275. INFANTERIE-DIVISION (GE)

15 Sep - 1 Oct 1944


II. ACTIONS IN THE HUERTGEN FOREST SOUTHEAST OF DÜREN

by Hans Schmidt, Generalleutnant a.D.

1. Commitment at the Boundary between the LXXXI and LXXXIV Corps Schevenhütte from 22 September to 1 October 1944.

While I was still occupied with the commitment of the forces at my disposal in the Westwall behind the right wing of the 183d Volksgrenadier Division, the 275th Infantry Division was, on 22 September, ordered to move in behind the left wing of the corps where the situation had become critical and where a gap between it and the adjacent unit on the left had to be closed. I was not enthusiastic about this mission, since at the moment I had only very few troops at ay disposal and these were in urgent need of rest and rehabilitation.

At that time our division consisted only of two complete regimental staffs, with Oberst Schmitz commanding the 983d Infantry Regiment and Oberst Heins commanding the 984th Infantry Regiment. In the latter the remnants of the infantry formed one battalion under the command of Captain Dienelt. The 983d Infantry Regiment consisted only of its staff and one headquarters company. In addition the partly motorized Infantry Battalion Riedel which included all arms and branches of the service was at my disposal. The Navy was represented by officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men. Despite this motley composition the spirit of this outfit, was magnificant. Battalion Riedel had again and again proved its worth in previous engagements.

The total strength of the infantry available for commitment was approximately 800 men, since stragglers had reported in the meantime and several new assignments had been received.

Our artillery still consisted of but one battery of four light field howitzers with about 100 men. The battalion staff arrived several days later, as its presence was still required in the old position.

The staff of the engineer battalion was still intact and commanded half an engineer company, approximately 50 men strong.

The rear elements of the division, like the signal communication battalion, fully prepared for commitment though only at half strength, had not undergone any change.

The total strength of the division amounted to about 2700 men.

Besides some heavy and light machine guns and medium caliber mortars, no heavy infantry weapons, such as antitank or infantry guns, were available.

Such was the composition of the 275th Infantry division on 22 September the day of its commitment in the Huertgen forest. Many weeks of extremely heavy fighting and severest loses followed, but in the end these actions certainly deserve honorable mention in the annals of the 275th Infantry Division.

On 23 September the division staff transferred its command post from Linnich to Düren-Nord. The troops had already begun their march during the preceding night.

The gap which had developed between LXXXI and LXXIV Infantry Corps extended about three kilometers. The 12th Volksgrenadier Division, which had suffered heavy casualties in the engagements of the preceding days, was no longer strong enough to secure its contacts with the 353d Infantry Division. The town of Schevenhütte had repeatedly changed hands during these engagements and finally remained in the possession of the enemy. My division was assigned the sector from the northern edge of the town to approximately the bend in the road, two and a half kilomaters further southeast. The corps boundary extended roughly from Zweifall to Gürsenich. The position assigned was occupied during the course of day, and the outguards of the 12th Volksgrenadier Division were relieved without interference from the enemy. Contact woe established with the units on the right and left flanks.

Battalion Riedel, the most mobile unit, went into action at once, since according to corps orders it was important and urgent to eliminate the weak spot consisting of the very weakly occupied gap at the sector boundary. Battalion Riedel established two sub-sectors: a smaller one, opposite Schevenhütte and a larger one, in the adjacent wooded terrain. A continuous line did not exist. First, the outguard positions of our predecessors were taken over, and out of these a defense line was created in sections, entrenched in foxholes. The position extended axong the hills east of Schevenhütte and ran mostly along the east bank of the Wehe to a point of contact with the positions of the 353d Infantry Division, which had been echeloned forward across the Wehe. The enemy remained quiet and did not interfere either through reconnaisance or fire with the occupation of this position.

The battery occupied positions just west ef Derichsweiler.

Battalion Dienelt of the 984th Infantry Regiment took up quarters in Roelsdorf (1 km southwest of Düren), where it remained at my disposal. The combat value of this battalion was not very great. The rest period was utilised to organize its units, train them, and improve their discipline. An early commitment of this battalion was anticipated.

