THE OPERATIONS OF THE 60TH INFANTRY - 9th Inf. Div.
HURTGEN FOREST, GERMANY, SEPTEMBER - OCTOBER 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)

By Major William B. Sullivan, Infantry

PATCH 60th INFANTRY

INTRODUCTION

The Effect (General)

This monograph covers the operation of the 60th Infantry, 9th Division, First United States Army, during its combat in the Hurtgen Forest, Germany, September - October 1944. There is nothing singular about the effect on the 60th Infantry of problems which were brought about chiefly by the nature of the forest itself. Other units operating in the forest during different periods, encountered the same problems, and reacted in much the same way. I believe, however, that each unit had problems which were the result of its own individual set of circumstances. This was the case with the 60th, and the circumstances were such as to directly affect the outcome of the combat. These events will be discussed preparatory to, and in connection with the discussion of the operations.

On the 19th of September 1944, the 60th Infantry entered the Hurtgen Forest 1 with the mission of attacking through the forest and seizing the Schmidt-Steckenborn area, the final goal being control of the Roer Dams. 2 On the 27th of October the 60th Infantry left the Hurtgen Forest, 3 greatly reduced in strength, 4 mission unaccomplished, 5 and proceeded to Camp Elsenborn, Belgium for a rest. Concerning this operation, the Germans, in their publication by the 183d Volks Grenadier Division, delivered themselves of this comment: "In combat in wooded area the American showed himself completely unfit." 6 V Corps, under whom the 9th Division was operating at the time of their relief, explained their need for relief rather briefly as follows: "The 9th Division had been in the line for sometime and needed rest and rehabilitation." 7 Obviously there is more to the situation than can be gleaned from either of these statements, however true they may be. They do, in some respect, summarize the effect. They offer nothing of the cause and none of the details of the effect. I plan, now, to present these in turn. To do this, it is necessary to go back into the history of the unit a short way, and follow it through its succession of circumstances about which I have, already commented.

THE CAUSE

On June 16, with rather amazing speed in the face of determined and strong enemy resistance, the 9th Division completed the isolation of the Cherbourg peninsula by cutting through from Utah beach to the opposite coast. 8 The 2d Battalion of the 60th Infantry was awarded the Distinguished unit Citation for its part in this operation, the citation reading in part: " *** the major contributing factor to the complete success of the Cherbourg Campaign." 9 The combat efficiency of the 60th was, in my opinion, as high then as it ever was or ever would be. With the same speed and effectiveness they participated in the attack to Cherbourg and in the final reduction of all organized forces on the peninsula. Apparently just as effective, they entered a concentrated portion of the line west of St Lo and prepared to assist in making the eventful breakthrough which has become famous. It was here that they suffered their first blow, however, in that some of the bombs which were delivered by an armada of 1800 10 planes on the enemy front line, fell short into the 3d Battalion area, and crippled this unit. 11 In spite of this event, the regiment participated in the attack which became successful only by dint of unrelenting effort and hard blows on the part of all concerned. Casualties were heavy during the first few days, but became noticeably lighter as the fighting got out of the hedge-row country and the armor began to roll across France. Ensuing days were featured by long moves by vehicle 12 punctuated by short rear guard actions wherein the enemy would detach minor forces to hold temporarily and gain time for their main forces to withdraw. Company strengths were at a low level as a result of casualties and the fact that the unit was moving too fast for its replacements to catch up with it. 13 This state of affairs existed up to the time the Germans crossed the Meuse River and made their first determined stand on the other side.

The 60th Infantry reached the river south of Dinant late afternoon of 4 September 1944. Desiring to give the enemy as little time as possible in which to build up a defense, it crossed the night of 5-6 September, led by the 2d Battalion. All during the day of 6 September, fighting was severe. Communications were bad and information was slow coming in, making it difficult for the regimental commander to ascertain the situation. The 2d Battalion lost heavily and was able to maintain itself on the enemy side of the river only because the 1st and 3d Battalions on either flank were more successful in driving the enemy back. It wasn't until late morning of 7 September that the fog of battle had cleared away sufficiently for the regimental commander to take stock of his regiment. He found this situation: All battalions had lost heavily; the 1st Battalion was less than forty per cent full strength; 14 of the three rifle companies, two machine gun platoons, and part of the communication platoon which the 2d Battalion had used in the attack, only twenty five men total could be accounted for. 15 The 2d Battalion ceased temporarily to be an effective fighting force, having lost all its experienced leaders except one company commander and about four noncommisioned officers. It was deemed inadvisable at the time to further deplete the already dangerously weakened 1st and 3d Battalions by taking from then a framework of experienced leaders on which to build a new 2d Battalion. The 2d Battalion appointed leaders out of what they had left and of any likely material they found in the replacements which came to them. 16 The replacement stream for nearly the whole division sat now temporarily diverted to this battalion, 17 Replacements came in bunches at irregular intervals and at odd places along the march which had now been resumed toward Germany. Most of the replacements received between the Meuse and the German border were converted from the anti aircraft artillery. 18 They all seemed to be good calibre men about whom there was nothing wrong except the fact that their training as infantry men did not seem to have been as extensive as other replacements the unit had received.

On the 9th of September, the Germans, after having fought bitterly at the Meuse, retired toward Germany, and the chase was on again. Now it was the 1st and 3d Battalion who were chasing, the 2d Battalion was only following. The key personnel of the 2d Battalion were frantically trying to form some sort of organisation out of what appeared to be chaos. The 1st and 3d Battalions were now taking all the casualties and the 2d Battalion was taking all the replacements. The rapidity of the move made training out of the question except during a three day stay at Aywaille, Belgium, where the regiment waited for supplies to catch up. On the 13th of September the regiment broke up into task forces. The task force of which the 1st Battalion was the main element, proceeded via Spa, Sourbrodt, Elsenborn- Kalterherberg to Höfen and Alzen where they were stopped short of the town.

This battalion eventually took Höfen and Alzen by a flanking maneuver after the third had arrived there. The task force of which the 3d Battalion was the main element proceeded via Verviers, Eupen, Mutzenich, Monschau, finally capturing part of Hofen. The 2d Battalion followed the Third Battalion to Monschau 19 and took over the defence of the town after the third had captured it on 15 September. The Second Battalion as part of an Infantry-Tank Destroyer task force remained at Monschau, in defensive positions until about the 4th of October. It was in actual contact with the enemy during this entire period. Training was in progress during this time but it could be only by units the size of a squad, and down, that could be taken out of the line without visibly weakening the defense. 20

The regiment less the 2d Battalion moved on to the vicinity or Zweifall (See Map 2) on the 19th of September, and from that point started its operations in the Hurtgen Forest. 21 The 2d Battalion turned over its defensive sector at Monschau to a cavalry unit and joined the rest of the regiment in the forest on 4 October. 22

I have tried to bring out up to this point the fact that the 60th Infantry started on the invasion of the continent with a well trained unit, the result of its operations in the initial stages so proving; that it was in combat almost steadily from the time it started until the time it entered the forest; that the combat, for the most part, was exacting in its drain on energy and personnel. I now wish to point out further that very few of the personnel, including leaders, who started the campaign in Normandy with the regiment, were with it when it started to clear the Hurtgen Forest in Germany. So much for the cause.

HORIZONTAL FLOURISH LINE



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