TACTICS
Attacking infantry must have tanks in close support regardless of difficulties presented by the terrain. The psychological advantages of using tanks in the HURTGEN FOREST — the shock effect on enemy troops and the confidence which tanks gave our own infantry — far outweighed the disadvantages of limited mobility and restricted fire power. This premise — that some tanks must be in immediate support of infantry in every tactical situation — underlies any discussion of the tactical use of armor in forest fighting. It does not follow that the principle of mass is violated just because the terrain often dictates that tanks must be used individually or by section to give effective support to the infantry; if tanks must be so employed, then the commander is using them in the largest mass possible. From this it follows that commanders at every echelon must be alert to use their tanks in greater mass if the accidents of terrain offer this opportunity. The infantry battalion commander having a platoon of tanks at his disposal must look for opportunities to use his tank platoon in massed formation; the regimental commander must be prepared to mass his tank company; the division commander should be ready to use his tank battalion (or an attached Corps tank battalion) to exploit a favorable situation; and the corps commander should seek an opportunity to employ his armored division to gain the decision.
Present doctrine for the use of armor in reducing a forest mass contemplates (1) that armor sweeps around the forest mass in a pincer movement to isolate the area and thus facilitate the advance of infantry through the wood; or (2) when the flanks are unassailable, that armored elements are massed in a mobile reserve to attack through infantry when the far edge of the woods has been secured as a line of departure. In addition, the basic premise that tanks must be in immediate support of infantry regardless of the difficulties presented by terrain necessitates a third concept: infantry clearing dense forests must employ small combined arms teams which include tanks, infantry and engineers.
The HURTGEN FOREST operation was initially planned in accordance with the second method. However, it was found necessary to weaken this reserve by committing part of it to assist in the penetration. The utilization of the armored division in this role, prepared to attack through the infantry when sufficient penetration has been made to secure maneuver room, follows the normal principle of employing a mobile reserve. The reserve must be centrally located; the armor must maintain close liaison with infantry elements to be prepared for any contingency; and prior planning and detailed reconnaissance forward are necessary. Great stress must be placed on liaison and planning in forest fighting as any movement through infantry will require detailed coordination and preparation to avoid congesting the limited road net and the few open patches of ground. In the battle of the HURTGEN FOREST, the means used to solve this requirement for special coordinations was to attach to the infantry division concerned the combat command which was to lead the attack, with the reservation that this combat command would revert to its parent unit as soon as the attack had progressed sufficiently beyond the infantry. Such attachment of a combat command to an infantry division is not the best solution, since (1) it further augments the difficulties of coordination by necessitating a change of command at a critical moment, and (2) it complicates logistical and administrative support because the combat command is not an administrative headquarters. Further, infantry commanders will be tempted to use elements of this, intended reserve in the line, reducing its capability to make a powerful driving attack when committed. With proper training and a proper attitude on the part of the infantry and armored commanders, the necessary coordination and cooperation can be accomplished without friction. Mutual understanding and mutual appreciation should be the keynote rather than technicalities as to command, whether units are attached, supporting, or cooperating.
During the mobile reserve phase it will frequently be expeditious to use components of the reserve in secondary missions such as the defense of an inactive sector or indirect fire roles. The former may become necessary as an economy measure in order to permit other forces to be concentrated to achieve the breakthrough; and the latter, as in the HURTGEN FOREST campaign, will often be necessary because of a shortage of artillery ammunition. Missions such as these should be considered as expedients but may be assigned when circumstances dictate, provided that (1) they do not detract materially from the primary mission, (2) a majority of the mobile reserve is retained ready for immediate employment, and (3) plans are made for a quick release of units so utilized.
A modification of the concept of employing armor after the infantry has secured the far edge of the woods is to commit armored elements from the mobile reserve to assist the infantry in penetrating the forest mass. Such attacks will normally be limited objective attacks directed at decisive points such as those made by CCR, 5th Armored Division to secure the HÜRTGEN - KLEINHAU - BERGSTEIN area. This employment of part of the mobile reserve to hasten a penetration when it is progressing slowly and at a high cost to the infantry is sound. In this role, particularly if the objective or zone of action is completely within the boundaries of one of the attacking infantry divisions, the armor may well be attached to that division. There are two requisites to the employment of the armored command in this type of operation: (1) the area assigned for attack should be sufficiently open to allow maneuver room to the armor even if surrounded by woods, and (2) sufficient force must be retained to take advantage of any success so gained. Deliberate planning and violent execution are the key; there can be no hesitation once the attack is launched.
The concept of employment within the attacking force follows the same pattern as for any armored attack: close teamwork between tanks, armored engineers, and armored infantry is vital, and especially important is close cooperation between the armored troops and the other infantry units in the area. The restrictions on maneuver necessitate detailed planning, often to include special missions down to squads and tank crews. Such planning requires good reconnaissance by all echelons, adequate time, and accurate maps and air photos. Likewise, closely coordinated artillery support becomes particularly important since the tanks must advance immediately behind supporting fires and often under artillery time fire to get protection against bazookas. Other principles are normal: infantry must attack with the tanks; engineer support must be well forward and immediately available. The engineers remove obstacles slowing the advance; the infantry protects the tanks and the engineers; the tanks protect both.
The role of tanks in immediate and direct support of infantry divisions during the HURTGEN FOREST fighting was the role of the medium tank company of the attached tank battalion. Cooperation between the tank battalions and the infantry divisions which they supported varied in proportion to the length of time they had worked together — the longer their association, the smoother their combined action. To render continuous, immediate support to the infantry it was necessary for tanks to be prepared to fight in small combined arms teams with the infantry and engineers. Forest fighting necessitates decentralization of command, and some such organization as was used by the 9th Infantry Division for the reduction of pillboxes might be desirable whenever tanks are to be used.
It has already been stated that infantry commanders at all levels must be ready to mass their tanks to take advantage of accidents of terrain. These accidents will usually be clearings within the forest mass where the mobility and fire power of the tanks can be better utilized. The attack at RICHELSKAUL by tanks of the 746th Tank Battalion is a good example of this employment at tank platoon level. The use of a company of tanks and tank destroyers near GROSSHAU where the 70th Tank Battalion was supporting the 4th Infantry Division exemplifies this employment on the company level.
Infantry commanders usually gained a closer appreciation of tank capabilities and limitations the longer they worked with armor. The use of the tanks of the 707th Tank Battalion as armored pillboxes at VOSSENACK by the 28th Infantry Division was extremely wasteful and was without material advantage to the infantry — in fact, it was frequently to their disadvantage because the tanks attracted artillery fire to the nearby infantry positions. The situation often dictates that tanks should be held in mobile reserve, prepared to move to any possible scene of action on short notice — as they were employed by the 70th Tank Battalion at GROSSHAU.
The new tables of organization and equipment adopted since World War II will eliminate many of the difficulties encountered by armored commanders in the Battle of the HURTGEN FOREST. The inclusion of a tank company organic to the infantry regiment recognizes the principle that attacking infantry must have tanks in close support in every situation, and will eliminate many difficulties of training and command. The organic tank battalion gives the infantry division commander a powerful weapon to assist in the penetration of enemy defenses and to use in the exploitation once the penetration has been effected. The corps commander can use a tank battalion from his armored group to further assist his infantry divisions before he is forced to commit a part of his armored division in mobile reserve in a limited objective attack.
