(1st Infantry Division) in the Attack on the Hürtgen Forest
16 November - 5 December 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)
By Major Maurice A. Belisle
SUMMARY
The operations of the 26th Infantry in the drive for the ROER RIVER were generally successful. Along the front of the VII Corps no unit had made progress farther to the east. The tenacity of the enemy on his home grounds west of the ROER RIVER forecast a long winter campaign. Except for the attack on MERODE the regiment did creditable work. If the MERODE incident was a fiasco it was so because the regiment had not secured the ground necessary to launch a successful attack on the town. The 26th Infantry Regiment had absorbed its greatest punishment of the war fighting through approximately three miles of forest against a determined enemy. (The cost to the regiment - approximately 2000 casualties in less than 20 days)
The weather and terrain had favored the enemy throughout the operation and he took full advantage of both. (46)
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
1. OBJECTIVE - MERODE
The attack on MERODE was ordered at a time when the regiment was ill-prepared for it. The woods had not yet been cleared. To the east along the regimental front there was still approximately 500-600 yards of forest to clear before reaching the open ground west of MERODE. The 1st Battalion on the right was not ordered to, and did not jump off with the 2d Battalion in a limited objective attack to clear the wooded area to the east of the 1st Battalion positions. On the left flank of the 2d Battalion the line was held by reconnaissance troops - certainly they were not capable of offensive action in heavy woods. Their organization, equipment, and training precludes their use on that type mission. The enemy facing the regiment had at no time given an indication of fighting a mere delaying action, much less executing a withdrawal. Pushing a salient into territory favorable to them was an invitation to disaster. MERODE is a very small town adjacent to and actually tied into its larger neighbor, SCHLICH, which was not a part or portion of the objective. It is evident that the attack was ordered before terrain essential to the attack's success had been taken and that the objective was not a logical one to be taken and held. The objective was only a portion of a tactically sound mission assignment.
2. REPLACEMENTS
The manner in which, replacements are received and indoctrinated is extremely important. No doubt the first impression of the groups assigned to the regiment during this period were good but the follow-up treatment of sending them directly to units in the line - necessarily at night during a period where fighting was roughest - where it was just about impossible for the newcomer to get acquainted with his buddy could not be other than detrimental to morale.
At the time when casualties were so heavy the regiment had little choice in the matter if it were to execute an attack with any strength at all. However it was noted that the casualty rate among the replacements during this period was much higher than among older hands. Later during the Battle of the Bulge, these same companies did properly assimilate a large number of replacements during the short rest period immediately following this operation, and bore the brunt of attacks by a Panzer Division and performed as well as the best of the veterans before them.
3. WOODS FIGHTING — FIRE LANES
When fighting in the woods, fire lanes should be avoided. Strolling down or across a fire lane in the front lines is just as dangerous in woods fighting as strolling on, or crossing a street is to city, town, or village fighting. The defender will naturally cover the lanes with final protective lines and defensive fires. This was evident to regimental troops the very first day in the forest. Because the above pertains to lanes in the front lines it is not intended that inference be made that fire lanes to the rear were overlooked - they were not. Heavy fire was placed on lanes to the rear to prevent the uninterrupted use for mortar emplacements, supply routes, CPs, or other installations. It was found that clearings as they existed were generally preferable for gun emplacements and locations for installations.
4. FIRE PLMO
Extreme care must be taken to properly and accurately identify and report units location when fighting in woods. It is necessary that a unit commander constantly know where all elements of his unit are in order that he might call for mortar or artillery fire on the target when he needs it. Because it is normally difficult to locate oneself in heavily wooded terrain due to lack of observation and lack of easily identified objects or features in the immediate area or within sight, the leader must constantly orient himself to the ground with his maps, photos, or charts. All units were impressed with this fact especially when they stopped, were stopped, or buttoned up for the night. If close defensive fires were to be placed to a unit's front the maximum effect could be achieved only if the fires could be placed as close to the front lines as possible to hit the enemy in his assault position, and far enough forward to clear friendly lines. Only by accurate locating and reporting of positions could such a fire plan be made up.
5. NIGHT DEFENSE IN WOODS
This subject is a controversial one, consequently it is felt that both analyses, the writer's and another will be discussed briefly.
Quoted herewith, is a statement taken from the conclusions section of the G-3, Report of Operations, 1st U.S. Infantry Division, 1-30 November 1944, par. 7. :
"About two hours after stopping for the night, or under cover of darkness, company commanders have found it advisable to move platoons 400 to 500 yards back from their initial positions, leaving strong outposts. The majority of the company is thereby removed from the area that is most likely to receive the heaviest enemy artillery and mortar concentrations. In this way, if they were observed, only a platoon gets the enemy attack or artillery or mortar fire, instead of the entire company."
It is known that some units tried this line withdrawal taction - and at times it might have been successful, but generally enemy pressure by patrols, night attacks, or counterattacks made it unfeasible. It is known that it did not work when tried consistently. Moreover a loss of 400-500 yards was often more than a day's attack had gained - and it would definitely be a loss if the enemy knew or even summized that a withdrawal had been effected. During this operation he generally knew because he maintained contact. It is the opinion of the writer that this tactic of withdrawing the main force is not generally acceptable.
6. INFORMATION OF THE ENEMY AND TERRAIN
Timely information of the enemy and the terrain is essential to the degree of success in battle. It is doubtful that the regiment had sufficient information of enemy forces in the MERODE - SCHLICH area otherwise one battalion would not have been sent across the open into the town against a superior force. The 2d Battalion's attack was made at a time when the remainder of the regiment was entirely committed. Once in MERODE, E and F Companies were on their own. Moreover the road leading to the town was little more than a muddy trail with deep ditches on either side. When the first two tanks were bogged down the road was blocked preventing reinforcement with armor.
7. THE REGIMENTAL ZONE
A main attack should be made on a narrow front, — particularly in heavily forested terrain.
The regiment's zone in this operation should have been narrowed as the regiment moved ahead of its flank units or its attaok held up until all were abreast. After the first few days the three battalions were almost constantly committed. Hence additional troops were required and brought in to hold the line while the rifle battalions continued the attack. Even so, when the MERODE attack was launched there were no reserves available in the regimental zone to continue the attack or reinforce the companies in the town. It is particularly important to note that as. the units slowed down or stopped casualties increased tremendously. Conversely, as the attack progressed and troops closed in with the enemy casualties decreased because the enemy artillery and mortar fires were forced to lift.
8. CONTACT — OBSERVATION
Although contact on right and left is essential at all times it is most essential in wooded terrain. The need for a close tie-in is naturally required because of the lack of observation. It is obvious that open terrain can be covered by fire more easily because most movement thereupon is seen, even at night. In wooded terrain a determined enemy can not only locate gaps but he can by stealth infiltrate a sizable force through a loose defense without its being known to the defender. No influence is intended that this be the rule only in a night defense, — the proximity of daylight tie-in is only relative to observation.
