CHAPTER VII
GROSSHAU to SCHAFBERG ( 29 Nov to 5 Dec )
As stated previously, the 5th Armored Division, less CCR, was attached to VII Corps on 29 November. While division troops and CCB remained near NEUDORF, BELGIUM, as VII Corps reserve, CCA was attached to the 4th Infantry Division since it was to be the lead combat command in any breakthrough. The 46th Armored Infantry Battalion of CCA was further attached to the 22d Regimental Combat Team then operating just west of GROSSHAU. The 46th was given the mission of attacking on the right flank of the 22d to secure the road from KLEINHAU northeast to SCHAFBERG (074383). The capture of SCHAFBERG, situated at the eastern edge of the forest, would provide a point of debouchment for CCA to attack the following day. The remainder of CCA, in the meantime, had moved to ZWEIFALL to be prepared to follow the 46th, to break out of the woods, and to push the attack rapidly to the ROER RIVER about four thousand yards east. The line of departure for the armored infantry battalion was to be HILL 401 just northeast of KLEINHAU; the hill and the town were reported to be in friendly hands. (It will be remembered from the KLEINHAU account that the infantry following CCR occupied only the town and not the hill).
The lack of time for preparation was a serious handicap as CCA and attached troops had been expecting to be employed in the V Corps zone where they were fully abreast of the situation and terrain; but now they became attached to an infantry division in another corps zone on one day, and the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion was used in an attack on the morning of the next. Information given to the 46th was that the 22d Regimental Combat Team was opposed by the 7th Company, 985th Infantry Regiment, and by three rifle companies and a heavy weapons company of the 353d Fusilier Battalion.
At this time CCA consisted of the troops indicated in Figure 12.
For the attack, the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion was to use its organic companies dismounted with the 44th Field Artillery Battalion, 4th Infantry Division, in a direct support role. The formation was Company C on the left, Company A on the right, and Company B in a reserve echeloned to the right rear. The Machine Gun Platoon of Headquarters Company was attached to Company A, while the 81mm. mortars and assault guns were retained under battalion control in general support.
At 300930 November the battalion moved from its assembly area in an approach march formation; but as the leading companies emerged from the woods at 045375 they came under heavy and continuous artillery and mortar fire, and as they advanced they received small arms and automatic fire from HILL 401. Although the 22d RCT still insisted this must be friendly fire, the battalion commander directed an assault of HILL 401 by Charlie. The assault, although against "friendly" fire, was costly but successful and resulted in the capture of fifty prisoners and six machine gvns. The attack was continued and by nightfall the battalion had established a line approximately one thousand yards short of the objective. Here the battalion dug in for the night.
The devastating artillery fire created an acute supply and evacuation problem and as a result all supplies and evacuation of wounded was carried on during the hours of darkness. (38) Casualties for the operation so far were four officers and one hundred thirteen enlisted men.
This position was held throughout the night with considerable patrol action on both sides, and the battalion jumped off at 010900 December with the same formation to continue to SCHAFBERG. Although contact with the enemy was made immediately, the leading companies had made a costly advance of five hundred yards by 1100. Visibility was limited to a maximum of five yards due to the density of the trees. (39)
However, the 22d RCT directed at this time that the battalion withdraw to position held the night before in order to establish contact with the 2d Battalion, 22d RCT, which was about six hundred yards back and eight hundred yards left. This withdrawal was successfully accomplished with difficulty because of the number of wounded who had to be carried back. While organizing this position a counterattack by a company of the 941st Regiment was dispersed, primarily by artillery fire.
That night the 46th reverted to CCA control and orders were issued that Company B, 34th Tank Battalion, would support the battalion in its attack east the following morning (2 December), but by 021100 December the tanks still had not arrived at the battalion. Then the attack was postponed because of a German counterattack from GEY and because artillery, probably fired in conjunction with this attack, had reduced the battalion to below 30 per cent effectives so that it was withdrawn west of KLEINHAU. All of the effectives except a skeleton company acting as a covering force were used to carry the wounded, and during the withdrawal the one remaining battalion staff officer and the ranking company commander were put out of action. The withdrawal was completed on 022000 December. In the three days the battalion had suffered ten officers and two hundred twenty-seven enlisted casualties.
From 2 to 5 December elements of the combat command remained at this location and on 5 December assembled in ZWEIFALL to reorganize and remained there until 9 December.
Although the 46th Armored Infantry Battalion of CCA had advanced to within about five hundred yards of the eastern edge of the HURTGEN FOREST on 1 December, it was directed to withdraw by the 22d Regimental Combat Team and CCA was not able to gain maneuver room to commit its forces at this time.
