CHAPTER VII
BERGSTEIN Operation (4 to 8 Dec)
On 4 December CCR was directed to prepare to attack BERGSTEIN. Colonel Anderson strongly requested (1) air support, (2) the use of both his battalions, and (3) that the attack not be launched until the infantry had successfully cleared the flanks. The first request depended on the weather; the second was granted and in regard to the third, it was agreed that the infantry should clear the enemy from the draw southeast of HÜRTGEN and should occupy the woods south of BRANDENBERG before the attack would be launched. Reserve Command formed its task forces as shown in Figure 9.
The Germans defending BERGSTEIN consisted of the 2d Battalion, 980th Regiment, (approximately four hundred men) the remaining elements of the 189th Anti-Tank Battalion, five self-propelled guns, all supported by the same artillery that backed up the defenses of BRANDENBERG.
Later the same day, CCR was directed to be prepared to attack on order of the 8th Infantry Division after 050800 December. The 10th Tank Battalion was to seize and hold north and northeast BERGSTEIN and HILL 400 "if the situation permitted," and to utilize the light tank company to secure the MSR and to maintain contact with elements of the 121st Infantry Regiment of the northeast flank. The 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, with eleven tanks and sixty-four fighting men, (20) was to move on order to an assembly area south of KLEINHAU and attack on order behind and west of the 10th Tank Battalion to seize and hold the southwest and south portions of BERGSTEIN. This battalion was to prepare AT defenses on all roads entering from the south and west and to contact the 28th Infantry Regiment on the west. Weather permitting, air support would be made available. The 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was to furnish direct artillery support.
The attack was postponed until 051400 December because of bad weather. However, when the weather cleared, the air flights arrived for the attack and gave excellent support. The flights were controlled by a forward air controller who rode in the executive officer's tank. Air-ground coordination between the armor and the planes worked perfectly, although some confusion was caused by an air controller with the 8th Infantry Division who directed the planes to bomb BERGSTEIN after the tanks had entered the town; this was countermanded in time by the tank air controller, who was with the battalion commander on a small rise where he could see the entire operation. Between attack missions the planes remained overhead thus reducing considerably the volume of enemy artillery fire.
The assault guns of the 10th Tank Battalion, prior to the jump-off, were to take up defiladed positions just north of BERGSTEIN to cover the northeast portion of the town. The "married" C Companies swinging west behind the assault guns would attack the eastern portion of the town. A Companies "married", which now had but seven tanks, would follow C and move directly into town. The married B Companies under the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion were to swing west of A and hit the town from the southwest (Figure 10).
The plan was a good one and worked almost perfectly; (21) the one delaying factor was that the assault gun platoon failed to turn off east as soon as they should have and ran into an unreported minefield. The rear assault gun was knocked out by a mine and blocked the withdrawal of the others, the platoon leader was killed by artillery when he dismounted to direct the withdrawal. The two remaining assault guns fired from this position although in a minefield and under heavy artillery fire. Company C moved east of the assault guns as soon as the first AG stopped. In doing so, one tank was hit by an 88-mm. shell and burned. All this ground was under observation from a ridge at NIDEGGEN across the river, and the operation was constantly subjected to heavy artillery fire. The commander of Company C reported he was in the town at 1444 and by 1500 had begun to mop up. At the same time A companies were moving in and the 47th task force was entering the western portion of BERGSTEIN. All this action took place under unremitting artillery fire; however, this time the armored infantry was mounted in half-tracks following the tanks (after the lesson learned at KLEINHAU). "Infantry dismounted couldn't have lived through that inferno of fire, but as it was we had only one casualty going into town." (22) Then the infantry of the 47th task force dismounted and deployed to the west in a skirmish line at the tip of the town.
By 1720 the mission of taking BERGSTSIN was reported accomplished, but the town was bigger than had been thought and an urgent call for more infantry was made. Two reconnaissance platoons were set put as outposts, and the two engineer platoons which had been kept in reserve were brought forward to act as infantry. In addition, Company D came up to assist in the defense.
Forward observers with all three tank-infantry teams were casualties and trained observers were requested from the 8th Infantry Division. Radios had to be removed from disabled tanks to furnish them with the communications necessary.
Since the 121st Infantry Regiment failed to secure its objective during the attack, it was planned to cover the north flank with artillery fire. Nor was the gap on the west cleared by the infantry, so CCR was reinforced by one infantry company and one TD company to assist in defending that flank.
In this attack CCR lost four assault guns, six tanks, and one M-10 tank destroyer. In fact, all units were seriously understrength in men and vehicles as shown in Figure 11.
Some of the vehicles listed in Figure 11 were tanks that had been disabled in the battles for HÜRTGEN and KLEINHAU and had been evacuated, repaired, and returned.
