THE OPERATIONS OF COMPANY L, 13th INFANTRY
(8th INFANTRY DIVISION) IN THE ATTACK ON DÜREN, GERMANY,
AFTER THE CROSSING OF THE ROER RIVER,
23 - 25 FEBRUARY 1945
(RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)
(8th INFANTRY DIVISION) IN THE ATTACK ON DÜREN, GERMANY,
AFTER THE CROSSING OF THE ROER RIVER,
23 - 25 FEBRUARY 1945
(RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)
By Captain Alexander F. Berol
LESSONS
- In any attack supply levels should be at their peaks to include reserves particularly in technical equipment for special operations.
- Psychological warfare, to succeed should be, used when the enemy is at a distinct disadvantage to gain their worth,
as indiscriminate use as an attempt to harrass, is without value.
- A thorough preparation and orientation for all echelons prior to an attack is a must both for morale and success in an operation.
- Training in special operations must not be simulated, but must be as close to actual needs or requirements as possible to succeed.
- The proper and prompt application of field expedients can, when standard tried and true methods fail, be the difference between success or failure.
- The use of reserves in line is a must if a situation so warrents, but the risk must be well calculated before hand.
- Emphasis on the basic rules in training can not be stressed too frequently so that in combat they become second nature.
- The use of artillery weapons is limited in built up areas, therefore all infantry should be taught the true replacement value of recoilless weapons.
- The use of wire communications in the attack is to be highly regarded, as it might well be the only quick means of
communications.
- By-passing areas or sectors where the enemy might be waiting is a calculated risk, that must be taken in cases
where lack of troops or time does not permit the complete clearing of an area.