Our division was also ordered to prepare the defenses of Düren. The chief problem was to establish defense positions along the western edge of the town to connect with the Roer positions extending to either side. Oberst Schmitz of the 983d Infantry was put in charge of this project, assisted by his staff. Corps headquarters appointed Schmitz commander of Düren. The party district leader who had his office in the town assigned civilians as laborers. These were supervised and controlled by S.A. men who, strange to say, were not of that area. It was some sort of levee en masse among all age groups. Thanks to the energy and combat experience of Oberst Schmitz, work progressed so satisfactorily as to permit the subsequent inclusion of Gürzenich and Roelsdorf in the defense system especially when a few days later an additional battalion of Russian "Hiwis" (Freiwillige or voluntary helpers) were assigned to this work.

The line of defense extended in a wide curve from Mariaweiler to Roelsdorf, with Gürzenich serving as an advance position. In addition, the east bank of the Roer river within Düren itself was prepared as a shorter secondary line.

The extensive wooded area, through which the position ran, consisted of Meroder Forest, State Forest Wenau, Huertgen Forest, and further to the south, Roetgen Forest. These wooded areas were collectively called the "Huertgen Forest" in the course of the ensuing actions, a designation which as far as I can remember, appeared for the first time in an American Armed Forces communique and which was later adopted in German Wehrmacht reports.

The "Huertgen Forest" is a complex of wooded areas, eighteen kilometers long and eight kilometers wide. Long established forests of wide-spaced trees alternate with dense thickets and re-aforested areas in various stages of growth, which preclude observation even at close range and are almost impenetrable. The dark pine trees and the dense tree tops, which scarcely admit light, give the forest even in day time a somber appearance which is apt to cast gloom upon sensitive people. The ground is solid but interspersed with swampy places, especially in the deeper hollows and at the bottom of ravines. Steep slopes, hills of considerable height, and numerous streams with steep banks produce a rich assortment of terrain features, but render it difficult to fight in. Vehicles can only move through the woods along the few roads or paths, and in an emergency in dry weather also along the firebreaks or division lines. (1)

(1) German forests are generally divided into relatively small numbered lots of varying stands, separated by a Schneise, a prolonged clearing wide enough for a cart and kept open in the interest of accessibility and fire control.

During the continuous rains which prevailed at the time all roads and paths without solid subsoil quickly turned to mud, become unfit for vehicles, and sometimes even inpassable for pedestrians. During the first days we were compelled to corduroy the roads and paths in order to insure a continuous flow of ammunition and supplies, and to evacuate the wounded.

This wooded terrain presented great difficulties, especially for the conduct of battle but was favorable to the infantryman and his improvised weapons. At no time was it possible to fire at medium, let alone long distance, ranges. The terrain and continuous dennse forests permitted the use of weapons only at close range. Mortar fire on the other hand was pleasantly effective in the woods. The mortar shells exploded among the trees, and flying wood splinters caused more casualties then normally occur in open country. Artillery fire, of course, produced the same effect, but unfortunately, we lacked the forward observers and radio equipment so important in a terrain where direct aiming was impossible. On the other hand again the construction of positions was favored by the trees. Fire lanes were cut, and the tree tops as well as the tree trunks were used as obstacles. Machine guns could cover the artificially created field of fire from the flanks. Barbed wire obstacles subsequently laid in a continuous line, could be strung out so much easier in the woods than in open terrain where poles have to be driven. Terrain particularly favorable to the enemy's approach and paths leading towards our positions were mined; camouflaging was relatively easy. These minefields turned out later to be particularly troublesome to the enemy and stopped his advance rapeatadly. We will come back to this subject later.

Bunkers were not available in my sector. At first, everybody had to camp in the open, day and night; but after the necessary tools and equipment had arrived, weatherproof shelters were erected, which also offered protection against enemy fire and splinters. The installations were built on steep slopes facing away from the enemy, or consisted of dugouts whose roofs were level with the ground and made of several layars of timber and soil. Splinter-proof outpost shelters were built in the same manner, with embrasures in all directions. Also effective were camouflaged snipers perches built in trees, from which snipers, their rifles equipped with telescopic sights, could shoot more effectively and further than from the ground.

HORIZONTAL FLOURISH LINE



Source:
U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies B-373

Top of Page

Sitemap