CHAPTER VII
BRANDENBERG Operation (30 Nov to 4 Dec)
Following the seizure of KLEINHAU, plans were completed for the attack on BRANDENBERG. Elements of the 8th Infantry Division were to approach BRANDENBERG through the woods from VOSSENACK and to secure a line of departure north of the town for the armored attack from KLEINHAU. However, the infantry had considerable difficulty advancing through the woods so that CCR was directed to launch its attack on 2 December rather than wait any longer (Figure 8).
The assignment of troops within the command remained the same as at KLEINHAU except for miner changes in supporting troops. On the enemy side, BRANDENBERG was defended by elements of the 1055th, and 1056th Regiments, the 2d and 3d Companies of the 189th Engineer Battalion (used primarily as infantry), the 189th Anti-Tank Battalion (towed 75-mm. guns only two of which were actually in BRANDENBERG), the 2d Company, 983d Regiment, and one battalion of dual purpose anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns. These enemy units were receiving direct support from the 189th Artillery Regiment and from at least two batteries of 120-mm. mortars.
BRANDENBERG is situated on a narrow, ridge which runs southeast from KLEINHAU to BERGSTEIN. The ridge had open, rolling, cultivated fields on the crest and was heavily wooded on the slopes. A paved road running along the crest was in extremely poor repair and was pockmarked by numerous artillery craters. The approaches to both BRANDENBEBG and BERGSTEIN are dominated by HILL 400 (F087338) six hundred meters east of BERGSTEIN and just west of the ROER RIVER and north-west of NIDEGGEN (F115332) and they could be observed from the KOMMERSCHEIDT-SCHMIDT area (Appendix I).
The reserve command plan was to attack southeast along the ridge with the 10th Tank Battalion passing through the infantry front lines (Figure 8) at 020730 December to seize BRANDENBERG and to be prepared to continue the attack to seize and hold BERGSTEIN. The 47th Armored Infantry Battalion was to take a position astride the road southwest of GERMETER prepared to move through HÜRTGEN and KLEINHAU to attack or to assist in the defense of BRANDENBEBG or BERGSTEIN within thirty minutes. Direct artillery support would be furnished by the 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion reinforced by the 56th Field Artillery Battalion and a 155-mm. Howitzer battalion. Air support would be available if the weather permitted. Company D, 10th Tank Battalion was to cover both flanks of the attack.
The attack did not commence at 0730 since the 10th Tank Battalion said "it was too dark to shoot," but elements did move forward to the line of departure. Then the attack finally jumped off, very little progress was made during the morning as the road was well covered by camouflaged SP guns in KOMMERSCHEIDT, BRANDENBERG, and other positions. One of these guns was later located within friendly lines. When the tanks attempted to deploy they found they were confined to the road because the shoulders were deep mud and the fields were mined. This mine-field was covered by automatic weapons and panzerfausts from the draws and by small arms and machine gun fire from the woods to the east, in addition to the self-propelled guns referred to above.
Two flights of aircraft reported at 0835 and 0942 respectively to the forward air controller who was riding in the executive officer's tank. These were employed in bombing and strafing targets in BRANDENBERG, BERGSTEIN, and the surrounding woods; but their effectiveness was limited by the very poor visibility, and at 1020 the weather eliminated further air support.
The only apparent approach to BRANDENBERG was straight down the road. Fighting occurred on both flanks since the infantry had not secured the east side of the road nor had they eliminated a pocket on the west just southeast of HÜRTGEN. A tank of the first platoon of Company A hit a mine on the right side of the road and came under direct fire from KOMMERSCHEIDT (75 or 88 mm.) when the platoon leader got out to direct the withdrawal of the tanks, he and several men who had fallen to the ground to avoid artillery bursts were run over when the tanks moved abruptly. In the meantime, two more tanks hit mines on the wast side of the road. Accurate artillery and direct HE fire continued to pour onto the ridge.
