4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
FOR THE PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER - 8 DECEMBER 1944
HEADQUARTERS 12TH INFANTRY
APO 4
UNITED STATES ARMY.
15 November1944
1st and 3d Bns continued to improve their positions while the 2d Bn received reinforcements and reorganized in their assembly area.
16 November1944
Again the attack. This time the 2d Bn was given the draw on our left (Northwest) flank to clear of enemy. This draw was vitally important as it contained a much needed road net into Hurtgen, Kleinhau, Grosshau, Gey and finally Düren. The plan this time was to attack directly up the Valley so as to keep the supply route open at least as far as they were able to go. The going, once more, was rough – but by dark the 2d Bn had moved 1,000 yards from their line of departure reaching the road fork at 015346. The road had been covered by Teller mines and the shoulders were thick with anti-personnel box type sizes (Schu mines), which will blow of a leg when stepped upon. Meanwhile the 3rd Bn had again jumped off in an attempt to secure the Germeter-Hurtgen road against intense small arms fire. The enemy fire was more than a match for one battalions and our troops were forced to remain on the west side of the road. L Co’s commander was killed, and K Co’s commander seriously injured during this action.
17 November1944
The 2d Bn once more attempted to push forward with E and F abreast, E to clear the west road and F the east road up the valley. These roads were flanked by steep, rugged slopes on both sides. The bridge across the culvert just beyond the fork on the east road was cut, making tank or TD support impossible. In addition both roads were mined. Three times during the day E & F started out and three times they were forced back to their line of departure by well directed machine gun, mortar, and artillery fires.
18 November1944
G Co was given the mission of encircling the enemy position by moving up the hill between F Co and E in order to clear the enemy from that ridge. To make this more entailed about two miles of painstaking marching thru a jungle of fallen trees, mines and constant mortar fire. Lt Daspit, commanding G Co was seriously wounded. At 1245A G Co reported their mission was accomplished and they had reached their objective. However there was a formidable enemy line just 25 yards to their front. With their flank thus cleared E and F again jumped off but were unable to make headway down the narrow draw.
19 November1944
Still with the same objectives the 2d Bn attempted a new plan. F Co following G Co guides were to make contact with G on the ridge and then, together with G, they were to move directly west into the draw in order to hit the enemy’s flank. The contact was made and the two companies jumped off at 1005A in the attack. The fire-break was even more formidably defended than had been anticipated and later proved to be the German’s main line of resistance. It extended across the entire regt’l front. By this time both companies were badly depleted and had a total of only 90 men available for fighting. It was impossible for them to advance. Co C to the east of the 2d Bn, about five hundred yards, had continually patrolled the gap in an excellent manner in spite of very heavy mortar fire.
20 November1944
The entire regiment once more jumped off in an attempt to secure the two all-important roads leading into Hurtgen. The 3d and 1st Bns already badly decimated moved forward but again were forced back into their holes because of the heavy mortar, artillery, machine guns and small arms fire that continually harassed them. E Co having received some reinforcements at dawn and supported by three tanks pushed straight up the draw for 450 yards and finally made contact with F and G Co’s at 1931A.
21 November1944
The 121st Inf Regt jumped off at 0900A in an attempt to push thru our lines and thus relieve the regiment. They were stopped cold on the enemy's MLR after suffering heavy casualties. Our Bns remained in line during the night but received orders to move to assembly areas at dawn.
22 November1944
The 4th Division less the 12th Infantry had jumped off several days previously with the 8th Inf on the North and the 22d on the South moving East. Their objectives were Kleinhau and Grosshau (22d Inf) and Gey (8th Inf). The 12th of having been relieved by the 121st Inf after a five mile road march closed into Bn assembly areas at 1215. These areas were along the high ground 3,000 yards West and slightly north of Hurtgen. Their mission was to protect the south flank of the division. To accomplish this mission the 2d Bn was ordered to jump off on the 23d and seize the high ground and cut the road leading into Hurtgen at 015360. At 1400 the entire 1st Bn received a very heavy concentration of artillery fire. Co A’s Commander was killed and one of his two remaining officers was severely injured.
23 November1944
In spite of heavy rain and cold miserable weather the 3d Bn and 1st Bn managed to have their Thanksgiving Day turkey dinner. Even patrols from Co's B & C who were to patrol the gap between the 2d Bn and 22d Inf by reaching the north-south road 800 meters to their front had turkey sandwiches for breakfast. This evidentally helped their morale for they accomplished their mission in excellent style.
The 2d Bn was to be denied its turkey for the time as it jumped off in the attack at 1015 with F Co in advance. By dark F Co had cut the first north-south road and G Co had advanced to a position in their rear. E Co remained in its original assembly area. Small arms and mortar fire had slowed the advance of Co F but the ever-present threat of anti-personnel mines was still the main impediment to rapid progress.
