CHAPTER VII
The HURTGEN Operation ( 23 to 25 Nov )
The original plan was to move Reserve Command less its trains from WALHORN to an assembly area at ROETGEN on 23 November and to launch an attack against HÜRTGEN the following morning. As discussed in Chapters V and VI the infantry part of the corps plan called for:
- the 121st Infantry Regiment, 8th Division to secure a line of departure along the edge of the woods just south of HÜRTGEN;
- the 28th and 13th Regiments of the same Division to hold the woods from HÜRTGEN south to include VOSSENACK;
- the 4th Infantry Division to continue mopping up the woods northeast of HÜRTGEN and to push its attack on GROSSHAU.
In addition all available artillery would lay a preparation to include smoke on the town of HÜRTGEN just prior to jump-off. The 47th Armored Infantry Battalion moving to an attack position in the night was to attack HÜRTGEN at 0730 and hold until relieved by elements of the 13th Infantry Regiment; the 10th Tank Battalion following the 47th across the LD was to seize the high ground southeast of HÜRTGEN to protect the command's right flank and continue the attack to KLEINHAU on reserve command order; engineers and reconnaissance elements were directed to mark the routes to the attack position and to support the attack once launched. The attack, however, was delayed twenty-four hours as neither the 4th nor the 8th Infantry Divisions made the progress initially contemplated.
On the evening of the 24th, the 8th Infantry Division reported that it had secured the line of departure and was removing mines and bridging a crater in the road north of GERMETER (Chapter VI) Captain Frank M. Pool, commanding Company B, 10th Tank Battalion, was sent to a forward battallion CP to get the latest reports on infantry progress, particularly that which applied to the condition of the GERMETER-HÜRTGEN road over which his company would attack. He learned there that, contrary to reports, the infantry had not physically reached the edge of the woods designated as the LD; but he was informed that this would be accomplished prior to jump-off time as two infantry companies were to attack forward to that line at 0500. Later, at the 121st Infantry CP, Capt. Pool met the 8th Infantry Division Engineer and was reassured that:
- the road to the line of departure would definitely be cleared of mines, and
- the crater would be bridged or a path would be cleared around it. (1)
At 0725 this was confirmed by a radio message from the 8th Infantry Division.
At 242100 November the infantry of the 47th proceeded in half-tracks to a point from which they were to move to the LD dismounted. The tanks started later and were to meet the infantry on the LD prepared to attack at 250730 November. Major Hogan commanding the 3rd Battalion 121st Infantry Regiment gave the armored infantry locations of his troops and minefields and furnished guides to lead them forward through the minefield. It had rained a11 night and continued to rain all morning. About fifty yards from the meeting point the first platoon of the armored infantry walked into a minefield and the mine explosions alerted the Germans, who began pouring in intense and accurate artillery and mortar fire. Three minutes later and right on schedule the artillery began its preparation and laid the smoke screen on the southern outskirts of HÜRTGEN.
At the same time the lead tank of the tank column which was about three hundred yards south of the LD reached the crater in the road at 026347. Although the crater was neither bridged nor by-passed, it looked as if it would hold a tank so the lead medium tried to cross and immediately bogged down. Artillery and mortar fire was coming in, and as the tank hit the crater the column began receiving small arms fire from the right and left. An AT gun located southwest of HÜRTGEN opened fire on the tank; however, each round missed and passed in the same place. Evidently, the gun had been laid to fire directly down the road and was not being re-aimed at the tank, which was laying on its side on the left edge of the road. By combining manipulations of the elevating and traversing handwheels, the tank gunner was able to destroy this AT gun. (3) Several other tanks in the column were hit by artillery and, although not disabled, lost crew members. Americans and Germans in the woods were so intermeshed that the enemy small arms fire could not be neutralized without endangering the friendly troops. The infantry commander stated that he could not withdraw his men because of the mines. (4)
A bridge truck of the 12th Engineer Combat Battalion, 8th Infantry Division, was standing by, so it was decided to span the crater. However, there was an additional delay as the engineers did not have sufficient treadway to complete the span and had to go to the rear to obtain some, during which time the infantry suffered very heavy casualties. Even when material was available, the engineers were very reluctant to erect the treadway under the heavy fire until the spirit of the crane driver, who volunteered and moved forward, spurred the others on. The crater was finally spanned after considerable difficulty. With the first tank immobilized the next tank in the column crossed the span at 1030 and the attack was resumed only to stop fifty feet from the crater when this tank hit a mine, again the road was blocked. Before the crew could get out this tank received a direct hit from another AT gun. Since the artillery smoke screen had dissipated by this time, two tanks were edged into a firing position just off the road and placed HE and smoke on the south border of HÜRTGEN while a third tank moved forward to tow the disabled tank from the road. The third tank was hit by a bazooka round as it reached the knocked-out tank. The road was now completely blocked for the tanks; therefore, a request for more infantry was made. In the meantime additional smoke was requested, but the supply had been exhausted. At this time an air attack was made on HÜRTGEN and KLEINHAU and the air claimed one enemy tank, but this gave only temporary relief from the constant rain of fire.
CCR began regrouping at once to give the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion its own A, B, and C companies in addition to Company B, 10th Tank Battalion, already attached. The attack was resumed at 1630 when Company C was committed to the left of Company B of the infantry. At first progress was good, but then the company encountered a minefield in which it lost seven men in ten minutes. Company C then swung right to move up the highway, but was pinned down by six machine guns and an AT gun in the south edge of HÜRTGEN. During all of this time the mortar and artillery fire had been falling without let-up. Company B of the infantry had eighty men left out of two hundred twenty-five and Company C suffered fifty casualties in twenty minutes. An attempt was made to evacuate the disabled tanks but was unsuccessful due primarily to the artillery fire. The element of surprise had been lost, the infantry continued to suffer heavy losses without making any headway, and the 10th Tank Battalion was never able to get clear of the woods to make its thrust; therefore, Colonel C.H. Anderson, the Reserve Command commander, directed that the troops withdraw to ROETGEN under cover of darkness to reorganize. After considerable difficulty with vehicles becoming stuck during the withdrawal, the 47th Armored Infantry Battalion closed in its assembly area at ROETGEN just prior to daybreak or 26 November.
Thus, after a day's fighting and at a cost of one hundred fifty actual casualties and three tanks, the command succeeded in reaching its line of departure for the attack on HÜRTGEN. The action can be summarized by saying that enemy mines and and soggy ground made movement of tanks almost impossible, while artillery and mortar fire and numerous anti-personnel mines made dismounted advance very costly.
Following this unsuccessful attack it was decided that HÜRTGEN could not be taken from this direction and would have to be captured by infantry forces from the west and north-west. Even when elements of the 121st Infantry Regiment were entering the northwestern outskirts of HÜRTGEN (the town fell to them on 28 November as brought out in Chapter VI) it was still imposible for other forces to debouch from the woods along the road from the southwest.
All during the period that the 121st was reducing the German defenses at HÜRTGEN, the 10th Tank Battalion was parked along the armored division's MSR, which was a one-way, narrow, circuitous route from ROETGEN through the forest on secondary roads te ROTT (K922326) and ZWEIFALL. "Our parking on this road must have interfered seriously with supply, but there was no place to clear and besides we were expecting to attack at any moment — for about three days!" (5)
