(1st Infantry Division) in the Attack on the Hürtgen Forest
16 November - 5 December 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)
By Major Maurice A. Belisle
NARRATION ctnd.
During the day the 1st and 3d Battalions were ordered to hold what they had, consolidate, and tie in. By noon the Battalions reported that they were tied in just south of triangulation point 245. The line was now facing east from the south boundary to Hill 245, then facing north with the 3d Battalion. The 3d Battalion moved north along trail #6 to tie in with the 18th Infantry. For the next two days no offensive action of note took place. Both sides patrolled extensively sparring as though looking for an opening. Advance notice had been given by Division that JÜNGERSDORF would be the next regimental objective. The 3d Battalion oommander was advised that it would be his job in order that he might feel out the opposition by patrols and begin planning his method of attack. On 27 November Corps ordered the Division to take LANGERWEHE and JÜNGERSDORF. The 18th Infantry was given the job of taking LANGERWEHE simultaneous to the 26th taking JÜNGERSDORF. Regiment then ordered the 2d Battalion to send one company to take over part of 3d Battalion area adjacent to the 1st Battalion. At 1500 hours the 3d Battalion jumped off with K Company taking the high ground to the south of the town and overlooking it, I and L Companies moved cross-country into JÜNGERSDORF and were engaged in extremely heavy fighting. The Battalion Commander dispatched the tanks and TDs into the town to support the companies in clearing it. The companies were so notified, and met the vehicles and proceeded to mop up resistance. By dark the town was reported taken and secured. At about 0300 hours the K Company positions on the high ground overlooking JÜNGERSDORF were heavily counterattacked. One of the 3d Battalion TDs was knocked out and another was threatened before the counterattack was repelled. During this action one of the Battalion 57 mm AT guns knocked out a Mark IV tank. Later in the morning about 1000 hours the enemy counterattacked JÜNGERSDORF. Now we had observation and the enemy was caught in the open and given the treatment. His forces, unsuccessful in taking JÜNGERSDORF withdrew toward LANGERWEHE where the 18th Infantry was attacking. Friendly artillery took the back tracking enemy force under fire and caused extremely heavy casualties. Later in the day as friendly aircraft hovered over our lines the enemy dropped red smoke on JÜNGERSDORF in an attempt to get the US Air Corps to bomb the 3d Battalion, however, the trick was detected in time to prevent the bombing. (36) Now that JÜNGERSDORF had been taken plans were made for sending the 2nd Battalion east to seize the town of MERODE. The 1st Reconnaissance Company and the reconnaissance platoon of the 734th TD Battalion were attached to the regiment to hold positions between the 1st and 3d Battalions. The 2d Battalion was then ordered to attack east along the unimproved road to clear the woods (500-600) yards and take and hold the town of MERODE. The remainder of the regiment was to hold its present line. Except for the 3d Battalion positions on the north (facing north) the line was well inside the forest on high ground with little if any observation of the ROER RIVER valley to the east. (37) At 1000 hours on 29 November, after an artillery preparation, the 2d Battalion jumped off with Companies E and F, each reinforced with a Heavy Machine gun platoon. From the outset the attacking troops received heavy artillery and mortar fire as they plodded through the last enemy defenses in the forest. Again they hit well dug-in enemy behind a mesh of wire and mines. Of the estimated 350 personnel in the assault approximately 130 were casualties before the two companies emerged from the forest into the open overlooking MERODE. (38)
Moving out for the assault on the town, Lt. (now Capt.) John D. Hamilton, Company Commander of F Company called for the tanks and TDs to be employed in the clearing of the town. The companies proceeded with their assault on the town and seized that portion along the road east into town. G Company moved up and held the edge of the woods facing MERODE. Meantime, the tanks had been dispatched and appeared on the outer edge of the woods where they drew considerable fire. Two of these tanks proceeded to join the companies and helped in clearing the remainder of the town. However, MERODE, a small town, is joined with its larger neighbor SCHLICH so that it is difficult to tell where one ends and the other begins. Companies E and F took all that they could hold and the enemy held the rest strongly. The defense consisted mainly of holding the houses along the two roads of MERODE.
While the companies organized their positions the enemy in SCHLICH took MERODE under fire with their tanks and assault guns and kept all of the buildings and the two tanks covered. During the day the two tanks left the troops in MERODE and made an attempt to return to the forest. (39) On their way, west of the town on the only road back, one of the tanks bogged down in the mud and turned over and the other was hit by an enemy shell. They now blocked the road so that it could no longer be used to reinforce the troops in town. About this time it was noted that communications to the town were particularly bad, Lt. Hamilton did have intermittent contact with his SCR 300 until approximately 2200 hours, thereafter no contact whatsoever was made except by one runner.
That night a coordinated German infantry and tank attack on E and F Companies systematically proceeded to wipe out or capture the group in MERQDE. The gallant fighters had no defense except their small arms against the tanks and infantry moving in. Fighting lasted throughout the night. At daybreak G Company could observe enemy tanks firing directly into the E and F Company buildings. German tanks drove their guns into windows and blasted the insides of buildings then infantry moved in to mop up. Finally on 30 November the Germans had recaptured MERODE. Throughout the seige, patrols were sent from Battalion to the Companies in MERODE but none ever reached the town. One patrol consisted of twelve (12) bazooka teams to make up for the lack of armor in the defense of the town but it never reached E and F Companies. The enemy had apparently first cut off the town from the forest by setting up a line west of MERODE. Any movement toward the town drew immediate and intense small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. The platoon of engineers and tank recovery tried to clear the road several times but were unable to remove the obstacles under the terrific fire. During the night in question several illuminating Shell fire missions were fired In an attempt to catch enemy reinforcements In the open. (40)
At the time MERODE was counterattacked the regiment had no reserve. It is estimated that G Company had an effective strength of approximately 50 men employed in the line holding the edge of the forest west of MERODE. (41) Division at first alerted a battalion of the 16th Infantry then ordered the 18th Infantry to relieve elements of the 3rd Battalion in JÜNGERSDORF on 30 November. It was evening before the 3d Battalion became available - that was too late. Strong patrols were unable to make any progress toward the town. In fact the enemy was beginning to feel aggressive, he had regained the initiative in MERODE and apparently decided to continue. During the day he launched an attack on the 1st Reconnaissance Company positions just north and west of MERODE which was broken up by our mass of artillery and mortars. (42)
On 1 December the two companies were given for lost. Four 2d Battalion men who had been taken prisoners escaped and returned to our lines confirming the fact that there were no longer any friendly troops in MERODE. The regimental front required all available troops - any major move might so weaken the line as to make it vulnerable in the event of enemy attack and so for that reason the 1st and 3d Battalions were ordered to hold what they had and to clear the woods in their respective areas. The 1st Battalion was to clear the area south of the MERODE road and the 3d Battalion, the area southeast of JÜNGERSDORF. (43) The 3d Battalion cleared its area during the day while the 1st Battalion ran into heavy fighting and cleared little. G Company pulled back on line with the 1st Battalion and held its position north of the road. For the next three days only the 1st Battalion moved, sweeping its assigned area against heavy resistance. Enemy captured by the 1st Battalion during this action told of the enemy's recent reinforcement to the 1st Battalion front. (44)
On 4 December, division notified the regiment that elements of the 9th U.S. Infantry Division would relieve the 26th Infantry on 5 December. During the afternoon of 4 December, reconnaissance parties from the 9th Infantry Division arrived to plan the relief and gather information of their new area. On 5 December the regiment was relieved and moved to a rear bivouac area in the vicinity of HENRI-CHAPPELLE for rest and rehabilitation. (45)
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