LXXXI. ARMEEKORPS (GE)
(4 - 21 September 1944)

By General der Infanterie a.D. Friedrich August Schack, March 1948.

MAP 4
Situation map 9 - 20 September 1944

9 SEPTEMBER

During the morning, the weak forces of the 353d, 275th, and 49th Infantry Divisions held the eastern bank of the Meuse River. In the afternoon, the U.S. Twelfth Army Group launched an attack, out of the Liege area, in a northeasterly direction, and our 49th Division established a defensive flank in the line Jupille - Fleron. Farther to the left, the 116th Panzer Division, echeloned to the rear, was engaged in heavy action on the hills west of Herve, on both sides of the Liege - Herve highway, against an armored division attacking the line Herve - Verviers. The 105th Panzer Brigade was subordinated to LXXIV Corps in the vicinity of Limbourg.

The bridge at Visé had been blown up on 8 September, after the last stragglers had crossed.

The 116th Panzer Division was ordered to attack the enemy, who had reached Dison with 20 tanks, and to push through to the banks of the Vesdre River. All movement, however, was hampered by lack of fuel and the attack did not penetrate very far. During the day the left wing of the 49th Division was pushed back across the Bolland Brook. Nevertheless, the weak German forces prevented the rolling-up of the Meuse River front. The enemy penetrated as far as Limbourg, but their attacks farther south in the LXXIV Corps sector were checked along the defile on both sides of Theux.

That evening, Maastricht and the Maastricht bridgehead were subordinated to the 176th Division. Corps headquarters was therefore no longer responsible for this unlucky bridgehead.

Hilter had ordered that Fort Eben Emael, north of Liege, be occupied by one battalion and defended to the last man. This order was absurd, because all of the fort's defensive installations faced eastward. Moreover, the fort was unsuited for prolonged defense, not only because of its deficiencies in armament but in its entire planning and arrangement.

The 353d Division, at Maastricht with the remainder of its own elements and some newly-organized units, was ordered to transfer every non-divisional unit to the 275th Division and to man the defenses of the West Wall from Orsbach to the forest south of Aachen.

The LXXXI Corps command post was moved to Würselen, 3 kilometers northeast of Aachen.

10 SEPTEMBER

After a peaceful night the enemy began, early in the morning, to direct heavy artillery fire on the Argenteau area south of Vise. They had apparently reorganized their artillery and were now placing well-directed fire upon our positions, especially on the roads exposed to observation in the vicinity of Visé and on the town itself. Although lack of guns and ammunition prevented us from replying, our casualties were not heavy.

We got the impression that the enemy was preparing for a river crossing. Therefore we organized, out of the stragglers, an improvised motorized task force, consisting of three companies mounted on personnel carriers, commanded by Major Riedel and assigned ad subordinated it to the 275th Division.

That afternoon strong enemy armored forces attacked the tin security line, west of Herve, from the south and penetrated to Dalhem, east of Argenteau. We recovered the village by an immediate counterattack. The enemy was stopped along the Bevinne Brook by combat teams from the 49th Division and the 116th Panzer Division.

By evening the front line ran: Argenteau - Dalhem - Mortroux - St. Andre - Charneux - Clermont. In spite of heavy enemy pressure on the left sector boundary the 105th Panzer Brigade held the are west and south of Limbourg; but in the adjacent sector the security line was pierced at several points and the situation was no longer clear. Also toward evening, the enemy adjusted artillery fire, light and heavy calibers, on the main line of resistance in the Argenteau - Dalhem area. Enemy movements in strength on the hills 3 kilometers west of Julemont were reported.

Corps headquarters expected another enemy attack on 11 September, with the point of main effort on the southern wing toward Eupen. Therefore, we tried in every way, with the insufficient forces at our disposal to reinforce the defenses in this sector. We withdrew the left wing of the 49th Division behind the Berwinne River. On the left rear the 116th Panzer Division was staggered in depth along the Liege - Aachen highway, with outposts on the hills southwest of Henri-Chapelle. The advance elements on the 9th Panzer Division, recently subordinated to LXXXI Corps, approaching from the Kaiserslautern area, were committed at Eupen, in support of the exhausted 105th Panzer Brigade along the Limbourg - Eupen - Aachen highway. We also combined units of the 9th Panzer Division as they arrived at Limbourg, with the remaining elements of the 105th Panzer Brigade and with the 394th Assault Gun Brigade, also newly arrived, as a task force commanded by the commanding officer of the 9th Panzer Division, Colonel Mueller.

The 105th Panzer Brigade had lost most of its armor and had no more than 10 tanks and 20 armored personnel carriers. Moreover, only the following elements of the 9th Panzer Division had actually arrived: three companies of armored infantry, with 90 men and from 6 to 9 light machine guns each; one company of engineers, of the same strength; two batteries, 10,5 cm, with 3 guns each; two antiaircraft guns, 8.8 cm, from the division antiaircraft battalion; and some elements of division headquarters. Division headquarters was equipped with radio, but had no telephone companies. The remaining elements of the 9th Panzer Division were still somewhere between Kaiserslautern and Düren, and because of lack of fuel, combined with errors in the march organization, they did not arrive until such later.

