By Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence H. Kenman, Infantry

THE ATTACK ON KESTERNICH

At 140600 the 2d Battalion, 309th Infantry, resumed the attack on Kesternich from the northwest with E Company to the right (south) and F Company to the left (north) of the Witzerath-Kesternich road, each company with the mission of seizing that portion of the town of Kesternich in its zone. G Company was to follow F Company with the mission of outposting the high ground east of town. The attack was proceeded by an artillery and mortar preparation. The enemy was fully prepared to meet the attack as evidenced by the immediate concentration of artillery, mortar, and small arms fire on the attacking troops. Heavy casualties were inflicted by the enemy, including Lieutenant Colonel Wilson L. Burley, Jr., the Battalion Commander, and Major Mark H. Hudson, Jr., the Battalion Executive, both of whom were killed prior to midday attempting to make personal contact with the rifle companies. At this time Captain Douglas P. Frazier, commanding H Company, assumed command of the Battalion, and was ordered to continue the attack; however, the assault was repulsed by the enemy and at the close of the day the Battalion settled in the positions held during the previous night. 22

At 140600 the 2d Battalion, 310th Infantry, jumped off from Simmerath with the mission of assisting the 2d Battalion, 309th Infantry, in the capture of Kesternich. E Company followed by G Company advanced on the left (north) of the Simmerath-Kesternich road. F Company, at dawn, with the support of two tank destroyers, reduced the pillbox at the west edge of Simmerath which had not been reduced the day before. Following this action F Company proceeded toward Kesternich to the right (south) of the Simmerath-Kesternich road and to the right of E and G Companies. As F Company came abreast of E Company, approximately nine hundred yards east of Simmerath, it came upon a Schu minefield. In the meantime E and G Companies had been pinned down by intense fire from a large and previously undisclosed pillbox at the west edge of Kesternich. Tied in with this pillbox was a series of organised hedgerows which also contributed to pinning down the attackers, who were at this time approximately five hundred yards west of Kesternich. 23

All requests by this Battalion to bring artillery fire on the enemy positions were denied for the reason that it was believed that friendly troops from the 2d Battalion, 309th Infantry, were in Kesternich. The situation in the 2d Battalion, 309th Infantry, at this time was so fluid that the Battalion Commander himself did not definitely know whether or not he had any troops within the town of Kesternich. Communications had not improved over the previous day. 24

The 2d Battalion, 310th Infantry, made no farther gains on 14 December, and completed digging in for the night approximately five hundred yards west of Kesternich. 25

At 150100 December, Lieutenant Colonel Creighton E. Likes, Executive, 309th Infantry Regiment, was placed in command of the 2d Battalion, 309th Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, 310th Infantry. These battalions, with a platoon of tanks and a platoon of tank destroyers attached, were, as a task force, to launch a coordinated attack to seize the town of Kesternich commencing at 0700. 26

WITH THE 78TH INFANTRY DIVISION, GERMANY Thanks to Lt. Col. Creighton E. Likes, Charleston, S.C., regimental executive officer of an infantry regiment of the Lightning Division, 40 Germans who surrendered and came out of a pillbox looked like the black-face chorus from an old time minstrel show. Lt. Col. Likes and his unit were assaulting a village and espied a pillbox just left of it. He suggested to a small group that they drop some grenades down the chimney of the pillbox. Lt. Col. Likes himself crawled to the top of the pillbox and while his patrol covered him dropped seven grenades down the chimney, pulling the pins with his teeth. The occupants of the pillbox refused to budge, so dynamite charges and a TD unit cracked it wide open, and 40 prisoners who filed out were completely black-faced from the grenades the colonel had dropped down the chimney. The Wind Mill - THE TOMAHAWK TALKS   21. JANUARY 1945

In the plan for the attack, the tank destroyers were to improve their positions before daylight so as to bring direct fire on the embrasures of the pillbox at the western outskirts of Kesternich commencing at 0700. Following the reduction of the pillbox by the engineers, they were to support the attack on Kesternich. Immediately following a preparation on the town by two battalions of field artillery, E Company, 310th Infantry, was to move rapidly, on the road, through Kesternich to the northeast edge of town. G Company, following E Company into town, was to clear the north portion and then move to the right of E Company and secure the southeast edge of town. F Company was to advance from its present position, south of the Simmerath-Kesternich road, and clear the south portion of the town; thereafter to dig in on the south. Tanks were to support the infantry in the attack and then move to the east portion of town where they were to be utilized in the defense. An engineer demolition team was to follow the infantry and reduce the pillbox. 27

The 2d Battalion, 309th Infantry, (See Map D) was to advance and tie in with E Company, 310th Infantry, northeast of Kesternich. 28

