(8th INFANTRY DIVISION) IN THE ATTACK ON DÜREN, GERMANY,
AFTER THE CROSSING OF THE ROER RIVER,
23 - 25 FEBRUARY 1945
(RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)
By Captain Alexander F. Berol
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
1. SUPPLY AND EVACUATION
The build up of all supplies both as reserves, and for use in the attack was excellent except for the shortage of engineer assault equipment, namely boats and outboard engines. The small elements of I and K Companies were isolated on a far side of a river from their parent unit for over 14 hours, partially due to the lack of this equipment.
2. PROPAGANDA LEAFLETS (PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE)
The use of weak forms of psychological warfare against troops that are well trained, equipped and with high morale is pointless. The German use of leaflets on the 13th Infantry while in assembly areas on the western side of the ROER RIVER did nothing towards helping their case, except to cause wonder regarding the counterintelligence of the American forces.
3. PREPARATION
The preparation and orientation for the crossing of the ROER RIVER, was made in great detail, as all studied both maps and aerial photographs, as well as visual reconnaissance. This preparation requirement for any successful operation was well accomplished, and would have paid off, had the river crossing been more successful.
4. RIVER CROSSING
The crossing of the ROER RIVER in a piece meal fashion should have been avoided, so that once the attack started all elements of a unit could have continued on their mission. The training was conducted on a still water creek which could not approach the proper and required level of troop training for success. Engineer troops should be trained extensively in the proper care, maintenance and operation of outboard motors, if they are to be used successfully.
ANALYSIS & AND CRITICISM 5 to 9 are missing in the original document.
10. BYPASSING OF ENEMY
The City of DÜREN was skimmed through in the effort to speed up the attack. This is a calculated risk which could prove disasterous, if too large an area is bypassed. It proves that at best, city or town fighting to completely clear the area is slow, tedious work, requiring large numbers of troops.
