grosshau, and it had been reported that two panzer regiments were snoring south towards Grosshau. Artillery was requested which temporarily halted the enemy fire allowing the infantry to operate more efficiently in their mopping up operations. White phosphorous and fragmentation grenades were used to flush the enemy from his concealed positions.
Task Force Hamberg occupied defensive positions to the north and to the east of Kleinhau. The anticipated armor threat from the north required mine laying and the attachment of C Company, 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion. As planned, the 13th Infantry Regiment relieved most of the 10th tank Battalion on the night 29-30 November.
Rallying positions for the task force had been selected earlier in the day in the woods west of Kleinhau by the CCR Commander, Colonel Glen H. Anderson. This plan was refused by V Corps orders, forcing the 10th Tank Battalion to rally in the open fields west of Kleinhau, there to spend the entire day of 30 November in this position under intense enemy mortar and artillery fire and direct fire weapons.
It is interesting to note at this phase of the attack the attitude of the German defense. Elements of two infantry divisions were holding the line with the normal attachments of engineers, grenadiers, anti-tank battalions, artillery and mortar batteries. Prisoners of war reported that these elements were about one third normal strength. It was assumed that not more than one regiment faced CCR during this assault. The enemy was exceedingly stubborn and reluctant to relinquish any ground as evidenced by a captured field order for the defense of Kleinhau, which read, "hold Kleinhau at all cost." The lack of aggressiveness, contrary to his usual custom, was apparent because of the failure to counterattack after forcing to give ground so bitterly defended. The German self-propelled guns were used purely in a defense role and not as a counterattacking instrument.
This most adequate defense, manned by a limited number of personnel, can bee attributed to the clever use of obstacles, in which sufficient preparatory time had been made available, and also to the most effective mortar and artillery support.