The attack by the foot troops commenced on schedule following the artillery preparation. E and G Companies proceeded up the road and into the town. E Company encountered sniper and automatic weapons fire which slowed its progress considerably. It reached its objective, however, about midday. G Company encountered a determineed enemy set up in fortified houses. Intense house to house fighting resulted with the Company fighting in squad groups. Unit control, coordination, and mutual support of fighting groups weakened as the attack progressed. Small groups became isolated in separate fire fights. Casualties, especially among leaders were heavy. Manpower was further weakened by soldiers returning to the rear area with their small groups of prisoners. This Company, however, succeeded in clearing the north portion of town and moved to its objective in the southeast edge of town about 1400 hours. 29

F Company moved east in its zone and encountered a Schu minefield, covered by enemy fire, in the vicinity of the pillbox. It skirted the minefield to the south, entered the town and experienced the same house to house fighting as did G Company. It cleared the south portion of town by 1400 hours. 30

The tanks had not engaged in the house to house fire fight. They had accompanied the foot troops to the west edge of town where they ran upon a Teller minefield. Two tanks were destroyed by enemy antitank fire while the other three took cover to the rear. 31

Fire by the tank destroyers had kept the pillbox buttoned up. The engineer demolition team used a 500 pound charge in an effort to reduce this pillbox. The charge had little penetrating effect on the 16 foot walls; however, the concussion caused the occupants to surrender. Fifteen of the enemy occupants had been killed by the concussion and thirty-nine were taken prisoner. 32

The remaining tanks and tank destroyers moved to the east part of town at about 1400 hours where they took up positions in the defense plan. 33

During the progress of the attack in the forenoon, the Commanding officer, 2d Battalion, 310th Infantry, established his command post at the west end of Kesternich.

At approximately 1400 hours he moved his command post into the middle of town. However, he ordered his artillery liaison section to remain at the old command post location. From this time on no requests for artillery fire were made by the infantry through his section. Furthermore, this artillery liaison section was not in communication with its forward observers, nevertheless, the artillery liaison officer called for and received fire on distant targets. 34

Lieutenant Colonel Creighton E. Likes, commanding the task force, had been present in Kesternich during the forenoon where his main concern was the progress of the attack of the 2d Battalion, 310th Infantry. After conferring with the Battalion Commander, concerning the establishment of the defenses of the town, he withdrew to the RCT Command post in Simmerath "to report on the situation", wherein he reported that the town of Kesternich was seized and that preparation for the defense was in progress. 35

Reorganization and preparation for the defense, which provided for digging in on the perimeter of the town, were delayed. This delay was caused by the absence of sufficient leaders due to casualties, physical exhaustion of personnel, the inclement weather, and constant harrassment by enemy fire. Control became difficult as personnel, when not under immediate supervision, frequently sought shelter in houses and basements. Preparation for the defense was only partially completed, when, at approximately 1615 hours the enemy launched a counterattack from the northeast, east, and southeast behind a heavy artillery preparation. By darkness enemy troops and armor had succeeded in penetrating the town defenses, thereby separating and isolating the defending units. The attached tanks and tank destroyers, lacking close infantry protection, withdrew to the west of town under orders from their respective platoon leaders. 36

Lt. Col. Likes, learning of the counterattack, proceeded to Kesternich, where at the west of town, he met the withdrawing tanks and tank destroyers. He then contacted the Battalion Commander, 2d Battalion, 310th Infantry, and directed further preparation for the defense of the town, but did not order the tanks and tank destroyers to return to their defense positions within the town. He again withdrew to the RCT command post "to report on the situation". 37

It is to be recalled that the 2d Battalion, 309th Infantry, was to tie in with E Company, 310th Infantry, to the northeast of Kesternich during this operation. Contact, however, was never accomplished. Several attempts were made to contact elements of the 2d Battalion, 310th Infantry, all of which failed. The attempt was made around 160230 December when Captain Brey, leading a patrol into Kesternich, observed the presence of enemy troops in considerable numbers, but failed ...

Page 19 of the original document is missing

... to defense on 16 December as the Germans launched the Ardennes Counter offensive. 42

Near midnight 19-20 December, two men from the illfated 2d Battalion, 310th Infantry, entered the Command post reporting that they had just returned from a cellar In Kesternich where a group composed of three officers and fifty-three enlisted men, mainly from F Company, were isolated, some of whom were suffering from battle wounds and others suffering from trenchfoot. A patrol of one officer and three enlisted men was immediately organized for the purpose of locating and evacuating the isolated personnel. The two men who had returned from Kesternich were unable to accompany the patrol as guides due to the fact that they were suffering severely from trenchfoot and exhaustion. The patrol entered Kesternich but was unable to locate the isolated group and returned to the command post. Early the night of 20-21 December, the same patrol was preparing to repeat its mission into Kesternich when two more men from the same isolated group reported. One of these men guided the patrol to the correct location. All personnel, including litter cases, were evacuated from Kesternich. 43

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