6-8 DECEMBER, 1944 - (RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)
By Lt. Frank U. Roquemore
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
Well aware of the obstacle the Huertgen Forest offered, the German commanders used it to the best of their abilities. However, concerned with economizing their first class troops, the commanders relied heavily on supporting weapons, (next three words were unreadable in original text) ? ? ? organised main line of resistance, to halt or delay the advance of our forces. The economising of forces was confirmed by the German Ardennes offensive in December. Nonetheless an organised defense of the critical terrain around Bergstein could have halted friendly attacks.
Further disadvantages of using miscellaneous troops and supporting weapons can be seen in the enemy's failure to penetrate the weakened Ranger defense line.
Similarly, enemy infiltration forces were too small to accomplish their mission, and lacked aggressiveness. An exposed position, such as the companies occupied on Hill 400, is highly vulnerable to infiltration or envelopment.
The Rangers attack on Hill 400 forced a salient into enemy positions. This salient being the most easterly point to which the Allies had driven, it offered the enemy the opportunity to place a mass of fires from three sides onto the attacking force. The ability of the enemy (to mass and deliver these fires resulted in heavy casual-ties to the attacking force even after the objective had been seized. Total casualties in the Ranger battalion amounted to 135, including over two-thirds of the entire force that assaulted the hill.
A coordinated attack, using supporting fires, would have lessened casualties in this operation. Sufficient time was not allowed for coordination outside of the companies, nor for obtaining supporting fires. This urgency of time, however, was due to the weakness of friendly units defending the area and the nature of the enemy held terrain.
Artillery could have been used more effectively in the initial phases of this operation rather than at a later time. Counterbattery could possibly have eliminated some of the volume of fires the enemy was able to concentrate in the area. A Ranger battalion should not be employed in the same manner as a regular infantry battalion. It is trained and equipped for special type missions and lacks strength or weapons to organize a defensive position in depth. As all six line companies are normally committed at one time, it has no reserve nor any quantity of supporting weapons. The battalion, therefore, has to depend on such supporting fires as can be obtained. In this operation, even the 60mm mortars organic to each assault platoon, could not be successfully employed due to enemy fires, the terrain and difficulties of observation.
In a wooded area, such as the Hurtgen Forest, armor is confined, or canalized, and cannot be employed to its fullest advantage. The enemy dan defend the natural avenues of approach with anti-tank weapons and mine fields thereby making the employment of tanks too costly to be practical. Combat Command 'R' could have possibly driven to the Roer River had its attack not stopped due to the confinement imposed by terrain around BERGSTEIN and the enemy's organization of the area for anti-tank defense.
