CONCLUSIONS
The combination of terrain and weather was the more prominent of the two major factors which were common to all of the armored units involved in the HURTGEN FOREST fighting. The terrain restricted maneuver, reduced mobility, limited observation, hindered supply of attacking units, and decidedly favored the determined German defenders. The weather was closely allied to the terrain conditions: rain transformed the already formidable terrain into a morass; fog reduced visibility in some instances to only a few yards; snow and cold adversely affected equipment, concealed mines and booby traps, and added frostbite and trenchfoot to the other discomforts suffered by troops in the forest.
The fact that armored units were fighting in support of infantry and under the operational control of infantry commanders was the second major factor. This means that the tactics of armor were modified to fit the infantry situations and were dictated by the infantry and that their objectives were infantry objectives. Furthermore, coordination was weak; control was ineffective; and armored units often lacked the necessary tactical information.
One of the most pressing problems in the HURTGEN FOREST — a direct result of these two major factors — was the vital need for close and aggressive engineer support for armored units: (1) terrain and weather conditions made excessive demands on the engineers; and (2) engineer units trained to support infantry did not appreciate the magnitude of their role in supporting armor. For instance, lack of adequate engineer support precluded the use of the 707th Tank Battalion in the 28th Infantry Division's defense of SCHMIDT and was instrumental in the failure of the attack on HÜRTGEN by Reserve Command, 5th Armored Division. Aggressive and continuous preparation and maintenance of a route for armored vehicles would have done much toward avoiding the losses sustained in these two engagements.
Engineers, must be included in every tank-infantry team. Their presence assures maximum availability of tank support to the infantry. But their absence delays or denies the infantry this support; for instance, a lack of engineers for mine removal prevented timely tank support for infantry of the 9th Division at both LAMMERSDORF and GERMETER. Russian army doctrine recommends the following small combined arms team for forest fighting:
It is advisable to attach about one squad of infantry and three or four sappers to each tank, and contact between them must not be broken. Aside from saws and axes, the sappers should be equipped with mine detectors and explosive materials for demolishing trees.
All of the difficulties encountered stem from the fact that the engineers with the infantry divisions had too little training in tank support. The tank battalions, which had fought continuously from the NORMANDY beaches with the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions had less trouble getting adequate engineer support than the tank battalions with other infantry divisions. Inclusion of tanks in the infantry division under the new tables of organization would result in better tank-infantry-engineer training and will do much to solve the problem of engineer support.
