By Major William B. Sullivan, Infantry

THE EFFECT (DETAILED)

The Hurtgen Forest was considered by the enemy to be an obstacle. It covers an area about fifty square miles and stretches from the vicinity of Aachen on the north to Monschau on the south, to Düren on the east. (Map 1) It is not a virgin forest. Patches were planted at different times. The newer patches were planted irregularly and were thick with trees averageing from ten to fifty feet in height. Trees in the older patches were for the most part, planted in regular rows and averaged in height from seventy five to one hundred feet. Visibility within the forest at mid day was not good; at night it was impossible due to the utter darkness. The troops were untrained in special measures of control, so, no night operations were attempted. The Germans made free use of anti personnel mines which were very difficult to pick up because the ground was covered with pine needles. 23 Anti tank mines were unnecessary except on the roads or the fire breaks which were interspersed throughout the forest at about two hundred yards intervals. The intervals between the trees were such that armor could not operate through them, but was confined to the passable fire breaks or the roads, both of which were few and far between. Conditions in the interior were such as to cause opposing forces to come within fifty yards of each other before either could discern a target at which to shoot. Main defenses of the Siegfried line ran through here and consisted for the most part of twelve to fourteen pillboxes placed at strategic avenues of approach. Initially the Germans defended in strongly manned pillboxes. Later most of the defending forces defended from positions outside the boxes. The weather in September was cold, requiring heavy clothing be worn at all times, especially at night. 24

On September 19 the 3d Battalion set up a defensive screen commanding all the important road junctions to the north of Zweifall. (See Map 2) The 1st Battalion arrived in darkness on the same date at a position three miles east of Zweifall and some five thousand yards removed from the third. From this position the 1st Battalion was to attack along the road toward Jagerhaus, swing around to the left and eventually capture Germeter thereby gaining possession of the road network which was vital to the enemy as a means of supply. 25 The attack began on the 20th but was only moderately successful in that it gained about seven hundred yards. It appeared from the action this day and from other attacks that the enemy line through the forest was spread thin, but that when a threat came enemy strength built up quickly in front of the attackers. It further appeared that, once in the forest, a separate force, as the 1st Battalion, could meet resistance by moving in nearly any direction. At any rate, on the 21st of September the attack was less successful, gaining only about five hundred yards, and on the 22d, after a very short gain, the battalion was hit by a strong counterattack which split the battalion in half, isolating Company A on the right, and was finally stopped by elements of Headquarters Company. 26

It is believed that the enemy was unaware of the tactical situation they had effected because they allowed time for the battalion to recover Company A and reorganize. In a somewhat surprised condition, the battalion attacked again on the 23d, regained the ground lost, and captured three pillboxes, but on the night of the 23d the enemy counterattacked using tanks up the fire breaks, and recaptured the pillboxes. It became evident at this time that the 1st Battalion was not going to clean out the forest by itself.

Because of the difficulty or impossibility of getting armor to the desired place it could not be used. A battalion of Field Artillery was available for support but could only be fired three hundred yards ahead of friendly troops because of tree bursts, whereas the enemy was usually only fifty yards away.

A reorganization of the battalion on the 24th showed that the average strength of the rifle companies was less than fifty. After turning over its sector to a combat Engineer Battalion, the 3d Battalion was brought down from the north, it being prudent to judge from the information on hand that there was no further need for them there. Its mission, however, was still a defensive one. It was to hold the left flank of the 1st Battalion (See Map 2) who then could direct more of its effort to the enemy in front. With this safe guard and an added stimulus of twelve officer replacements, which had now started coming again, and eighty enlisted men, 27 the 1st Battalion renewed the attack on the 24th but enemy armor and automatic small arm weapons stopped it after a gain of two hundred yards. The stimulus and the safe guard together were not enough to push this battalion through, and it again became obvious that something else had to be done.