By 1245 the situation had become static. Company A had lost four tanks to mines or direct fire and had had a large number of radio antennae shot off; also, it appeared necessary to remove the mines before any further advance could be made. Permission was received from the 9th Infantry Division to consolidate present gains in order to remove the mines under cover of darkness and to resume the attack on 3 December. Company D, 10th Tank Battalion, supported by infantry, took over the front positions while Companies A and C returned west of KLEINHAU to reorganize for the attack the following day.
The line was held by Company D, 10th Tank Battalion, during the night while Company C, 22d Armored Engineer Battalion, cleared a path through the minefield west of the road by removing two hundred fifty Holz mines. The minefield itself was situated on the friendly slope of a rise that dominated BRANDENBERG. The original plan was to clear five lanes to permit the tanks to advance in line across the crest, but only one sector was cleared; however, the Germans for some reason did not make full use of this tactical advantage when the attack was made.
A few prisoners were taken during the night as patrols were sent forward into the surrounding woods. These patrols reported that enemy in large numbers as well as panzerfaust teams were active throughout the night. One of these patrols led by Lt. Wiersma, commanding officer of Company C, 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, got through the minefield and ran upon eight Germans in dug-in positions; these eight followed the patrol back to our lines to surrender. Apparently some of the Germans liked this type of fighting no more than did the Americans!
Heavy artillery fire was placed on BRANDENBERG all night with a ten minute preparation in the morning just before the attack. This was followed by bombing and strafing as the tanks moved forward at 030800 December to the minefield which was the designated line of departure. This time the "married" C companies were in the lead, followed by the A companies which were to establish a base of fire at the top of the crest. Moving to the line of departure the tank of Lt. T.A. Maguire, commander of Company C, was disabled by a mine before he could get into position; he changed to another tank and continued to lead the column down the road even though they received terrific artillery fire from all directions — KOMMERSCHEIDT, NIDEGGEN east of the ROER, and from OBERMAUBACH (F088361) due east, as well as direct fire from positons near BRANDENBERG. An enemy smoke screen sloped progress somewhat initially, but by 0912 with the air still attacking, the C companies were ready to enter the town. The base of fire companies were receiving some artillery fire, but mostly small arms fire from a draw west of the road which had not yet been eliminated by the infantry.
Another flight of aircraft controlled by the forward air controller riding in the Company C column began attacking at 0958. As the air strafed and bombed BRANDENBERG, the tank column pushed down the road with the first platoon going straight into town and the third platoon swinging left to hit the southeast edge of the town. When guns from BERGSTEIN opened up on the third platoon, "one of the sergeants got burned up about it and went down to BERGSTEIN where he destroyed the AT gun that had fired at him and knocked the sight off another." (14) A second tank moved down to BERGSTEIN, but this premature movement of tanks in BERGSTEIN caused the 28th Infantry Regiment to call for corps artillery fire on the town. This fire was cleared by Lt. Col. Hamberg because at the time he had not been informed of the two tanks advancing to BERGSTEIN; when he heard they were his tanks, he had them withdrawn immediately. (15) No casualties were suffered in this particular encounter; and although the tanks were withdrawn, it was learned the road to BERGSTEIN was not mined.
Lt. Col. Hamberg felt and had recommended during the planning the night before that the battalion could and should have pushed right into BERGSTEIN. (16) The biggest bone of contention, however, seemed to be the fear of higher headquarters that the second town could not be held and that the counterattack thus incurred might not only cause the loss of BERGSTEIN but of BRANDENBERG as well, primarily because of the heavy woods around the town and the non-availability of infantry to assist in the defense of the towns and the exposed flanks.
The remainder of the tanks and infantry continued cleaning up BRANDENBERG and established security. One of these tanks which had been set out as an outpost on the main road at the south edge of town was hit by a panzerfaust; the concussion blew off an open hatch, killed the tank commander, blew open a closed hatch, and blew two crewmen out of the tank. By 1115 the seizure of BRANDENBERG was complete and two hundred seventy-six prisoners were taken. (Some of these were taken by the 121st and were turned over to the 10th).