The morning of 11 September Kampfgruppe Mueller occupied the line Hackelbach, 5 kilometers northwest of Limburg, - Bilstain, 2 kilometers west of Limbourg, - Limbourg itself.

The corps command post was moved to Weiden, 8 kilometers northeast of Aachen.

11 SEPTEMBER

The morning passed quietly but, as expected, a major enemy attack began in the afternoon. Through a heroic defense, an a tempted enemy crossing in the vicinity of Vise was repulsed. Later, strong enemy forces supported by tanks, attacked Dalhem and Neufchateau and, after a short but fierce fight, captured both towns. The 275th Division was driven from its position along the brook to a hastily-prepared rear position in the hills, which it held until evening. By an advance from Dalhem in a northeasterly direction the enemy cut off the battalion at Argenteau. This battalion was simultaneously attacked from the south, and the bulk of it fell into enemy hands.

The main enemy attack, as expected, was directed against our southern wing and a penetration by strong enemy tank forces, was effected at several points. At 1800 enemy tanks and mechanized infantry broke through the 49th Division security line in the vicinity of Aubel and captured Hagelstein. The two battalions holding this position were cut off. Farther south, the enemy drove back to weak covering elements in the vicinity of Hockelbach but was stopped near Henri-Chapelle by elements of the 394th Assault Gun Brigade. West of Limbourg the enemy penetrated the security line and reached the 9th Panzer Division command post at Walhorn, with 35 tanks, via Herbesthal. At 2000 enemy armor engaged elements of the 116th Panzer Division in Hergenrath.

While fighting was still going on around Limbourg, other enemy forces by-passed this city on their way to Eupen, captured it, and wheeled northeast toward Eynatten. In the adjacent sector enemy armored reconnaissance advanced on Monschau.

We concentrated every reserve available for counterattack. However, we were handicapped by lack of fuel and ammunition and every attempted movement was paralyzed by enemy fighter-bombers. They attacked even individual motorcycle messengers and light cars. By mobilizing the very last reserve we succeeded in breaking up the enemy attack sufficiently to prevent a breakthrough toward Aachen before evening. Our strength in personnel and materiel, however, was grievously exhausted. The 105th Panzer Brigade, for example, now had only two tanks available for action. On the other hand, the enemy had also suffered heavy losses. Fifteen enemy tanks and an armored reconnaissance car had been destroyed.

Our thin line of security had disintegrated in several places. To consolidate, we had to fall back a little, increasing the possibilities of concentration and reorganization. The 275th Division was ordered to withdraw its left wing behind the Voer Brook, and the combat teams of the 49th Infantry and 116th Panzer Divisions were ordered to reorganize and commit their units in a new line of defense running along the Voer Brook toward Moresnet. The 9th Panzer Division concentrated its units around Eynatten, and the 353d Division in its rear, manned the West Wall as a security force. However, the insufficiency of our forces, the continuing lack of ammunition and fuel, and the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in personnel and equipment continued to make the situation critical

It was clear that perhaps the next day there would be a fight for the West Wall positions.

12 SEPTEMBER

The night passed quietly. The withdrawals were carried out according to plan, without enemy interference. Up to non no special engagements developed, - a circumstance of special value to us, since the bulk of our troops marched into their positions during the forenoon.

That afternoon, however, elements of the U.S. First Army, consisting of an armored division, and armored brigade, and a infantry division, attacked in a northerly and northeasterly direction along the whole LXXXI Corps front and, in spite of stubborn defense and local counterattacks, pierced our line of defense in several places. In the 275th Division sector, enemy forces from the area north of Vise penetrated as far as Breust, via Mouland - Eysden, and as far as Mheer, via Fouron le Comte. Schilberg was defended successfully. Strong enemy armored forces penetrated the security line of the task force of the 49th Division as far as Slenaken and, east of Remersdael, to Epen. In the 116th Panzer Division sector the enemy's advanced elements entered the Aachen municipal forest north of Hauset. In an engagement with Kampfgruppe Mueller they carried Eynatten and Raeren. In the LXXIV Corps sector, enemy armored reconnaissance cars reached the West Wall's "dragon teeth" north of Roetgen.

Our defense was paralyzed by the lack of antitank close combat weapons and antitank mines. By nightfall, the location of our front line was no longer clear to corps headquarters. Its disintegration at several points made the situation very serious indeed. In fact, the next day was sure to bring the struggle for the West Wall, to the southern sector.

We had no illusions whatever about the condition of the West Wall. But its "dragon teeth" and permanent fortifications, visible from a distance, might arouse the enemy's respect and make them cautious. And perhaps their cautious approach would allow our exhausted forces, which this fateful day had thrown into confusion, breathing-time in which to reorganize and organize a new defense system. These serious questions, and the anxiety resulting there from, absorbed the attention of every commander at the close of this fateful day.

HORIZONTAL FLOURISH LINE



Source: U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies B-816

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