AND THE 2D BN, 310TH INFANTRY (78TH INF. DIV.),
IN THE ATTACK ON KESTERNICH, GERMANY,
14 - 15 DECEMBER 1944
By Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence H. Kenman, Infantry
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
In analyzing this operation, it is my opinion that the mission assigned to the 2d Battalion, 310th Infantry, already depleted In strength, of seizing and securing the town of Kesternich on 15 December, was too large. This belief is predicated on the fact that, on 13-14 December, the 2d Battalion, 309th infantry, with the same mission, experienced no success.
Although the 2d Battalion, 309th Infantry, was to participate in the coordinated attack on 15 December, its assigned mission of tying in with the 2d Battalion, 310th Infantry, to the northwest of Kesternich, was but a small part of the overall mission to be accomplished, and might more profitally have included a convergence on the town with the other battalion. Furthermore, the presence of this additional battalion would have contributed materially in securing the objective.
The assignment of the Executive Officer, 309th Infantry, to the command, of the two infantry battalions resulted in a hastily improvised command lacking a staff and a communications center. Furthermore, the two battalions concerned were from different infantry regiments and had not previously trained or fought together as a team, a combination which is considered ill-advised. It is felt that a better solution would have been the attachment of one battalion to the other, thereby utilizing an established headquarters.
The Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 310th Infantry, erred in isolating himself from his artillery liaison section. This act deprived his command of close in, coordinated artillery support. Furthermore, he neither requested nor directed the preparation of an artillery defense plan following the capture of the objective.
The Commanding Officer of the task force withdrew to the RCT command post in Simmerath on occasions, during the attack, "to report on the situation", when his presence with his command was essential. It is felt that the information concerning the situation might well have been transmitted by messenger.
Infantry-armor coordination was lacking in that the armor withdrew at a crucial time of battle. Furthermore, the commander, on learning of the withdrawal of the armor, failed to take decisive action toward reestablishing effective infantry-armor coordination. This failure might well have been the deciding factor in the turn of battle.
The opening phase of the attack on 15 December was characterised by close infantry-artillery coordination. The foot troops following closely behind the artillery preparation entered Kesternich to find a stunned and surprised enemy. This initial advantage, however, was lost when units became disintegrated through lack of aggressive command, and failure to promptly organize the objective.