However, elements of the 8th Infantry Division had not taken their planned objectives, so CCR was directed to assist the 28th and 121st Infantry Regiments. Company D, 10th Tank Battalion, supported the 121st in seizing a small hill northwest of BRANDENBERG from which one hundred forty prisoners were taken, and the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion was attached to the 28th Infantry Regiment at 031200 December to assist in its zone.
At 1430 the 10th Tank Battalion was attacked by enemy planes, and two planes were shot down with no damage to the battalion. These planes, however, gave BERGSTEIN "one hell of a working over and the Germans captured there by us the next day were still plenty bitter about it." (17) The units were now disposed to prepare for the attack on BERGSTEIN and to defend BRANDENBERG; tank destroyers and infantry were in the town while tanks and infantry were in positions near the road junction south of town. The tanks of Company D were used to patrol the MSR, the road from KLEINHAU to BRANDENBERG. Enemy artillery and mortar shells continued to fall on the troops in BRANDENBERG, while our own artillery interdicted the road to BERGSTEIN throughout the night. Two platoons of Troop C, 85th Reconnaissance Squadron, were sent to BRANDENBERG to act as infantry. Elements of these platoons formed two night patrols to enter BERGSTEIN from the north and west, respectively. These patrols reported the town occupied and verified the absence of mines in the approaches.
In the meantime, the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion (supposedly the CCR Reserve) was given a mission by the 8th Division of clearing a large rubble pile and fire trench at the east edge of VOSSENACK. This mission was assigned to the second platoons of the "married" B companies, who launched the attack at 031430 December. A second team of married platoons would follow the attack and push southeast through the objective to contact infantry elements at the woods line while mortars from Headquarters Company smoked the KOMMERSCHEIDT ridge. The rubble pile was crescent-shaped and surrounded by an elaborate system of mines and fox holes in addition to the already existing fire trench and draw nearby (Figure 8).
Just as the attack jumped off, the area was strafed and bombed by a group of twenty to thirty ME~109's ( the same planes that attacked BERGSTEIN ). One ship was reportedly knocked down by fire of the infantry or tank units. As the attack again got under way, orders were received to send tanks immediately to repel a hostile counterattack northeast of VOSSENACK, but this turned out to be only about twenty-five Germans who advanced a short way out of the woods and then retired. By 1530 the attack had progressed to within approximately seventy-five yards of the objective when the lead tank hit a mine and was knocked out. Although the infantry attempted to continue the advance, it was driven off by small arms and artillery fire. The infantry then withdrew and tried to attack the objective from the north supported by direct tank fire, but they again were driven off by automatic, artillery, and mortar fire. Each time the infantry approached, the enemy in the southern fire trenches fired a green flare which brought down heavy artillery and mortar barrages from the KOMMERSCHEIDT area. During the same period the tank-infantry team tried to move around to the south and east to reach the woodllne, but hit minefields which stopped the tanks and high velocity fire that prevented the infantry from clearing the field or from moving through it. A third unsuccessful attempt was made to seize the rubble pile after which the 28th Infantry Regiment directed the forces to withdraw, reorganize, and make an attack that night. At 040239 December the forces, which had been reinforced by the "scorpion" tank, jumped off. The "scorpion" worked excellently at first (18) but hit a nest of five mines which blew off the chains; the tank, still moving, hit another mine and lost a track. Nevertheless, by 1200 the pile was cleared of enemy after two more tanks were lost — one to artillery fire and the other to a mine. Lt. Goldman, commanding the force, was commended by the CO of the 28th Infantry Regiment as this position had been a thorn in their side for more than a week.
The 47th was then directed to attack southeast from V0SSENACK, reinforced by Company C, 28th Infantry Regiment. The plan was to divide the eight remaining tanks of Company B, 10th Tank Battalion, into two groups, one to mount the remaining men of Company B, 47th Armored Infantry Battalion, and the other to mount Company C, 28th Infantry; however, the attack had to be postponed since the men of the latter unit could not be rallied and reorganized in time. (19)
This latter plan was abandoned as the 47th reverted to Reserve Command control at 041600 December, and was directed to reorganize in GERMETER prepared to attack BERGSTEIN in conjunction with the 10th Tank Battalion.