Intermittent artillery and mortar fire throughout the night further demolished BERGSTEIN. Also, considerable noise came from the enemy area all night which seemed to indicate the Germans were preparing an attack. Finally at 0640 an artillery preparation began and lasted about fifteen minutes. This consisted mostly of high-velocity fire from three sides — SCHMIDT, KOMMERSHEIDT, NIDEGGEN, and the woods to the south and west. Actually it came from four sides as part of the friendly artillery was falling on CCR's southwestern troops. (24)
At 060710 December the first of three counterattacks was launched into the sector of the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion from the woods to the southeast. This attack was made by about five hundred men of the 1st Battalion, 980th Regiment (PW's later stated they had moved from the SCHMIDT area during the night of 3-4 December), supported by about ten Panther tanks and assault guns. The attacking forces were brought under fire by the 10th Tank Battalion with everything it had; but the battalion now had less than one 76-mm. per company and the rest, which were 75-mm., "just bounced off the enemy tanks." (25) The troops in the 47th sector also fired all available weapons. Division and corps artillery was called and "began landing in about thirty minutes which was as soon as could be expected." (26) This time interval was specifically stated by Lt. Goldman; however, Lt. Col. Hamberg, who commanded the 10th Tank Battalion in BERGSTEIN, had this to say when confronted with that statement:
"That sure is a surprise to me! We had an elaborate artillery plan with numbered concentrations and anyone could call them down. The concentration overlay had been issued to leaders down to and including tank commanders. The Corps Artillery Officer told me later that we fired more than 40,000 rounds of artillery in the few days we were in BERGSTEIN. This (statement of Lt. Goldman) is grossly unfair to our artillery, since a look at our strengths and the sector involved should prove that artillery actually bore the defense." (27)
In view of artillery support and coordination in previous attacks, it seems likely that Lt. Col. Hamberg's picture is closer to the actual facts.
At this time it was still dark, and American forces were having considerable difficulty finding targets although the Germans did not seem to be having the same trouble. The German tanks had moved to the flank and were firing point-blank range, while the infantry came through in groups — "they would have made good targets if we could have seen them." (28) There were two TD's near the edge of the town, but one received a direct hit before it could do any good. The other waited for a German tank to come up within seventy-five yards and knocked it out; the enemy must have picked up its gun flash, as it was hit a few seconds later. As dawn came, the Company B command tank (the only 76-mm, with the 47th!s forces) moved to the south edge of town. Daylight disclosed a Mark V moving in an open field; the 76-mm. destroyed it with one shot and quickly traversed left to get a second Panther in two rounds. In the course of about an hour this tank knocked out five enemy tanks and an SP gun. "We were in the open between two houses of rubble and don't know why they failed to destroy us" as German tanks were in good defilade firing positions and the shells burst all around the tank. " (29)
ROCKETS FIRE ON THE ENEMY COUNTER ATTACK OF BERGSTEIN
All during this time there were two 90-mm. TD's sitting in the road to the rear of the tank, but the turrets were facing the wrong way and the crews were in cellars and would not come out to fire as they said the enemy would pick up the gun flashes. (30)
Friendly elements had initially withdrawn about seven houses for more secure positions, but by 0900 the attack was repulsed and the position was restored with an estimated two hundred enemy killed, sixty captured, and six tanks and five anti-tank guns destroyed. A PW later reported that all but ten men in one company were casualties. At 1130 and 1420 further attacks were launched (the latter by the 189th Replacement Battalion); but these were quickly broken up, primarily by defensive artillery fires.
The importance the Germans placed on repelling this attack by CCR and the sincerity of their counterattacks is exemplified in the following statement by General-Major von Gersdorff, Chief of Staff of the Seventh German Army:
The attack of an American armored group in the direction of BRANDENBERG and BERGSTEIN in early December was of critical importance. This thrust threatened a deep penetration with a consequent extension of our thinly spread forces. Every effort was, therefore, made to repel this lunge by counterattacks. Having no other reserves available, Seventh Army, with the concurrence of Army Group, decided to commit the 272d VG Division assisted by assault gun units. It was an unwelcome decision for both Army and Army Group. The division was scheduled to participate in the ARDSENNES offensive and it was recognized that heavy casualties in this engagement would seriously hamper its effectivness. The projection, however, of the American attack on through BERGSTEIN to the ROER RIVER would jeopardize the execution of the ARDENNES operation .... Repeated counterattacks against BRANDENPERG, BERGSTEIN, and HILL 400 enjoyed no success. (31)
Enemy continued firing constant artillery and mortar fires on BERGSTEIN and BRANDENBERG, and casualties of men and equipment rapidly mounted. By afternoon the 47th task force had a fighting strength of but thirty-four men, and the 10th Tank Battalion was comparatively as weak. "Couldn't afford to evacuate combat fatigue cases although some of the men were out of their minds." (32) In answer to the request for reinforcement for the town, word was received that the 2d Ranger Battalion would move into the town to reinforce the reserve command and to seize HILL 400 to the east which the "situation had not permitted" the armor to capture. The Machine Gun Platoon, 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, was dispatched forward from BRANDENBERG, but the platoon leader was wounded as they assembled and a half-track was hit and the platoon sergeant killed when they started down the road. By evening there were only ten or twelve men effective in this platoon. Then the third reconnaissance platoon (about forty men) from Troop C, 85th Reconnaissance Squadron, was dismounted and started to the south. The artillery gauntlet en route to BERGSTEIN eliminated all but fifteen; a German counterattack just after their arrival left only eight effective in the platoon. Next sixty men just out of the hospital were sent into BERGSTEIN as replacements, but these men were still in poor health and lacked essential individual equipment. (33) It was necessary to pick up weapons for them wherever they could be found on or near the dead, and although they had no blankets there were none available for issue in BERGSTEIN. Rain was pouring down as it had been almost constantly for several days; all the men were soaked and were already suffering from bad colds.
