By Lt. Frank U. Roquemore

LESSONS

1. A heavily wooded sector offers excellent defensive possibilities if property organized. This may be attested by casualty tables of units operating within the Hurtgen Forest for a 99 day period: (62)
   
   

   9th Infantry Division(l5 Sep-26 Oct)	3,835
   28th Infantry Division(27 Oct-20 Nov)	3,611
   4th Infantry Division(6 Nov-8 Dec)	5.260
   Total for 99 days	12,707

   
   
2. Artillery fire is a potent weapon against an enemy either in the open or in wooded areas. Majority of casualties suffered on either side are from artillery or mortar fragments. Tree bursts or time fires utilize the maximum effect of shells.
3. Artillery cannot offer close support to infantry in heavily wooded areas due to lack of observation and tree bursts endangering own troops.
4. Infantry troops, down to and including platoon level, should be trained in adjusting and directing artillery fire. An artillery forward observer cannot always be in position when needed.
5. Armored units operating in heavily wooded areas should be employed only against limited objectives. Deployment and maneuver is extremely limited and exploitation virtually impossible.
6. The capture of a critical terrain feature, without a defense in depth, leaves a unit vulnerable to envelopment or infiltration.
7. Infiltration tactics should employ sufficient and aggressive forces to successfully accomplish mission.
8. Communication, evacuation and supply are always difficult problems in any combat situation. Alternate methods of accomplishing each should be included in the training of a unit.
9. A coordinated and aggressive defense by a small force using supporting arms can defend critical terrain against a superior force.
10. A successful attack depends on the ability to defend.

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