CHAPTER VII
Summary
First Phase. The employment of the 5th Armored Division and its elements in the reserve role conforms, in general, to present doctrine except that it is felt that combat commands will not normally be attached to infantry divisions. Argurments that attachment was necessary for logistical reasons are inconsistent since the combat commands were supplied by the armored division anyway. Additional missions given the armored division while it was in the reserve role, although not considered normal, were dictated by the circumstances and did not detract materially from the primary mission since the majority of the division remained ready for immediate employment and since plans were made for quick release of elements otherwise utilised.
Second Phase. Colonel Anderson was particularly critical of the use of his Reserve command while attached to the 8th Infantry Division, (41) but it is certainly doubtful that dismounted infantry could have seized the objectives without suffering even greater losses. There was evidence of a lack of cooperation between the armor and the infantry division based on: (1)receiving erroneous reports from the infantry, and (2)the failure of the infantry to take, its objectives in joint attacks. However, the latter may be justified since some of the infantry companies were down in strength to a dozen men (Chapter VI). As for the erroneous reports, commanders must learn that reports must be verified by personal reconnaissance whenever time permits. The officer establishing contact must not stop at division or regiment, but must go to the company or platoon that is physically on the ground.
A different picture of the operation is presented by Lt. Col. Hamberg, who commanded the 10th Tank Battalion, in the following statement:
I have never seen an operation in which more personal initiative and bravery was shown. The reason that individual initiative and courage shewed up was due to the way the attack was conceived and planned. Ample time was given to study the job. There were excellent maps and photos. Each job was studied in complete detail. Houses and terrain features were identified. Squads and tanks were assigned to particular missions. After the first operation, however, CCR's forces were depleted to the point that there were no reserves; all troops were committed. Artillery preparation was planned in the same detail as other actions. (42)
This commitment of CCR to assist the infantry in its penetration by limited objective attacks at decisive points where the infantry lacked the strength and drive to be successful is fully in accordance with present-day doctrine. It is felt that CCR's success where three infantry divisions (the 9th, 28th, and 8th) had bogged down vindicates its employment in spite of heavy losses. This is not indented to indicate that CCR accomplished what three divisions could not; the divisions had attacked singly and were low in strength and spirit by the time they had reached this point. In addition, the 8th Infantry Division captured HÜRTGEN, which unhinged the defense of the area and served as a wedge into the German positions. Further, the greater percentage of CCR's losses were received in two actions, the unsuccessful attack on HÜRTGEN on 25 November and the holding of BERGSTEIN against repeated counterattacks between 5 and 8 December. The first was directly occasioned by erroneous information from the infantry and the failure of CCR to verify these reports on the ground. In the second instance, infantry elements, to conform with ground. In the second instance, infantry elements, to conform with doctrine, should have taken over the defense of the objective the first night. This was called for in the original plan, although the depleted strength and other commitments of the 8th Infantry Division may have precluded this. Nevertheless, the action did prove something. Tankers normally are very reluctant to be placed on the defensive; although position defense is not the most profitable use of mobile forces, this action demonstrates that tanks can set up a strong defense with a small force of infantry when required to do so.
Thus, the use of armor in a limited objective attack to speed up the penetration when it is progressing slowly and at a high cost to the infantry is certainly within the scope of past and present tactics; in fact, the retention of all of the 5th Armored in a reserve role when it could hasten such a costly penetration could not have been justified. In such a commitment of armor there are two principles that should be applied: (l) that the objective assigned be within the capability of armor (i.e., ground sufficiently open to give maneuver room to the attacking armor even if surrounded by woods), and (2) that sufficient force be retained in reserve to take advantage of any success so gained.
Final Phase. In the last period, two armored columns attacked through the infantry on the far edge of the forest to push to the ROER before the Germans could reorganize their defense. The attack did not proceed rapidly because of numerous mines, but it was successful and was marked by close cooperation between the 5th Armored Division and the 83d Infantry Division.
