10 - 15 December 1944 - (Rhineland Campaign)
By Major John F. Staples
THE REGIMENTAL PLAN OF ATTACK
The Regiment's plan of attack was for the 2nd Battalion, with a platoon of tanks and the Anti-Tank Mine Platoon attached, to attack Gey from the edge of the woods west of the town. The attack was to jump off at 0600 on 10 December, about one hour before daylight, following a heavy artillery preparation and supported by the Heavy Weapons Companies of the 1st and 3rd Battalions. The 3rd Battalion was to occupy positions of the 2nd Battalion and be prepared to pass through Gey after its seizure and take the ridge southwest of Berzbuir and Lendersdorf. The 1st Battalion was to remain in position and block the enemy in the woods north of Gey. (59) (60)
The 2nd Battalion's plan of attack called for E and F Companies to make a direct frontal assault from the edge of the woods. E Company, on the right, to attack across the open terrain between the west and south legs, of town and seize the south and southeast portions. F Company, with a platoon of tanks attached, was to seize the west and north parts of town. G Company, was to protect the right flank of the battalion from positions along Gey Creek near the right limiting point and be prepared to attack Gey from the southwest. (61)
The 2nd Battalion jumped off at 0600, but ran into difficulty immediately. F Company got a good start and secured the first buildings on the edge of town. B Company, however, was detected before it overran the enemy outpost and heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire caught then in the open area southwest of town. The company continued forward until it raft into a barbed wire entanglement which had not been reported by patrols. Unable to advance and suffering casualties from the heavy fire the men sideslipped to the left and became intermingled with F Company. With the intermingling, both companies became disorganized and the attack bogged down except for some of the leading elements of F Company which had pushed on ahead. (62) (63)
By 1100 hours the leading elements of F Company had advanced to a point about 100 yards west of Gey Creek against very determined resistance. The Company commander, who was with this group, held up the attack because the group was considerably weakened by casualties and the remainder of the company was not following up the assault echelon. Enemy fire was increasing. Machine guns were firing on the attacking troops from positions at the northern and southern ends of town, enemy artillery fire was pouncing the western end of town and the edge of the woods with the heaviest artillery and mortar concentrations ever experienced by members of the regiment. (64) (65) (66)
In the meantime, the platoon or tanks had been trying to move up on the road leading into town from the west. The road was narrow and muddy, and after a great deal of difficulty the lead tank got to within 100 yards of the edge or town where it hit a mine. This happened in a narrow defile where it was impossible to get any other tanks around it. Efforts to get the tank out were started immediately, but because of the difficulty of working in the restricted area under enemy artillery fire the road was not cleared until after dark that night. (67) (68) (69)
It was not until 1100 that the Regimental Commander was informed of the true situation. The battalion had reported the progress of F Company hoping to be able to get F and K companies reorganized and the attack moving. The Regimental Commander immediately went forward to contact the 2nd Battalion Commander. Investigation revealed that enemy observation and fire precluded the possibility of any effective reorganization and resumption of the attack by B and F Companies. (70) (71)
Reports from the 2nd Battalion and from prisoners captured in Gey indicated that the buildings in the town had thick walls through which the enemy had blown holes for use as firing ports, and deep basements into which the enemy moved during our artillery fire. There were mines and booby traps in the yards around the houses and dug-in positions in the fields outside the town. Prisoners also reported that there was approximately a battalion in Gey and another one on the ridge about 2200 yards to the northeast, and that they had seen several anti-tank guns a short distance to the northeast of Gey. (72) (73) (74)
G Company with one platoon of tanks attached, was ordered to attack Gey along the Grosshau-Gey road. However, upon the receipt of information that Strass had been taken and a report of a large mine field on the Grosshau-Gey road, the plan was changed. One platoon of G Company plus one platoon of tanks was to move through Grosshau, Schafberg, and Strass for an attack on Gey from the southwest. Permission was obtained from the 330th Infantry for movement of this task force and it moved out on its mission. (75) (76)
Strass, however, had been erroneously reported as captured. Two companies of the 3rd Battalion, 330th Infantry, had gotten into the town but had not cleared it. The enemy had cut these units off and when the g Company task force attempted to enter the town it became engaged in a fight, knocked out two enemy tanks, and withdrew. This erroneous information had unnecessarily endangered the lives of the men involved and disrupted another attack on Gey. (77) (78)
The 2nd Battalion was ordered to continue the attack the following day. F and E Companies with one platoon of tanks were to continue the attack in the west leg of Gey, and G Company with one platoon or tank destroyers was to attack along the Grosshau-Gey road. A squad of engineers was attached to G Company to remove the mine field reported by the 330th Infantry the previous day. This mine field was about 100 yards outside the edge or the woods and was well covered by all types of fire. Smoke was to be fired on the woods north of Gey, on the ridge northeast of Gey and on Horm to block enemy observation and to cover G Company's movement, and to permit removal of the mines. (79) (80) (81)
The 2nd Battalion jumped off as scheduled, but the smoke was ineffective and when G Company came out of the woods it immediately came under enemy fire, including anti-tank gun fire which was coming from the vicinity of Horm. Heavy small arms fire was coming from a house on the south side of the road about 200 yards from the edge of the woods. (See Map D) Attempts to move the tank destroyers into positions to fire on the house were unsuccessful and G Company was stopped. (82)
