CHAPTER VII
KLEINHAU Operation ( 28 to 30 Nov )
When on 28 November the 121st Infantry Regiment took HÜRTGEN, CCR was directed to continue the attack to KLEINHAU and on to BERGSTEIN as originally planned. The enemy defending KLEINHAU consisted of three infantry companies of seventy men each, three self-propelled guns, and several gun sections from the 31st Machine Gun Battalion (towed 75 mm.) The friendly order of battle remained the same except that one platoon of Company C, 628th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and the attached flail tank were transferred from the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion to the 10th Tank Battalion while the multiple AAA M16 reverted to its parent battery.
The general plan called for the 121st Infantry Regiment to clear north to the road junction at 052366 (6) and for the 4th Infantry Division to push its attack on GROSSHAU. The 10th Tank Battalion established liaison with elements of the 22nd Infantry Regiment and Company C, 70th Tank Battalion, both of the 4th Infantry Division, which were just west and north of KLEINHAU. These elements were, not to fire on KLEINHAU unless fired on by high velocity weapons. The tank-infantry teams of the 10th were to move through GERMETER with the head of the column to reach the draw north of HÜRTGEN at first light on 29 November, attack through KLEINHAU to seize HILL 401 northeast of the town, and hold until relieved by the 1st battalion, 13th Infantry Regiment, which was to follow the armored elements. The 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, in direct support, would concentrate its fires north of KLEINHAU to prevent retreat but would be prepared to shift to targets called for by forward elements, while the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion would stand by in reserve southeast of GERMETER.
Between 25 and 28 November, two self-propelled 155mm. guns were emplaced on a hill about 5,000 yards west of KLEINHAU and proceeded to destroy the town by direct fire starting at the south end and working north up the main street. In addition, artillery fires had been placed on KLEINHAU all the previous week by the 8th Division and supporting artillery, but as a variation it was decided not to shell the town the night before the attack. However, preparatory fires from sixteen to eighteen battalions were fired immediately preceding the jump-off. Although there was a trench around the town in the path of the attack which reconnaissance had reported occupied, it was only lightly manned at the time of the attack; it was felt that this was because the Germans remained in town during the artillery lull the night before and were caught there in the morning by the intense preparation. (7) This perhaps facilitated the entrance to the town but at the same time left more Germans to be rooted from the cellars; whether it is more beneficial to defeat the enemy infantry in the relative open outside of town or to have to combat them house to house in town is certainly debatable. The reason the 10th preferred the second method is that the tankers did not want to assault the fixed, dug-in positions; they all had developed a high respect for the panzerfaust. (8)
Returning to the assault, the 10th Tank Battalion task force under the command of Lt Col W.A. Hamberg began moving forward in the early morning hours of 29 November, but again there was trouble reaching the line of departure. The head of the column with the "married" C companies leading finally passed through HÜRTGEN at 0756 after having trouble by-passing the same crater that caused trouble in the HÜRTGEN action and still further difficulties with mines on the raod. At 0860 the attack began as forward elements opened direct fire from positons just south of KLEINHAU. The infantry had been dismounted early to breach a minefield that had been reported south of the town. The dismounted infantry was hit heavily by artillery and mortar fire and became pinned down, but they did determine that there was no specific minefield, although the shoulders of the road were littered with AT and AP mines. From this time on it was extremely difficult to keep the dismounted infantry up with the tanks.
This early dismounting of the infantry and the resulting casualties was considered by Lt. Col. Hamberg to be one of the biggest mistakes he made during the war, (9) although it certainly seems justified in view of the information then on hand. The original report of the minefield was received from the infantry and it was verified several times by prisoners of war. In addition, the report was "clinched" the day before the attack when, after a light snow, a regular pattern of partially melted rings could be seen just where the mines were supposedly located; these rings were later found to have been caused by cow dung! The incident is of value to show how a series of small circumstances can lead to a wrong tactical decision even by an experienced leader. It was decided that from this time on the armored infantry would not be dismounted in a tank-infantry attack until forced to do so; this rule was followed at both BRANDENBERG and BEBGSTEIN in spite of the mines, and the attacks progressed much more rapidly and were less costly to the infantry. (10)
The artillery preparation lifted at 0858. The second tank platoon of Company C moved into the town from the south; the first platoon attempted to flank the town from the west but began bogging down as soon as it left the road; the third platoon acted as a base of fire from the jump-off point at the crossroads on the southern edge of the town. At 0908 the second platoon reported that it had entered the town but that its infantry had fallen behind due to accurate artillery time fire.
