The Operations of the 112th Infantry, (28th Infantry Division)
in the Hurtgen Forest
Germany, 2 - 14 November 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)
in the Hurtgen Forest
Germany, 2 - 14 November 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)
LESSONS
By Major Paul A. Troup, Jr.
Some of the lessons learned by this operation are:
- Prior to an operation through heavily wooded terrain, troops must be thoroughly trained in the variances of fighting technique in woods necessary to successfully combat the defense lines embedded therein.
- Immediate and rapid organization of an objective once it has been taken must be accomplished with the same voraciousness as that of the attack.
- Rocket launchers as the primary means of defense against the armor of an infantry-tank team are not adequate due to the short range of the weapon.
- Routes of communication must be made adequate to fit the needs of the attacking echelon.
- Sufficient troops must be made available for the rotation for rehabilitation of units which are subjected to severe weather or hazardous conditions for extended periods. The disregard of this requisite will greatly increase the casualty rate of the unit.
- When air power is depended upon to isolate the local battlefield, plans must be flexible so as to include supplementary provisions in case a rapid change in weather prevents the air force from accomplishing its mission.
- Replacements (reenforcements) should be trained as a unit of at least squad strength and when conditions permit they should be joined to combat units between actions and not during actions.
- Secrecy of plans is essential in a withdrawal action.
- Due to the extreme difficulty in maintaining control, plans for a night withdrawal in wooded terrain must be not only simple but complete down to the most minute detail and must be disseminated to every man of the command.
- Artillery forward observers with the assaulting echelon can effectively stave off counterattacks by observed artillery fire.
- The practice of authenticating all messages received must be impressed upon the minds of all combat commanders, their staffs, and their communication personnel.
- Combat engineers can be used as infantrymen but cannot be expected to perform the two jobs simultaneously.