However, the weather suddenly began clearing at about 1500, and by 1600 friendly air appeared overhead. It attacked the enemy to the south but received heavy anti-aircraft fire and requested artillery to counter this. This request was immediately acted upon. "So seldom were we ever in a position to help them," (35) and it was later learned that this counter-battery actually broke up a counterattacking force which was assembling to the southeast.
About 062400 December, the 2d Ranger Battalion began to move into BERGSTEIN. Lt. R.S. Lewis, commanding Company B, 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, said:
About midnight a guy came down the road, then two others, each one five yards behind the other. They were three Ranger lieutenants. They asked for enemy positions and the road to take; said they were ready to go. We talked the situation over with the officers. They stepped out and said, "Let's go, men." We heard the tommy guns click and without a word the Rangers moved out. Our morale went up in a hurry. (36)
In the early morning of 7 December the 2d Ranger Battalion seized its objective, the high Dround immediately east of BERGSTEIN, and later the same day the 121st Infantry Regiment took its 5 December objective.
Although any action involving HILL 400 would be closely allied with BERGSTEIN, no official relationship was established between the 2d Ranger Battalion and elements of CCR in the town. In fact, the entire command relationship in this operation was unusual, CCR maintained its CP on a rise west of KLEINHAU from which it had good radio communication to its battalions and to division. The 47th and 10th battalions were on an equal basis and coordination would normally come from CCR, but CCR was so far from the actual scene of operations that nearly all arrangements were made on a basis of mutual understanding between Lt. Col. Boyer, commanding the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, and Lt. Col. Hamberg although Colonel Anderson did come forward frequently to check on the situation. In fact, troops such as engineers, tank destroyers, and reconnaissance platoons were used in the 47th sector although actually attached to the 10th Tank Battalion. The relationship with the 2d Ranger Battalion was conducted on the same basis and cooperation was excellent. The ranger battalion commander said he would consider himself attached to the 10th Tank Battalion since he felt close coordination was necessary and since his organization was weak in radios and evacuation facilities; therefore, tanks were given to the rangers for communication and their casualties were evacuated through 10th Tank Battalion channels. With a maximum of cooperation and a minimum of confusion the ranger battalion lined up along the eastern edge of BERGSTEIN, and at a given signal all men rose and dashed to the top of HILL 400, receiving only three or four casualties in the few seconds it took to be on the objective. However, they found the hill barren and rocky and the enemy artillery began to cause losses. A request was relayed through Lt. Col. Hamberg for permission to defend forward of the hill, but the request was denied — the hill must be "occupied and held at all costs." When told this, the Ranger Battalion commander answered that he would seize the hill "every hour on the hour" but could not occupy it. This was apparently acceptable as no further message was received from the 8th Infantry Division. (37)
On 7 December CCR continued to defend in BERGSTEIN. All during the day artillery continued to cause casualties. During the night of 7-8 December, CCR was relieved by elements of the 121st Infantry Regiment and of the 644th TD Battalion and was directed to move to WALHORN, BELGIUM, for reorganization. It was impossible to evacuate any of the disabled vehicles at this time, and the command was followed up the road to BRANDENBERG by artillery fire. When CCR was relieved it had seventy infantrymen left out of seven hundred fifty, eight out of fifty-eight tanks, and one tank destroyer out of a company. The losses in tanks were particularly high both because of enemy action and because of the difficulty of evacuation. Also, losses were disproportionately high among key personnel because the type of fighting placed special demands on leaders; in addition, many tank commanders were lost as a result of time fire. During the period of reorganization that followed, CCR remained attached to V Corps and had no mission other than being the reserve of that corps.