General Conclusions. Two possible criticisms exist in the general picture. At various times elements of the 5th Armored Division were parcelled out to infantry units during the first period. This does not refer to the attachment of CCR to the 8th Infantry Division, as this was tactically sound and necessary. That sufficient emergency existed in other CC attachments is not apparent now, but full consideration should always be given to the fact that combat and reserve commands, like the organic battalions, are not designed to operate detached from the armored division. While CCA was attached to the 4th Infantry Division from 29 November to 9 December, its armored infantry battalion was used in the line with the 22nd Regimental Combat Team; this was a completely dismounted action and was very costly in officers and other trained personnel; although the battalion was well ahead of other battalions of the 22nd RCT, it was ordered to retire to straighten the line, and its contribution to the overall situation did not justify the losses sustained. Armored infantry contains too many specialists in proportion to the number of riflemen to attack profitably with regular infantry. By the same token, the 4th Cavalry Group was given so many gaps to fill that it became necessary to committ an attached light tank battalion and a TD battalion dismounted; although reconnaissance battalions are trained to fight mounted or dismounted, tank units should be committed in dismounted action only as a last resort.
The technique and tactics within the division conformed to present day doctrine except in two matters: (1) the constant use of the reserve command as a fighting headquarters, and (2) a semi-permanent attachment of battalions in the reserve and combat commands. This latter idea was carried down to reinforced battalions, which with few exceptions, consisted of tank and armored infantry companies "married" to each other. Both of these points are contrary to the teachings of the Armored School, but still have many proponents in the armored force. Those opposed to the school doctrine argue that a triangular organization is needed in combat and is actually provided by the third headquarters (which is organized the same as the others except for the grade of the commander) and, further, that units resting or being rehabilitated can operate with the trains or as division troops. Using three fighting commands enables a rotation of headquarters and leaves the headquarters commanding the reserve better able to be committed as a reserve.
In regard to the "married" formations CCR, for example, used a system of set formations which were included in SOP's and designated in orders by "A", "B", or "C". It was found that these formations covered just about every situation encountered, and if they did not, it was still possible to alter them as the circumstances demanded. They, of course, had the advantage of simplifying communications and command relationships and also built a pride in the various teams, but had the disadvantage that there was a tendency to use one of these formations out of habit rather than organize according to the terrain and the mission. One might say that there is a trend toward making the plan fit the task organizations rather than organizing the troops to fit the plan. In addition, this system led to a fixed formation within CCR whereby the armored infantry battalion consisted habitually of but one "married" team of tanks and Infantry and a small proportion of supporting troops, thereby wasting a battalion headquarters and giving the load repeatedly to the tank battalion.
Some consideration should be given to the employment of battalions and companies in CCR. The only criticism that can be made of this well-organized operation is in the plans for the utilization of the reserve, which considered its use only if the attacking battalion got in trouble rather than its use to exploit a success. The reserve was also kept well to the rear and was not moved forward as the attack progressed. For example, when the 10th Tank Battalion was attacking BRANDENBERG the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, the reserve, was still located west of GERMETER and would have had to move over poor, congested roads through KLEINHAU. Had the reserve been well forward, at least to KLEINHAU, it could have pushed through to BERGSTEIN when Company A tanks entered that town on 5 December.
The tank battalion in its attacks on KLEINHAU, BRANDENBERG, and BERGSTEIN used to full advantage the capabilities of its various arms. In general, the tanks and infantry attacked a town jointly; tanks with some infantry protection cut off the roads in and out of the town while the infantry, assisted by some tanks, was utilized to clear the town. In the attack on KLEINHAU the infantry was dismounted too soon, as we have already noted, and this error was corrected in subsequent actions.
An important point to be considered is the need for armored vehicles to bring up front line supplies and to evacuate casualties. Because of the intense high trajectory fire, the 10th Tank Battalion frequently used light tanks to accomplish these missions. The inclusion of the full-track personnel carrier in present tables of organization should solve this problem, however, since such situations will be the exception rather than the rule.
We can conclude that armor other than that in direct support of infantry can be successfully employed, not through heavy woods themselves but to seize decisive open areas within the forest when infantry elements have secured the woods-line. These attacks require particularly close teamwork between tanks, armored engineers, and armored infantry and especially close cooperation between the armored task force and other infantry units with which they are fighting. Such attacks require the maximum armor that the open spaces will hold as well as closely coordinated artillery preparations and counterbattery fire. The tanks must advance immediately behind supporting artillery fires and often under artillery time fire to get protection from enemy bazookas. These attacks require detailed planning, frequently down to squads and tank crews, which necessitates adequate tine and accurate maps and air photos.