By way of trying something new, the 1st Battalion of the 39th Infantry (another regiment of the 9th Division) was brought in on the 25th on the right of the first (See Map 2) and on the 26th this battalion and the 3d Battalion of the 60th attacked south. (Map 2 ) This operation cut the 1st Battalion, 60th Infantry out of the action and continued on to finally reach Jagerhaus, whereafter the 1st Battalion of the 39th returned to its unit. The 1st Battalion then withdrew a short distance and took up a defensive position facing east.

On the 26th the 3d Battalion took up where the 1st left off, and got about the same results. Two attempts at gaining ground to the southeast netted very minor success and it began to look like any further piecemeal attempts would only produce a repetition of what had gone before.

The next attack was to be in stronger force, supported by Artillery, Armor and Air. From the 27th of September to the 5th of October the Hurtgen Forest front was stabilised except for extensive patrolling on both sides. During this period, however, the 1st Battalion was not allowed to grow stagnant. On the 1st of October it was dispatched north to the original site of the 3d Battalion to help the 298th engineer Combat Battalion which had been occupying a widely spread defensive position, and which, as a result of a sudden enemy attack, had lost some ground. On the 2d this battalion retook the lost ground, reestablished the original positions, and returned to its reserve position in the forest. The 3d and 4th of October were used in preparing for an attack on the 5th. The 2d Battalion arrived in position shown on map 3 on the night of the 4th.

Now, for the first time since 19 September the entire regiment was assembled as one unit in the forest which had become very distasteful for most of the organization. None the less it seemed heartening to all to see the 2d Battalion returned. It was now the strongest battalion, being about seventy five per cent full strength. 28 It was almost completely new and devoid of combat experience except for what very little it had gained in its passive defense of Monschau. The other two battalions were considerably reduced in size being only about fifty per cent of full strength. The second, being the strongest, was to be the spearhead of the attack which was planned for 5 October. The battalions lined up for battle as shown on Map 3. The second was to lead, attacking southeast , objective; control of the road network 3500 yards SW of Germeter. (See Map 3) The first was to follow to the right rear, mopping up. The third was to temporarily protect the right of the regiment from its positions around Jagerhaus. The whole attack was to be proceeded by an air strike on the enemy positions by fighter bombers. The strike was originally scheduled to begin at 0800 5 October but inclement weather caused a postponement so the attack postponed also.

On 6 October at 1000 hours the strike materialized, and right on its heels the 2d Battalion jumped off with Company G on the right, F on the left, and K disposed to the left rear to protect the left flank, there being some two thousand yards distance between the left flank of the battalion and the nearest friendly unit. Despite the fact that the personnel of the battalion were surprized at the peculiarities of the forest, amazed at the actions of the enemy, and confused by combat in general, they managed to advance as a unit five hundred yards against resistance on the first day changing direction slightly so that they were facing south at day end.

Artillery, which was active on both sides, was very effective because of the fact that it was nearly all tree bursts. It was very seldom that a shell burst on the ground.

Three tanks were available for use by the assault battalion but were not used because there was no way to get them up to where they could be employed. There was a possible road which formed the left boundary, after the first day (See Map 3) but before it could bo used it had to be cleared of booby trap tank obstacles which were defended by small arms from the other side of the road. The advance of the battalion had put in its possession a passable firebreak (See Map 3) which ran parallel to the front. The only possible effective use of the tanks was to get them up this avenue from which they could poke into the trees far enough to get a shot at the enemy positions.

On the night of 6 October the 2d Battalion reported that they heard much tree chopping within the enemy positions. The morning of the 7th, when they re-instituted the attack they discovered that the enemy had dug in deeply and covered their foxholes with logs. Artillery tree bursts failed to be effective against this type of emplacement, and artillery advantage now swung over to the enemy.

Af ter two successive attempts to move forward on the 7th, the battalion commander employed E Company in a flanking move around the left flank. The maneuver succeeded in completely uncovering F Company (See Map 3) but, further movement was definitely stopped, and positions remained as shown on map for the rest of the day.

