CHAPTER VII
HÜRTGEN-KLEINHAU-BERGSTEIN Plan (19--23 Nov)
CCR was attached to the 8th Division, but it should be emphasized that V Corps assigned it the specific mission of seizing the dominating open ground surrounding HÜRTGEN, KLEINHAU, BRANDENBERG, and BERGSTEIN. This attack was to be carried cut in three phases:
- the edge of the woods one mile south of HÜRTGEN would be secured by the 8th Infantry Division attacking from the southwest and the 4th Infantry Division attacking from the west;
- the armor using this edge of the woods as a line of departure would attack to take HÜRTGEN and KLEINHAU where they would be relieved by an infantry battalion of the 8th;
- CCR would swing southeast to seize BRANDENBERG and BERGSTEIN as elements of the 8th threatened these towns by pushing through the woods to the west.
With this high ground in possession of V Corps troops, the ROER and the ROER DAMS could be taken thereby completing the first part of V Corps' mission, to protect the south flank of the attacking VII Corps. V Corps would then be in a position to secure a crossing over the ROER RIVER and to continue its advance to the east.
Since the dominating ground was controlled by the enemy and since there was no point which offered good observation, physical reconnaissance by unit commanders was limited. This was partially offset, however, by four factors:
- There was an OP from which part of the BERGSTEIN ridge could be viewed;
- many reconnaissance flights in liaison aircraft were conducted;
- there was sufficient time to make a thorough map study;
- information of the enemy was available largely as a result of patrolling to BRANDENBERG and BERGSTEIN by the 2d Ranger Battalion.
The area was defended by elements of the German 275th and 89th Infantry Divisions reinforced initially by the 116th Panzer Division as a mobile reserve; however, this latter division was being withdrawn at the time CCR was committed. The elements of the two infantry divisions included the 253d and the 600th Engineer Battalions, the 275th Fusilier Battalion, the 3lst Machine Gun Battalion, the 2d Battalion, 1055th Regiment, and the 1st and 2d Battalions, 60th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, all of which were supported by the divisional artillery of the two divisions engaged. This actually shows eleven battalions defending the area, but intelligence at the time correctly estimated that all battalions were down to at least one-third strength. This meant that opposing CCR there was the equivalent of one regiment with good fire support from the 31st Machine Gun Battalion, artillery, and mortars (at least two light and one medium artillery battalions and a minimum of twelve mortar batteries, 81mm, and 120mm.). The enemy in the area, however, was well organized and was controlled by two Kriegsgruppen – KG Trier and KG Wegelein. Of still more importance was the fact that the relatively stable situation over a period of weeks had been used to advantage by the two engineer battalions to lay large numbers of mines. AT and AP mines were interspersed throughout although Schu mines were predominant in the woods and Holz mines were predominant along the roads and on the shoulders.
The open terrain around the objectives was limited and surrounded on all sides by woods and wooded draws that facilitated tank stalking by the enemy at night and gave concealment to his AT guns by day. In addition, the ground had been cultivated in the previous growing season, and this plowed ground softened by heavy rains made tank movement difficult except on the narrow, third-rate roads. An exception to this was the GERMETER-KLEINHAU main road, but movement here soon became awkward due to the stresses of tank battle. The key terrain features of the area were a hill northeast of KLEINHAU, a hill northeast of HÜRTGEN, a hill just east of BERGSTEIN, and a ridge connecting these last two. This gave the enemy observation over the entire area. Further, a wooded draw between VOSSENACK and HÜRTGEN, another between VOSSENACK and BRANDENBERG, and heavy woods east of KLEINHAU and north of BRANDENBERG were good obstacles easily defended by a minimum of troops.
At this time the reserve command and attached elements were located at WALHORN (F810321), BELGIUM, where formations and groupings were made as shown in Figure 6. Immediately upon attachment to the 8th Infantry Division the 95th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was directed to reinforce the fires of the 56th Field Artillery Battalion (8th Division Artillery), but it was to revert to CCR control upon its committtment.
