15 Sep - 1 Oct 1944
II. ACTIONS IN THE HUERTGEN FOREST SOUTHEAST OF DÜREN cntnd.
by Hans Schmidt, Generalleutnant a.D.
To all these advantages and disadvantages in forest warfare must be added the very great moral strain resulting from fighting in these woods. Each man was more or less on his own, since the vast and difficult terrain made it impossible to establish a cohesive line. An officer or noncomissioned officer could handle only a very limited number of soldiers in actual fighting. The weird and wild surroundings intensified all combat reactions and impressions, especially since the effect of the shells which usually exploded in the tree tops was suoh greater due to the falling and splintering of trees and branches.Small arms fire hit trees and branches with a sharp crack, and the enemy often appeared suddenly close at hand and engaged in embittered close combat. Exposed to every kind of weather, the troops led a rugged life in crudely covered positions and foxholes. The irregular and frequently cold food was an additional hardship. For days men were unable to change their rain-soaked uniforms and boots. Due to a lack of personnel no regular system of relief could be introduced. Support from our heavy weapons was not as effective as it should have been in many critical situations because of shortage of ammunition, a lack of effective observers, and an inadequate telephone and radio communication system. These handicaps resulted in a further lowering of morale. The action of "Huertgen Forest" called for a great measure of self-sacrifice.
For the 275th Infantry Division these difficulties were accentuated. For many weeks it personnel had fought ardueus and costly battles without rest. They were in no way prepared for this new assignment. The units composed of stragglers and inadequately trained replacements were not yet fully consolidated. Above all there was a serious shortage of trained noncomissioned officers, and only a relatively small number of officers were available. All ranks had plenty to do, and they discharged their duties in an exemplary manner.
We succeeded during these days in establishing a firm organization and getting the troops accustomed to the peculiarities of forest warfare. Patrols were continuously sent out, and training courses were given in the use of weapons. The positions were extended and improved, though the lack of entrenching tools and construction material caused initial difficulties. The few engineers at our disposal were assigned to the front-line units and worked without rest. We were very fortunate in that the enemy remained quiet and inactive precisely during the first days of our commitment, perhaps because of the successes he had scored during the preceding days. His inactivity facilitated our work and madde it so much for our men to get used to the woods.
Based upon impressions derived from our first reconnoitering of the position, an order was issued on 24 Septenber to move our position forward across the Wehe south of Schevenhütte on the following day. I deemed this neccessary since the right wing of the 353d Infantry Division was echeloned about one kilometer ahead and our distance from the enemy seemed to make such an improvement of our position possible without much difficulty. Sector commander Major Riedel, who had his command post in the area of Point 312 (2.15 km southeast of Schevenhütte), was charged with the execution of this measure.
Traffic behind and to the front was greatly hampered by the numerous abatis and mines which had already been laid across most of the roads and paths. Apparently, at the time the Westwall was being prepared, it had not been intended to make a strong stand in this wooded terrain, but only to block the area as far as possible. Thus, the road from Gey to Schevenhütte at various points had been rendered unusable through minefields and tree obstacles. For this reason the right wing of the sector could only be reached via Merode and Schwarzenbroich. Most of the connecting roads behind the front had been blocked in the same manner. It was an unpleasant supplementary job for the engineers to restore use of the roads. To do so was all the more important since there were no maps or sketches showing the position of these obstacles.
During the night of 24-25 September, Düren had been subjected to harassing artillery fire of medium caliber, apparently from a great distance. Although there were relatively few casualties, the shelling, which occurred about every two hours and which was usually directed against the area around the railroad station and the western part of the city, caused unpleasant disturbances and great excitment, not so much to us soldiers, who were accustomed to it, but to the inhabitants, who also suffered casualties. This harassing fire went on almost every night. The battery could not be exactly located or effectively silenced.
On 25 September the forward shift of the position was carried out without casualties. Contact with the 353d Infantry Division was established in the shortest way, with a resultant saving in personnel. Now that the position was definitely established, the work of preparing it was carried out with concentrated effort.
Enemy air activity was relatively light during these days, probably because of the weather, which was cloudy with occasional rain.
On 26 September the division command post was transferred from Düren to Mariaweiler (2 km north of Düren) by order of Seventh Army headquarters, as its location within the town had proved impractical for various reasons.
On that day the division was detached from the LXXXI Corps and was subordinated to the LXXXIV Corps, which maintained its command post at Kall (4.5 km southeast of Gemünd). Thus the combat forces within the Huertgen forest came under a unified command, which proved to be advantageous. Seventh Army headquarters made a clear-cut decision to the effect that the town of Schevenhütte on the right flank should fall to the responsibility of the 12th Volksgrenadier Division, as the latter was in a more favorable position in the north to check the effects of artillery fire than the 275th Infantry Division. A disadvantage here was the fact that the front line formed a right angle at this most important point, but nothing could be done about that.
The strengthening of the Düren position progressed quite satisfactorily. Or labor forces had been increased by about one hundred members of the Hitler Youth organization, in the twelve to seventeen your old class, who had been sent up from the Rhineland to help in the building of entrenchments. They were billeted all together in Mariaweiler, and handled their own supplies. These young people were of relatively little help. They suffered from the cold weather, being inadequately clothed, most of them did not even have over-coats.
The so-called battle position, supposed to exist in the sector of the 275th Infantry Division, extending approximately along the eastern fringe of the woods on both sides of Hof Hardt and in the direction of Gey, consisted of nothing more than a series of foxholes. More important front line tasks left no forces available for the improvement of this position.
At that time livelier enemy activity than heretofore began along this line. The enemy had apparently observed the forward shift of our position, had perhaps even been irked by this move. His patrol activity was brisk. His frequent surprise mortar fire was annoying, especially since he frequently changed his target, and greatly hampered our work. Losses occurred daily, though they were not serious, amounting to three or four men each day. Medical aid stations were established as far forward as the battalion command post. From there the wounded were transported to the clearing station in empty supply vehicles. Due to the lack of ammunition the mortar fire could not be effectively returned.
Since the front sector of the combat command controlled by Riedel's staff had so to speak no roads connecting it with the sector on the right, which made things difficult, Oberst Heinz was put in charge of the entire sector. The latter could make use of the Headquarters Company of the 984th Infantry Regiment. He established his command post at Hof Hardt, three kilometres west of Gürzenich. That the civilian population of hamlets immediately behind the front, such as Schwarzenbroich and Hof Hardt, had not been evacuated proved a nuisance. It was several days before the district party leaders at Düren made the necessary arrangements. On the other hand, it was quite an advantage for our troops to have local guides -- local foresters were a great help -- at their disposition who knew every part of this difficult terrain, particularly for reconnaissance patrols. In order to prevent civilians from traveling back and forth across the front line, especially since some might be engaged in espionage, the crossing of a line which extended approximately two kilometres west of Gürzenich in the direction of the front was prohibited.
Düren policemen were posted as guards. The road from Gürzenich to Schevenhütte was frequently subjected to harassing fire, since the enemy expected heavy traffic on this road. Fire was also laid around our battery position close up at Derichsweiler and Gürzenich-West.
