CHAPTER VII
Logistics
Discussion of logistics will be broken down into the same three periods used for the discussion of tactical employment-- (1) a mobile reserve period; (2) a period during which elements were used in the forest to assist the infantry in achieving its penetration; and (3) the armored attack to the banks of the ROER RIVER.
First Phase. In the first period, the division was not in contact except for one combat command which held a defensive-sector on an inactive front. This period was very wisely used to resupply after the trek across France and to perform maintenance and te prepare for future operations, particularly in obtaining the necessary items, such as "duck bills", overshoes, and sleeping bags for the coming winter. The division assembly area in the vicinity of MONSCHAU was close to the army dumps so that no problem was involved in securing supplies; however, distribution was somewhat complicated by the splitting up of divisional organic units. Combat commands were periodically detached and moved to other corps areas; tank battalions and even companies (Company D, 10th Tank Battalion was attached to the 2d Ranger Battalion) were attached to infantry units. Nevertheless, as it turned out, none of these elements were actively engaged so that supply requirements remained at a minimum.
In preparation for future operations a system of conducting protected conveys was instituted. This entailed establishment and operation of a "Division Service Area" into which units would dispatch supply vehicles guarded by armed escort from the unit and from which the division could dispatch convoys to supply points with division protection. The reverse procedure operated in the forward flow of supplies. (40) This general system was utilized throughout the HURTGEN action, although armed escorts were seldom necessary.
The division set up Class I and Class III dumps by employing transportation of the attached Quartermaster Truck companies and by using personnel from these companies to supplement a detachment of service troops provided by V Corps. Scheduled conveys were operated between army and division dumps. During the months of October and November, the trucks of the two Quartermaster Truck companies averaged 739 miles per truck per month.
Second Phase. From the last week of November to 8 December, while elements of the division were assisting the infantry in penetrating the forest, resupply became a definite problem. The division headquarters and CCB were together; but CCA was attached to the 4th Infantry Division with one of its battalions operating under the control of the 22d Regiment Combat Team and, at the same time CCR was not only attached to the 8th Infantry Division but was in another corps zone. To increase further the burden, both CCR and the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion were suffering heavy losses in men and materiel. Losses in personal equipment, individual arms, and crew served weapons were extremely heavy; in addition, heavy replacements were required for tires, radios, and radiators shattered by artillery tree bursts in the forest action. An abnormal delay existed in the replacement of these and most major items because of the confusion caused by the detachment of organic components, the resultant time lag of reports, and the circuitious MSR's.
During this period individual units took steps to reduce the materiel losses and to obtain equipment that was slow in being replaced or that was not available at depots. A truck was kept at the aid station and items of individual equipment, particularly arms and overshoes, were removed from the wounded and loaded into this truck. Because overshoes were a critical item and the incident rate of trench foot was rising, trucks were sent periodically to the rear to canvass hospitals for overshoes and other items of equipment. Although this was out of channels, the expedient kept the trench foot rate low.
Those units engaged found that all supplies had to be brought forward at night and then in half-tracks or, more often, in tanks and armored trailers. In the action of the 46th Battalion east of GR0SSHAU, all supplies had to be hand-carried by teams of drivers, cooks, and maintenance personnel. The S-4 of the 46th found it necessary to direct most of his attention to distribution which required far more personal supervision to reload supplies, to organize carrying teams, and to command these groups in the operation.
Long evacuation routes to the Ordnance Battalion for vehicle evacuation were further complicated by the lack of hard standing and by poor roads. Because tank transporters could not negotiate the roads, disabled tanks were dragged to the rear by retrievers, tanks, and M-25 tractors.
Personnel casualties were evacuated in tanks or in armored trailers towed by tanks. In the action of the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion even this method was impractical. Administrative personnel and the supply carrying-teams hand-carried the wounded under cover of darkness sometimes as far as two kilometers. Since evacuation was so difficult, aid stations were kept well forward, frequently right with the assault companies.
Final Phase. During the third period, supply was not quite so difficult as in the second period. Resupply and evacuation for frontline elements was accomplished for the most part by light tanks and armored trailers — only full-track vehicles could negotiate the roads and high-angle fire continued to harrass the supply routes. In addition, supply installations were located on the west of the forest while units were attacking on the east edge with long, narrow, unimproved, winding routes between the two.
Few specific solutions can be found to the difficult supply situation in this type of operation; the only answer seems to be longer hours, initiative, endurance, and ingenuity on the part of service personnel.
