(13 Sep - 1 Oct 1944 )
By Oberst a.D. Hasso Neitzel
As a result of the situation described above the division’s cadre personnel, who had grown accustomed to hard fighting in open positions, were extremely unhappy at being obliged to occupy positions in such fortifications. Non-commissioned officer and men refused to go into the pillboxes. They preferred building themselves the kind of shelters they were accustomed to and eventually they were permitted to do so.
The division's northern sector was occupied by a replacement training regiment, which had got there shortly before we had. This regiment had had no time to do anything to remedy the conditions. It consisted of three battalions with 4 to 500 men each, two of which were committed in the MLR. There was a great deal of difference in age and training among the personnel. A great number of them had never been trained at all, since they had been deferred so long in the zone of the interior. Many of the officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel were men who had hardly been given time to recover from their wounds in the zone of the interior before their assignment to the regiment. Among the commanding officers there were many with artificial limbs. In short, in its present condition, the regiment could not be considered fit for combat duty.
However, its equipment and weapons were good for the
times. It had available German machine guns, type 34 and 42, and also some German light and medium field howitzers and one Italian medium field-howitzer with only 200 rounds of ammunition. As far as activating complete artillery units there was above all a lack of prime movers, and also
of signal and observation equipment which even later on
was procured and supplemented with great difficulty. There were no other weapons for the division and no engineer equipment whatsoever.
This was the situation in the division sector when on 15 September the elements still outside the West Wall were pressed back by the enemy into the wall. The enemy, however, did not continue the pressure as had been expected.
They ceased fighting to regroup and to adjust to the new front line in the West Wall.
Division command now estimated the situation as follows: The enemy, having pursued the seriously decimated German units from Normandy across France and Belgium, were surely well informed regarding the weakness of personnel and materiel. In addition their intelligence service and last but not least the civilian population, loyal to them, must have informed them regarding the insufficient personnel and equipment in the West Wall positions.
Since the combination of these factors indicated clearly the exceptional weakness of the German defences, the enemy could be expected to avail themselves of the first favorable opportunity to push through to the Rhine River. There could not be the least doubt that such an operation would prove successful in the 89th Division sector.
The Division's only chance was that the enemy would pause up this opportunity. Our troops would then have time to prepare actual and lasting resistance.
Division command fully realized that whatever could be done to reorganize the division, to amalgamate the old and new units into real combat units, to rebuild the West Wall proper, must be started immediately. Every day, even every hour, meant a gain and a strengthening of our power of resistance.
The order from corps, whose command post was at Kall, 5 kilometers southeast of Gemuend read: ’’Defence of the West Wall with all means available to prevent the enemy from breaking through and entering the Rhine River Valley. Defence to be mobile. It is important to constantly harass the enemy by armed reconnaissance before the West Wall during their probable preparations and also to recognize their intentions in time.”
The reorganization of the division was the first consideration. Now that division command knew what forces were available it endeavored to at once activate two infantry regiments. The replacement training regiment, which had been found already at the West Wall, was to remain unchanged. On request, it was later given the number of one of the division’s regiments smashed up in Normandy, the 1055th.
Out of the so-called parent units of the division's infantry and engineers a second regiment was activated.
It had, to begin with, no more strength than a battalion, but its officers and men were combat experienced. The
command of this regiment was given to the division’s engineer battalion commander, an officer who had proved
his ability on many occasions.
For lack of prime movers, and signal and observation equipment, the infantry guns still existing (I do not recall their exact number) were concentrated and committed to the central points of main effort.
The artillery remained the main problem. The trained specialists were transferred out of the artillery companies to await the arrival of the long expected artillery pieces and also so that they could get some extra training. With the one existing German prime mover our one German light field howitzer was comitted for use as a roving gun at the points of main effort.
The small amount of ammunition for the Italian medium field howitzer was soon expended and then the gun was used as a dummy. Whenever the prime mover was not needed to move the German howitzer the Italian one was moved around in the division sector for the purpose of deception.
The shortage of signal, survey and observation equipment was a tremendous handicap. By using surveyed points in the West Wall and the command communication system, it was possible now as well as later to move the one and only artillery piece and the heavy infantry weapons into positions at least surveyed by improvisation. It can be imagined how difficult flexibl fire control was with such primitive equipment.
Ammunition was transported on farm wagons and other vehicles the troops hed managed to bring along.
Since the engineers were for the time being employed as infantry no engineer units could be activated either now or in the near future. When groups for armed recon naissance in the West Wall front were forced as ordered every effort was raade to include some trained engineers.
Activation, for the time being, of independent anti-tank units was out of the question. All available guns were employed to back the infantry.
As mentioned above, the signal battalion personnel was on the whole complete. What we lacked was telephone and radio equipment and the men were kept constantly busy repairing the communication system.
The activation of supply personnel was entirely improvised. What rail lines were still undamaged in the division sector were consolidated.
The above account shows the situation of the 89th Infantry Division when it commenced fighting in the West Wall.