In the meantime, in the western leg of the town, the tanks were again in trouble. The lead tank, when in approximately the same position where the tank had hit the mine the previous day, threw a tread; again the road into Gey was blocked. This time the road was not to be cleared until 1800 the following day. (83) (84)
The enemy continued to pound the area with artillery fire, and E and F Companies without the tanks were making little, if any, progress. B Company took over A Company's position, and at 1445 A Company jumped off from the portion of town held by the 2nd Battalion with the mission of cutting the Groshhau-Gey road about 300 yards south of the main crossroad in the town. If successful, a Company was then to clear that portion of the town to the south. The enemy opened fire as soon as the company left the protection of the buildings, but the attack was pushed and some men reached the houses. Most of the men of the two assault platoons had been caught in the open and had been hit or had taken cover and failed to go forward. Attempts to reach the Company Commander, by radio, throughout the day and night were unsuccessful. It was later discovered that the Company Commander with one officer and about 20 men had initially captured two houses, but because of numerous casualties had consolidated into one. They remained there, repulsing numerous attacks, until the town was cleared on the 13th or December. This group of men, of which more then half had been wounded, played no major part in the capture or Gey, but certainly were a hindrance to the enemy in the defense of the town. (85) (86)
By dark the 2nd Battalion reported that it had reached the main road in town. (87)
During the day I company relieved elements of the 330th Infantry south of the Grosshau-Gey road and the boundary was shifted accordingly. (See Map D) (88)
Immediately after dark, orders were issued for the 3rd Battalion to relieve the 2nd Battalion and continue the attack on 12 December. The relief was accomplished by K and L Companies; K and F Companies moved to the west end of town; G and I Companies remained in position. The 3rd Battalion reported that the 2nd Battalion had not reached the main road, but were at the west side of Gey Creek. (89) (90)
The 3rd Battalion plan was for L Company on the left of the road and K Company on the right to continue the attack toward the center of town. One platoon of tanks was to be used with these two companies if it could be moved into town. I Company with one platoon of tank destroyers and a "flail" tank, borrowed from the 5th Armored Division, was to attack along the Grosshau-Gey road. Its mission was to seize about one-third of the southern leg of the town, initially, and push on up the main road. (91) (92)
The 3rd Battalion jumped off at 0600 without an artillery preparation. Two platoons of I Company moved out, in column, on the Grosshau-Gey road, passed the mine field and the house which held up G Company, and continued on towards the objective undetected by the enemy. The "flail" tank, leading the platoon of tank destroyers, started to work on the mine field and had exploded several mines, when it was knocked out by a mine which the "flails" had missed. The two platoons of I Company continued their advance, and after completely surprising the enemy took I Company's objective after a short fight. (93)
Shortly after daylight the I Company Commander, with his command group, was just across the road from the house from which the enemy had fired on G Company. He sent two men to investigate it and as they approached they were fired on. The Company Commander sent word to T Sgt. Carl Hansen, who was Platoon Leader of the 3rd Platoon, to take a squad and capture the house.
Sgt. Hansen, after getting the squad in position, worked his way up to the house under the covering fire of the squad. Finding a door open he went into the house, killed three Germans, knocked one out with his fist, and captured 15 prisoners who were in the basement of the house. (See Map D) (94)
By this time the enemy was completely alerted and was pounding the area with artillery, mortar, and anti-tank fire. Engineers attempted to remove the mines under the enemy fire, but after having several men killed and wounded ceased their efforts. (95)
The enemy continued to pour his heavy concentrations of artillery fire on Gey with a noticeable increase in fire from high velocity guns. These high velocity guns were firing from the east and northeast of Gey with one gun located in the tip of the woods north of Gey. (96)
K and L Companies continued fighting throughout the day, making slow progress, against stiff resistance. K Company reached the main road on the south side of the road leading west into the forest. L company reached the main road, turned north and was pushed back several houses by a counterattack.
L Company resumed the attack to the north and reached a point opposite the junction of the Horm road where they were stopped by tank fire from the north end of town. The tank blocking the road from the west was finally moved at 1800 and three tank destroyers, were moved into town. This, success was short-lived, however, as one was knocked out by artillery fire and one threw a tread. The third tank moved up to support K Company. (97) (98)
Immediately after dark engineers were put to work re-moving mines from the Grosshau-Gey road up to the advance elements of I Company. Another mine field had been located on the road just inside the town. About 2200, the 1st Battalion Commander was called to the Regimental C.P. and directed to have one company attack north on the main road in Gey from I Company's position. The company was to have one platoon of tank destroyers and one platoon of tanks attached and was to attack not later than 0600 on 13 December. The Battalion Commander decided to use B Company, which was in the line, because the Company Commander had a great deal of experience and was very aggressive. (99) (100)
The decision to use B Company greatly increased the problem of having it ready to attack at the designated hour. Any movement at night was difficult and had it not been for the aggressiveness and drive of the B Company Commander the move probably would not have been accomplished as well as it was.