On the 8th, F Company moved from its uncovered position, around the line to the right flank to make an attack. This attack failed to gain any ground. To eject the enemy its log covered fighting positions a large calibre direct fire weapon was needed. The battalion commander realized this and on the 6th took measures to get his three tanks into position where they could bring effective fire on the emplacements. He dispatched the three tanks accompanied by a platoon of engineers and a platoon of infantrymen down the left flank road with the mission of deploying in the front line firebreak and assisting the attack by fire. This party had to capture the two road blocks, dismantle them, and generally fight every inch of the way. They arrived in the firebreak late morning of the 8th. The 2d Battalion then reorganized and made fresh plans for the attack. 29

When the 2d Battalion had reached the limit of its advance on the 6th of October the 1st Battalion attempted to move forward believing that such a move would relieve some of the pressure so that the second could continue its advance. Several such attempts were made but no ground whatsoever was gained. The night of 6-7 October the 1st Battalion swung around behind the second and at daylight on the 7th attacked in a new direction toward Germeter. (See Map 4) A combination of surprise and tremendous drive netted the battalion one thousand yards on the first day of the attack. Having gained this momentum, it continued on the 8th and 9th cutting the road south from Germeter. On the 10th, the 1st Battalion did a complete right face, and again, catching the enemy unprepared, made another blasting drive in the new direction for 2500 yards finally capturing the road junction shown on map 4.

On the 11th the 2d Battalion, supported by armor, began its drive. Since artillery was not effective on the enemy prepared positions, the battalion commander had it lifted so that it covered the enemy line of retreat some five hundred yards to the rear. The attack was successful in dislodging the enemy who then suffered heavy casualties passing through the artillery concentrations. This attack was finally stopped at the original objective on the 14th. (See Map 4) 30

Throughout all this action the 3d Battalion defended the vital road network which emanated from Jagerhaus. This network was important to the enemy as a route of communication and supply. Its importance was impressed on all concerned by the fact that orders pertaining to it came from First Army.

The road junction twenty five hundred yards southwest of Germeter now held by the 1st Battalion was also important to the enemy for the same reasons. The viciousness with which the enemy tried to got it back attested to the fact that it hurt them to have it in our hands. In order to secure this road junction more definitely the 1st Battalion was ordered to advance about two hundred yards into the clearing, (Map 4) the near side of which formed the front line, and take a series of four pillboxes which commanded the roads. On the 11th, the battalion, supported by three tank destroyers and three tanks advanced into the clearing. The plan was for the tanks and Infantry to gain fire superiority over the enemy while the tank destroyers drove up to the enemy embrasures and at point blank range fired into them. When the troops moved out into the open, enemy automatic small arms fire became very heavy and the men were pinned down until dark. The first tank which advanced into the clearing was hit, knocked out, later captured and taken off by the enemy. The attack failed to gain any ground. The captured tank was later seen in running order firing back at our lines. 31

On October 13 another attack was launched on the same positions. At this time there was one tank destroyer and two tanks available to make the attack, the other vehicles having been made inoperative by enemy action. At the time the attack was to begin it was discovered that one of the tanks would not start. This tank blocked the only opening into the clearing through which the tracked vehicles could enter, so the attack went on without the armor. Surprisingly enough this attack came nearer success than the previous one. The company commander of C Company with two of his men got up to and on one of the pillboxes and was trying in every way he could think of to gain entrance or to make the occupants surrender. The box remained completely buttoned up while fire from enemy outside continued unabated. The battalion had to withdraw to its original positions after suffering severe losses. 29

On the 14th and 15th of October there was no action. In fact, except for minor skirmishes, there was no further offensive action for the 60th Infantry in the Hurtgen Forest. On the 16th of October the 3d Battalion took over the 1st Battalion's sector and the first moved into reserve. This state of affairs existed until the 21st when the 1st Battalion was made part of a task force which occupied the original 3d Battalion screening sites to the north. (See Map 2) On the 27th, the 60th Infantry was relieved by elements of the 28th Division. "The 9th Division had been in the line for some time and needed rest and rehabilitation."

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