10 - 15 December 1944 - (Rhineland Campaign)
By Major John F. Staples
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
In making a study of this operation it is apparent that the Division erred, initially, in not designating the southern boundary of the 331st Infantry to include the Grosshau-Gey road. The Regiment also erred in not realizing immediately the importance of this road for an attack on Gey and requesting that the boundary be changed. Admittedly, boundaries are not walls through which no troops can pass, but, in my opinion, the initial placing of the boundary affected the original plan of attack.
By deciding not to attack in the woods north of Gey the Regimental Commander was refusing to attack where the enemy had proven it was easy to defend and where experience had shown that casualties to the attacker would be high.
The capture of Gey depended upon the successful movement of tanks into the town to give direct fire support to the infantry. The lack of adequate roads permitting their employment was the critical factor in the capture of the town. Without the tanks the direct efforts of six rifle companies were required over a period of three days to seize less than one half of the town. With tanks, one rifle company captured the remainder of the town in approximately two hours.
The use of only only battalion in the initial attack, and subsequent use of not more than three rifle companies in attack at any one time, was predicated on the assumption that over-saturation of a position with troops results in unnecessary casualties and may result in confusion with a consequent loss in fire power. This premise was proved by a sharp increase in casualties from artillery fire on 13 and 14 December when three battalions of the 331st Infantry and elements of the 5th Armored Division were consolidated in Gey for a continuation of the attack.
The use of artillery preparations prior to attack on Gey apparently had little effect in preventing the enemy, who was protected by thick walls and deep cellars, from placing accurate small arms fire on the attacking troops, attacks conducted in darkness or under conditions of low visibility without artillery preparations were successful in completely surprising the enemy.
The attacks by the 330th Infantry and the 331st Infantry, 10 and 11 December were the only ones conducted in the Division Zone on these days dates. These attacks, over a front of only 1600 yards out of a total 10,000 yards assigned to the Division, permitted the enemy to concentrate the entire weight of his artillery on the efforts of these two units.
The attack by C Company more then three hours after the fall of Gey was a case of sending "too little, too late."
Attacks by companies of the 1st Battalion, over open terrain, 14 and 15 December with the infantry following closely behind heavy artillery preparations, permitted these elements to reach the objectives before the enemy could retaliate.
Premature or erroneous reports made "by the 2nd Battalion of the 331st Infantry and by the 330th Infantry were not critical factors in this operation. The report by the 330th Infantry did, however, unnecessarily endanger the lives of the men involved and disrupt an attack.
The selection of Gey and the high ground to the northeast, for defense, demonstrated the enemy's appreciation of the importance of key terrain to the defender. Realizing that any movement out of the forest would be "funneled" through Gey, he had prepared strong defensive positions in and around the town and made maximum use of mines to restrict the movement of both tanks and infantry. The high ground northeast of Gey provided excellent observation posts for the control of artillery fire and good fields of fire for both small arms and anti-tank weapons.
(Personal Experience of a regimental S-3)
Major John F. Staples