B Company was relieved by A Company plus some men from C Company. To save the strength of the men, trucks were sent to a point about one mile in rear of B Company's position and the company moved to the vicinity of Grosshau by motor shuttle. From here the company was to proceed on foot to the line of departure. During the night a heavy fog had settled on the area and so hampered the movement that at 0900 only two platoons of B Company were ready to move out. As the fog had not dispersed the Battalion Commander decided to have B Company attack without an artillery preparation. At this time the Battalion Commander ordered the B Company Commander to move out by 0945, whether the other platoon of B Company and the tanks and tank destroyers had arrived or not. At 0915 the platoon of tank destroyers arrived and at 0945 B Company, minus one platoon, moved out. The third B Company platoon arrived about 1000, was quickly briefed, and sent ahead to join the company. The platoon of tanks arrived later and joined B company after the attack started. (101)
B company, under cover of the fog, surprised the enemy; and, by a vigorous, driving attack supported by fire from the tanks and tank destroyers, overran the town and announced it cleared by 1225. B Company captured 128 prisoners, had one tank knocked out, one man killed and several wounded. Prisoners captured in Gey stated that their casualties had been heavy and that approximately three companies had been sent in as reinforcements during the course of the battle. (102) (103) (104)
The 5th Armored Division was notified that the town had been captured and moved up to send its leading elements down the roads to Strass and Horm. The first tank attempting to move out the Strass road hit a mine about 200 yards from the main cross road. Further investigation revealed mine fields, at the edge of town, on each of the roads leading out of Gey. (105) (106)
When the success of 3 Company's attack was assured C Company was ordered to continue the attack to the northeast as soon as possible. The company was to attack on the right of the Duren-Gey road with the mission of securing Objective 8. (See Map D) The purpose of this attack was to maintain pressure on a retreating enemy and secure the high ground from which the enemy was directing artillery fire. C Company was unable to launch the attack until 1545. The company had advanced about 400 yards when it was stopped by artillery and mortar fire; and heavy small arms fire from positions about 600 yards northeast of Gey. The company was ordered to withdraw into Gey. The attack had not been a complete failure as several high velocity guns firing from Objective 8, and one from the point of woods north of Gey, had been spotted. (107) (108)
During the night the mine fields on the roads leading to Duren, Horm, and Strass were removed and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions were consolidated in Gey for the attack on 14 December. The 1st Battalion was in the north part of town, the 2nd Battalion in the south and southeast parts, and the 3rd Battalion in the west part.
The plan for the attack was as follows:- 1st Battalion, with one platoon of tanks attached, was to attack at the same time as the 5th Armored Division, to seize Objective 6. (See Map D)
- 2nd Battalion, with a platoon of tanks attached, was to pass through the 1st Battalion upon its capture of Objective 6 and seize Horm and objective 8. (See Map D)
- 3rd Battalion, in reserve, was to occupy Gey. (109) (110)
The 1st Battalion jumped off at 0700 following closely behind a rolling barrage, and by 0825 had captured its objective and two 150 m/m guns and two 88 m/m guns with unfired rounds in the chambers. During the attack the 1st Battalion had only two men killed. Shortly after the Battalion reached its objective the enemy began firing on it with high velocity guns from Objective 8, but two "time on target" barrages silenced the fire. (111) (112)
The 2nd Battalion passed through the right flank of the 1st BattaLion at 0930 and immedietely came under fire from Horm and a large emplacement about 400 yards northeast of Horm. Horm, which was strongly defended by infantry with three (3) tanks in support, was captured by G Company with the aid of tanks of the 5th Armored Division. G company continued its advance and captured the emplacement and 30 prisoners. The 2nd Battalion continued its advance and by dark had reached the foot of Objective 8. (See Map D) (113) (114)
At 0800 the following morning G Company attacked Objective 8 and after a short fight captured the hill. C Company, with one platoon of tanks attached, was directed to seize Objective 5. The company attacked at 1600 behind heavy artillery fire and by 1730 had captured its objective, 58 prisoners, and two 75 m/m anti-tank guns. C Company had five men killed end twelve wounded. (See Map D) (115)(116)
During the period of 10 December to 15 December 1944, there were 313 battle casualties evacuated through the Regimental Aid Station and an undetermined number through the 330th Infantry. There was a considerable number of non-battle casualties, also undetermined, caused by "Trench Foot" and frozen feet. Prisoners captured totaled 324.
