in the Hurtgen Forest
Germany, 2 - 14 November 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISMS
By Major Paul A. Troup, Jr.
In an analysis of the operations of the 112th Infantry in the Hurtgen Forest it is immediately evident that all the higher commanders involved were aware of the special conditions that had to be established before this attack could be successful. These prerequisites, the neutralization of enemy observation from the commanding ridges, the isolation of the battlefield, and the improvement of the trail (G-2 could not verify its existence) leading from Vossenack to Kommerscheidt so that supporting tanks could traverse the draw without any difficulty, were the cruxes to the accomplishment of this mission. It was not long after the assault began that the units of the 112th Infantry and those of the other regiments of the division knew that none of these provisos had been adequately surmounted. The supply and evacuation problem which was to be relieved by the use of weasels faltered when direct fire weapons on the ridge used them for ducks in the shooting gallery of Vossenack, Of the original 47 weasels received, 22 were lost in action. The failure to provide an adequate line of communication to the troops in Schmidt choked the flow of the much needed heavy support weapons and eventually threw the tide of battle to the enemy. The battalion in Schmidt had taken all the security measures at its disposal which would have held the position against any normal infantry attack, but its hastily spread mines and rocket launchers were not commensurate to the attack it received. The enemy under the cover of overcast skies was able to build up his strength in men and armor from day to day and by his tanks and artillery using precision fire he was able to slowly eliminate the troops who were forced to occupy exposed positions. The constant hammering of artillery and the overshadowing threat of counterattack sapped the fighting strength from these veterans and left them exhausted; consequently, the casualty rate greatly increased. 66
The artillery forward observers who shared the rifleman's foxhole earned their niche in the hall of greatness when by well adjusted artillery fire they were able to disorganize enemy counterattacks before they penetrated the fighting positions. 67
The series of skirmishes fought by the combat engineers in the Kall Valley re-emphasized the fact that these troops were not adequately trained in the adaptations of the normal fighting technique required to fight successfully in woods. The engineers were not the only ones who lacked this training for from a captured document published by the 183rd Volks Grenadier Division the following statement is extracted: "In combat in wooded area the American showed himself completely unfit." 68
In this action the reinforcement system of the army proved itself inadequate. Replacements, were rushed into the line and before they could become thoroughly indoctrinated to fire they were wounded and evacuated. The squad leaders were unable to help these men over the hump of battle initiation and many replacements became battle fatigued before they fired their first shot at the enemy. If these individuals could be organized into small fighting teams with battle tested leaders they would be able to fulfill their intended mission. The time wasting formalities of introductions and of learning the. capabilities of new personalities would be eliminated from the battlefield where time can be put to a better use. 69
One of the mysteries of this action is the origin of the message which ordered the Regimental Commander to report to the division command post. Although this message was received by the attached communication personnel of the Division Signal Company it presumably was not authenticated. A grim reminder to combat commanders to have every message that is received authenticated. 70
The withdrawal plans of the task force followed the doctrine of simplicity and completeness coupled with the ever important qualification of secrecy. To facilitate control the men moved in files with no interval, but once they entered the closely packed woods and started their descent of the steep sides of the ravine control was lost. But in spite of this the well laid plans made this a very successful withdrawal. 71
This operation had decimated a first class division. The casualty figure for the Hurtgen Forest Fighting varies considerably in the different reports; one source lists the total loss to be 248 officers and 5452 enlisted men. The 2nd Battalion, 112th Infantry alone received 515 reinforcements 6 days after the start of the attack. 72
Equipment losses were staggering although the actual figures are not available. 73
The other side of the ledger cannot be verified but intelligence records show 43 tanks and 7 self-propelled guns disabled or destroyed, an estimated 4000 Germans killed or wounded, and over 1000 prisoners taken. 74
Mission not accomplished.
