By General der Infanterie a.D. Friedrich August Schack, March 1948.

FIGHT FOR WEST WALL AND AACHEN
( 13 - 21 September 1944 )

Before continuing the survey of events I would like to describe briefly the situation on the West Wall and at Aachen. At the beginning of August Hitler had ordered the repair and reorganization of the West Wall for defense. Our attempt to stop the enemy's advance at the Meuse River and on the "inverted" Maginot Line until the reorganization was completed had failed. So when our exhausted and battle-weary forces finally reached the West Wall they found only antiquated and neglected fortifications. The West Wall had been looted during the hasty withdrawal of administrative troops from the zone of communications. Many concrete pill boxes were filled with water, devoid of equipment, others were locked and the keys were missing. In addition, a great deal of the ventilation and signal communications systems were not in working condition. The field of fire was obstructed by vegetation; wire entanglements had been removed and taken for the defense of the Atlantic Wall; firing slits were clogged with leaves and dirt. The concrete pill boxes for antitank guns, built in 1939, were adapted to 3.7 caliber guns only, and were now obsolete. The type 42 machine guns, with their rapid-cycle rate of fire, could not operate in the available machine-gun pill boxes and therefore had to be used in positions in the open.

Responsibility for the reorganization of the West Wall and for the installing of troops in it was that of the Inspectorate of Fortifications West and the commandants of the fortified sectors. The Aachen sector was the responsibility of Sector Commandant Düren. The fortress engineer administrative agencies had not yet become used to their new job and, in addition, suffered from lack of personnel. The experienced fortification officials had become suspicious and resentful of the disorderly conduct of the administrative troops who, at the time of their hasty withdrawal, had not only billeted themselves, without authorization, in the permanent fortifications but had destroyed or stolen much equipment. Therefore when our troops showed up, they were often refused the keys to the larger installations.

For every corps sector a division staff had been sent ahead to make arrangements for the actual transfer and installation of the troops. This mission was carried out for LXXXI Corps by the 353d Division's staff, as before stated. But when events developed much more rapidly than had been expected, the 353d Division was not able to do very much. The result was that the forces were not given basic information until their actual arrival at the West Wall and moreover, this information was in most cases incomplete. In addition, when the rest of the troops withdrew to the fortifications during the fighting, the appropriate information was not passed on to them. The number of maps, especially for the artillery, was insufficient. Except for a few machine guns these was no permanently-installed armament in the West Wall. There was also great lack of ammunition stores, and mines. Data on the technical details of demolition arrived too late, or not at all. Sections of the technical data regarding the cable net in the fortified areas were either incomplete or issued too late. Moreover, cables and permanently installed signal equipment had deteriorated so much from moisture they were useless.

The troops, upon arrival immediately started to work and they brought about a change in an astonishingly short time. However, in spite of energetic efforts, there was no remedy for the fact that the entire West wall arrangement was not suited to modern battle conditions - especially since barbed wire, entrenching tools, mines, concrete and, in short, the most basic materials for building modern field fortifications, were lacking. And all transportation of supplies was paralyzed by the enemy's absolute superiority in the air.

A Colonel von Osterroth had been appointed combat commandant at Aachen. With foresight and energy he had done everything possible, within the limitations of personnel and materiel. The Aachen sector was manned as follows:

North of Aachen, elements from the 176th Replacement Training Division;

In the adjacent sector from Laurensberg south to the Maastricht highway (inclusive), one fortress machine gun battalion organized by the Tenth Military District;

In the forest southwest and south of Aachen, two replacement training infantry battalions;

Some antiaircraft units, partly for antitank use and partly in lieu of artillery.

These units, composed of experienced but convalescent front-line soldiers and badly trained replacements of every conceivable age had been hastily thrown together. They were poorly armed. The replacement training battalions had only a few heavy infantry weapons.

On 20 August Hitler had drafted the local population Under Party supervision they were put to constructing trenches, antitank ditches, and so on. They worked with great eagerness. But the members of the Party acted with absolute independence and upon our arrival resisted teeth and nail, any military interference in the planning and construction of the fortifications. Therefore, a lot of absurdities were produced and many installations were built which could never be used or which, at the most, were valuable only as dummies.

The Party agents assumed a most unfriendly attitude toward the military. When our forces arrived at the West so unexpectedly, Gauleiter Grohe of Köln - Aachen deliberately circulated the rumor, originated by Ley, that the sad military situation was due to sabotage by the generals. Up to the very last minute the Party tried to deceive the population regarding the seriousness of the situation. When the battle for the West Wall began, no preparations had been made for the evacuation of the city of Aachen and the other towns along the Wall. Evacuation was begun only after corps headquarters had pressed the matter strongly. Then suddenly, during the night of 12-13 September, following exaggerated rumors about a penetration of enemy tanks into the West Wall area, the Party initiated a headlong evacuation and every Party agency, every member of the civil administration, and the entire police force abandoned the city, with the alleged purpose of directing the evacuation from outside. All of this made military command most difficult and in several cases it led to serious conflicts between the military command and Party. It eventually led to me being relived from command on 21 September.