About this time information was received that the 4th Infantry Division was not attacking GR0SSHAU as planned but would commence its attack at 1100. Since the tanks were drawing heavy direct fire from GR0SSHAU, permission was received to place artillery concentrations there which considerably reduced this fire.
By 1101 the 10th Tank Battalion had two tank platoons in town but the infantry was still about ten minutes behind. A Mark IV tank in the town near the outskirts was destroyed at very close range after it first disabled one CCR tank. In addition, several AT guns were found unmanned in KLEINHAU proper; it was not determined whether they had been abandoned or whether the crews had been knocked out by the artillery. At 1012 the armored infantry arrived and began clearing the buildings, and by 1058 the "married" A companies moved up and sent one platoon of infantry into town to assist in the mopping up while the remainder of the tanks and infantry fought west of KLEINHAU to flank the town and to strike it from the north and west (Figure 7).
This maneuver was likewise extremely difficult for the infantry as the force was subjected to devastating artillery and mortar fire. While this was occurring, the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion task force moved forward from ROETGEN to its reserve position west of GERMETER.
A message was received at 1100 that the 3rd and 9th Panzer Regiments were moving south toward GROSSHAU in a counterattack. All units were alerted and mines and tank destroyers were rushed forward, but nothing came of the attack except that Company C reported hearing sounds of enemy tanks moving into GROSSHAU at 1118. (11)
By 1245 the attack was progressing well although movement of the dismounted infantry was still costly because of the continuing high trajectory fire. At this time Company A was on the north edge of town while Company C was working through the town from the south with the infantry who were flushing Germans from the cellars, primarily by the use of white phosphorous and fragmentation grenades. About 1327 the weather cleared and friendly aircraft appeared overhead, which brought about a noticeable decrease in enemy artillery thereby enabling the infantry to proceed more effectively with its house to house clearing. In general, the enemy had evacuated the town before the tanks arrived; however, this did not preclude bitter house to house fighting in some sections.
The town was securely in American hands by 1730. Company A, 10th Tank Battalion, established road blocks just forward of the high ground northeast of KLEINHAU (12) and secured the north half of the town, while the other half was secured by Company C, 10th Tank Battalion. The two platoons of attached tank destroyers moved into the town but the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion remained west of GERMETER. During the night of 29-30 November, elements of the 13th Infantry Regiment assumed responsibility for the defense of KLEINHAU although they occupied the town only and did not occupy the road blocks or any positions on the hill northeast of town. The infantry stated that they did not have sufficient strength to go out that far. The road blocks were maintained by the 10th Tank Battalion until 300800 November when they were withdrawn by request of the infantry since they "drew fire."
The CCR plan had called for the 10th battalion to assemble in R0ETGEN upon completion of its mission, but V Corps now directed that the elements assemble and remain in the open field just west of KLEINHAU. On the 30th the Germans brought up eight self-propelled guns to the edge of the woods just east of GROSSHAU and placed direct fire on this assembly area. Air was requested but refused because the enemy was in the 4th Infantry Division zone; however artillery fire from the 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion caused the guns to withdraw with a probable loss of three. The 10th Tank Battalion had one tank disabled by a mine when it moved to engage these guns and lost one half-track which burned after being hit by a high explosive round.
That evening Lt. Col. Bamberg moved his battalion about seven or eight hundred yards west into the woods and as a result received much less artillery fire, which had been continuous since he assembled in the open field as ordered. This move was made without orders, but it was later approved. Even though the woods were rather thick, the standing was good enough to permit maintenance after the area was cleared of "Bouncing Bettys." (13)
The action of the Germans in the HÜRTGEN-KLEINHAU area was characterized by stubbornness rather than by aggressiveness. At no time was there any indication of a general withdrawal. The enemy refused, except by direct pressure, to give ground which he held by full use of natural and man-made obstacles with very heavy artillery and mortar support; yet contrary to his usual custom, he did not counterattack. This may be partially explained by the fact that a field order of the 31st Machine Gun Battalion was found which showed its mission to be "to hold KLEINHAU at all costs." In addition, the direction of the attack on KLEINHAU was somewhat of a surprise according to reports, as the Germans expected the attack to come from the north. This is substantiated by the minefield and trench system between KLEINHAU and GROSSHAU. (Figure 7)
In the battle for KLEINHAU, CCR captured fifty-five prisoners and lost sixty men, one tank destroyer, thirteen half-tracks (some were later recovered), and eight tanks (two to AT fire and six to mines).
