89. INFANTERIE DIVISION (GE)
(13 Sep - 1 Oct 1944 )

By Oberst a.D. Hasso Neitzel

With the assistance of the civilian population from the villages and towns situated in the MLR it was possible to maintain reconnaissance patrols to observe the movements of the enemy and, if possible, to harass them and interfere with their attack preparations. Contrary to expectations this proved very successful.

There was plenty of activity in the main line of resistance. For example, the enemy had established a
prisoner of war collection point in the school of Roetgen which our men were able to visit frequently. They would bring back one or two Germans who as proof that they had actually been prisoners of the Americans would show us rations they had received while in Roetgen.

We received word from Monschau which housses were evacuated by order of the Americans so that a military administration headquarters could be established there.

We also learned that a repair shop for tanks had been set up near the railroad station. However, our lack of weapons and explosives and also regard for the civilian population prevented us from taking advantage of the information.

The following stories give an idea of the movements back and forth in the MLR: Shortly after the Americans had occupied the city of Monschau several Germans who had been on leave, among them an officer from the eastern front, appeared at the division ccnmand post requesting instructions as to what to do since their leave had not yet expired. They were told to return to Monschau and finish their leave and they were assigned missions to carry out while they were in the town. It might be added, as an example of German discipline, that all those men on leave never failed to report back at the division command post when their leave time was up. We then sent them on east.

The officer previously mentioned came back accompanied by his father carrying his son's uniform in a suitcase. When the son had changed back into uniform the father returned to his home with his son's civilian clothes.

This movement of men going on leave continued right along. One man, coming from the eastern front — his family lived near Elsenborn — reported to the division and then went on to his home. He, too, returned by the established route when his leave time had expired, accompanied by his family.

It was a striking fact that in the village of Kalterherberg, during the first night of the occupation the enemy cautiously avoided requisitioning houses for use as billets. Their security measures were so slack that our men were able to move unhindered among them. Since there were many American officers who spoke German, division headquarters was fully informed regarding their conversations with the German population. Every bit of information was immediately passed on to us.

During night time our reconnaissance patrols operated mostly on the road leading to Eupen from the south where enemy movement of motorized columns were observed. Our panzerfausts generally destroyed single vehicles. (In one of these captured vehicles we found a copy of the "Stars and Stripes" containing the first printed information regarding the death of our division commander southeast of Liege.) After we had succeeded in destroying several enemy vehicles the Americans stopped using that road at night.

As a result of the estimate of the situation all available means were employed to strengthen especially the second line of the West Wall. A construction staff was appointed commanded by a field officer. It was charged with the building of field positions between the pillboxes of the second position and the general line of Gemuend— Schleiden. Civilian labor was to be used urtil the troops which were to occupy the pilxboxes had arrived and could carry on the work.

This work suffered also from the shortage of suitable tools. And last but by no means least, from the wellknown difficulties with the local Nazi party organizations, which were to furnish the labor. It was not only extremely difficult to clarify the question of competence but it was even more complicated to employ the forces and conduct the planning since the agencies concerned claimed the sole right of making decisions.

The construction work and the improvements were not carried out until later by our own troops under our own control.

The same difficulties were encountered when the main defense area had to be cleared. Everywhere local civilians of all age classes and of either sex were to be found in the woods living in tents or caves. As mentioned before there was considerable going and coming in the MLR. Though our troops suffered no damage or loss through treason or such, there was always danger from enemy artillery action. Though Nazi party officials and police were unable to handle the situation, nothing was done to change it.

Division headquarters again and again asked the Nazi organizations concerned to salvage the household
belongings out of the villages in the main line of resistance. We felt that as long as the houses had not been destroyed by artillery fire the furnishings could be removed by night and passed on to the refugees now living in the woods in the rear area. The division offered its vehicles for the transportation of the furnishings but nothing was accomplished. It was the same regarding the cattle which were allowed to wander uncared for when they were so badly needed in the rear areas.

Our troops were not enough to carry out their allotted tasks — remember our shortage of personnel — let alone take care of all these additional burdens and yet the Nazi party officials, who seemed to have the manpower available, did nothing to remecy the situation. There were hot arguments which led to nothing. The waste of valuable supplies in the MLR area continued. This indicates the additional responsiblilities the division had constantly to cope with.

The morning of 15 September enemy tanks came up from Eupen through Muetzenich and broke into Monschau, which was defended only by regional defence units and some cadre units who had withdrawn north from Kalterherberg.

Although all the approach roads had been blocked by the engineers some of the enemy tanks, led by local inhabitants through a side road in the southeaetern outskirts of Monshau sucoeeded in penetrating into the West Wall. After a fire duel with an antitank platoon from the east bank of the Lange River they withdrew back into the town.

Enemy infantry pressed our forces withdrawing by way of a water powered mill west of Alzen and tried, supported by artillery, which directed most of its fire on Hoefen, to breakthrough the West Wall also at this point.

Enemy tank-supported infantry finally succeeded in penetrating the West Wall. They broke through by way of the mill west of Alzen and took some of the pillboxes on the east bank of the Schwalm River.

Throughout the following days the enemy confined themselves to covering the Rohren—Hoefen area with fire barrages from motorized artillery. This damaged the villages badly but it did not affect the troops. The division command post was moved from Hoefen to the forester's house at the western edge of the forest of Monschau, southeast of Rohren.

The division seotor on the north extended from the village of Schmidt (exclus.) to Roetgen (inclus.), and on the south, to south of Schleiden, south of Haperscheid, toward Saarlodt. The right adjacent unit was the 353d Infantry Division and on the left was the 347th Infantry Division which had been fighting alongside of us from Liege on.

The enemy, favored by the heavily wooded terrain, penetrated in the latter division’s sector affecting from the south, even our left wing.

The regional defense battalion was committed to protect the area west of Harperscheid, behind the left wing of the division. However, no major offensive developed in that area.

Meanwhile the enemy had advanced into the Hurtgen Forest, north of the division sector, their aim being to bypass Aachen on the south. This attack extended pretty far south.

Approximately on 23 September, after systematic artillery preparation, the enemy launched a series of attacks generally following the Lammersdorf — Rollesbroich road.

There was special pressure against the so-called Paustenbach Height. The enemy attacked five to six times, again and again attacking at the same hour. Their regularity was amazing, the more so since each attack was repulsed— mostly with great enemy losses. For the latter reason the enemy requested a short one day, armistice to recover the wounded and bury the dead. This was granted. Nevertheless, the attack was repeated the following day at the usual time. The division front was held.

HORIZONTAL FLOURISH LINE



Source: U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies B-793

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