It has seemed necessary to describe all these circumstances in order to show the difficulties our forces had to face in the Aachen area. Added to a paralyzing enemy superiority in the air, a crushing enemy superiority in tanks, artillery, and ammunition there was constant trouble, in matters both great and small, with narrow-minded, spiteful, and pompous Party officials.

13 SEPTEMBER

Our anticipation that the battle for the West Wall proper would begin on this date proved fully justified. In the morning it was reported that the enemy, driving before them our forces withdrawing along the Hergenrath, Aachen, and Eupen Highways, and beached the West Wall position around Aachen with tanks and infantry had taken pill box 161, 2 kilometer north of Hauset. The combat commandant of Aachen had immediately launched a counterattack. The breach had been contained, but for the time being pill box 161 remained in enemy hands.

By evening, reinforced with assault guns, our forces succeeded in mopping up the entire breach. Along the remaining front of the LXXXI Corps, our task forces, which had been penetrated at several points on 12 September, had carried out a successful night withdrawal and now manned a line of security, south of the Maastricht - Aachen highway, as follows:

275th Division's Kampfgruppe at the Maastricht - Aachen highway; right wing at the road running south from Heer, left wing at Margraten (exclusive).

49th Division's Kampfgruppe at the West Wall

353d Division's Kampfgruppe together with the combat commandant of Aachen and the troops employed in the West Wall, at the Eynatten - Forstbach road.

9th Panzer Division's Kampfgruppe at the West Wall as far as the left sector boundary along the southern border of Roetgen toward Mambach - Hetzingen.

The 353d Division was moved to Vicht and ordered to man the Oberforstbach - Roetgen sector. With the replacement training battalion of the 536th Replacement Training Division, under the staff of the 453d Replacement Training Regiment, commanded by Colonel Feind its was to prepare for defense.

It was corps' intention to improve and reinforce, with all means available, the second line of the West Wall in the southern part of the sector where the next main enemy assault was expected. For this reason a regional defense training battalion which was to come from Frankfurt am Main and another regional defense unit were assigned and subordinated to the 353d Division.

In view of the obstructions placed in front of the West Wall, the 116th Panzer Division was ordered to disengage itself from the enemy and to assemble in an area around Würselen, northeast of Aachen as a corps reserve. When the advance elements of the division reached the northeastern outskirts of the city, they found that its inhabitants had collected here awaiting evacuation although, as stated before, all the Party agencies had left. To clear the streets for the use of his troops the commanding General of the Division, Generalleutnant Count von Schwerin, ordered the excited crowds to return to their homes. This order was seized upon by the arty members, when they returned later, as an excuse for their failure. They claimed that their authorized and organized evacuation of the city had been disrupted and prevented by General Schwerin's interference. This disagreement, which led to repeated and heated discussions and finally to my own and General Schwerin's relief from command, is mentioned here because it throws light upon a characteristic situation.

Our forces were still organizing a new line of security when superior enemy infantry forces and about two armored divisions of the U.S. First Army launched an attack in a northerly and northeasterly direction. The 275th Division was pushed back behind the Valkenburg defile, and while some of its elements held a bridgehead of sort in the line Amby - Heer east of Maastricht, it succeeded in organizing a new defense, in prepared field fortifications, on the line Meerssen - Valkenburg - Oud Valkenburg - Wittem. But that evening a new heavy enemy attack on Maastricht from the south and southeast flattened out the bridgehead, and some 15 enemy tanks infiltrated into the southern environs of Maastricht.

In the 49th Division sector the enemy advanced to the area northwest of Gulpen. By committing our last reserves, we succeeded in barely neutralizing this pocket, during the evening. Five enemy tanks were destroyed.

West of Aachen an enemy penetration was wiped out in an immediate counterattack by elements of the 116th Panzer Division. During the evening the gap in the neighborhood of Hauset was closed.

While fighting was going on in the areas mentioned above, the enemy broke through the West Wall, an a broad front, north of Roetgen, and their tanks advanced on both sides of Walheim and via Rott. Quick concentration of isolated reserve units succeeded in stopping the enemy on the lie Kornelimünster - Hahn - Mulartshuette. Four enemy tanks were destroyed in close combat. The 116th Panzer Division was moved into an assembly area behind the breach and ordered to clear the West Wall by counterattacking.

At the close of the day the LXXXI Corps' front showed several more or less pronounced indentures. Nevertheless a decisive enemy penetration through the West Wall or to the north had been prevented.

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