AFTER ACTION REPORT 12TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
4TH INFANTRY DIVISION
FOR THE PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER - 8 DECEMBER 1944

PATCH 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS 12TH INFANTRY
APO 4
UNITED STATES ARMY.


1 - 5 November1944

During the first for days of November the Regiment continued its program of combat and contact patrolling in the Losheimergraben area. On the 5th of November the 60th Inf Regt relieved the 12th and the Regiment closed into an assembly area north of Holzheim.

6 - 7 November1944

Combat Team 12 was notified to move to the vicinity of Zweifall, Germany – a distance of forty-five miles – at once. This was at 1410. Despite the short notice, by 1745 the regiment was on the march. The entire march was made during the hours of darkness – the night was intensely dark and very rainy. The first order stated that the 12th Infantry would be attached to the 28th Division, and that initially it would go into an assembly area as division reserve. However, while the entire regiment was still moving on the road, late that night a change of orders was delivered verbally to the column commander. "The 12th Infantry will relieve the 109th Infantry in the front lines tonight" – without prior reconnaissance. The word was passed along the column by runner, since there was radio silence. Change in plans were made on the march. Muddy, narrow roads caused vehicles to slide into ditches. The blackness of the night hampered operations. Finally about 0200 the column arrived at a detrucking point behind the front lines. Guides met the troops. A quick decision was made. We would relieve the 109th Infantry in place unit for unit. The 12th Infantry troops then marched on foot up to the front. In spite of the many difficulties by 1250A, November 7, 1944 the regiment had completely relieved the 109th Inf Regt in the sector of the Hurtgen Forest 1,000 meters west of Hurtgen (040355) running generally south to Germeter (027336). Major General Raymond G. Barton, our Division Commander made the following statement about this operation: "Seldom in the entire annals of military history does there appear a troop movement that equals this performance by the 12th Infantry. Only well trained and well disciplined men with excellent leadership could have accomplished this feat."

The 12th Combat Team was now attached to the 28th Division. The 28th Division had been assigned the tremendous task of clearing the enemy to the east of the Hurtgen Forest and capturing the towns Vossenack and Schmidt thus protecting the southern flank of the major American offensive that was to take place in this sector.

On November 6th their 1st Bn made an attack to clear the enemy salient from the draw on the left flank of the division. Initially the attack had gone very well but the enemy was determined to protect this corridor into Düren and the Rhine Valley at any cost, hence they struck back swiftly and powerfully. The 28th Division offensive was the only attack taking place on the First Army front. This circumstance enabled the Germans to concentrate their artillery and reserves in this area. Because of the wide front assigned and the power of the German counterattacks, the 28th had been forced to employ all available troops to stop the penetrations. No maneuvering force was left to attempt to regain their original objectives so the VII Corps had hurriedly attached the 12th Infantry to the division.

By the morning of November 6th the 109th Infantry had been relieved for action to the south and the 12th Infantry had again begun offensive action. With this attack began the hardest fighting that this regiment had ever been through. Added to the natural obstacles of tall, closely knit woods, steep hillsides and lack of roads were deliberate mine fields, wire entanglements and booby traps planted by the enemy during the weeks of inactivity in this sector. Continuous rain, show and freezing weather severely hampered our operations and during the next month the regiment suffered as many casualties from trench foot and exposure as it did from battle.

8 November1944

First Battalion attacked at 1230A in an attempt to cut the enemy salient on our left flank. By 1345 Co B in the lead had been stopped by machine guns firing along final protective lines covered by tactical wire and booby traps. Enemy mortar and artillery concentrations bursting in the thick fir trees fell like rain on the men caught without the shelter of foxholes. Co C advanced to the left of B only to meet the same fire. Evacuation and supply was almost impossible. Night found the 1st Bn digging in on this line.

9 November1944

First Battalion was withdrawn to Regt’l Reserve in order to support the attack of the 3rd Bn who were ordered to clear the woods east of the Hurtgen - Germeter Road. Co K crossed the road at 1100A and advanced 400 yards through heavy artillery and mortar fire before being stopped by an enemy line, protected again by machine guns and small arms covering concertina wire that was mined and booby trapped. All fire breaks leading towards the enemy, our only means of supply, were covered by accurate artillery interdictions and, in some cases, machine gun fire. Co I was committed and drew abreast of K Co by 1345A. By dark Co K had some elements through the enemy’s tactical wire but were forced to dig in for the night.

10 November1944

The entire regiment jumped off on the attack, 3rd Battalion to continue its mission. 1st Bn to renew the assault on the draw; this time hitting northeast across the draw with the help of the 2d Bn who were to out off the draw by hitting from east to west. Heavy artillery and mine fields again slowed our attack and at 1220 L Co was hit by a counterattack of Bn strength. At 1300 a similar counterattack was launched against the 2d Bn, hitting between E and F Co’s.

In the meantime the 1st Bn was pinned down by the most tremendous artillery concentrations to ever hit the regiment. By the day's end neither side had given ground – but an enemy pocket penetrating between E Co and F, G to the north had cut the fire-break that was being used as our main supply route.

At 1900 the 12th Infantry reverted to the control of the 4th Division.

11 November1944

Co’s B and C were again pulled back because of the enemy threat from Hurtgen. Enemy penetrations had completely isolated F and G Co’s and one platoon of Co L. By this time the 3rd Battalion was badly depleted but continued the attack on the woods east of the Hurtgen - Germeter Road. "A" Co pushed forward and made contact with E Co – and at 1500 C Co was attached to the 2d Bn, jumping off in an attempt to contact F and G. They were stopped by machine gun and 65mm direct fire and were unable to reach the stranded companies before dark. No movement could be attempted after dark because of the intense blackness of the thick forest – and the ever-present menace of Shu-mines and booby traps.

12 November1944

The entire 1st Bn was committed in an effort to reach the isolated 2d Bn. After a gruelling day’s fighting the 1st Bn pounded their way through to F and G Co at 1415A. Enemy forces again drove in, this time behind the 1st Bn. Even with the combined – although greatly depleted strength of the 1st Bn, F and G Co’s were unable to fight their way back before darkness set in. In the meantime I & L Co’s. by sheer dogged determination, reached their objective at 1340A.

13 November1944

Under cover of a bitter cold misty morning F & G broke through directly south to join up with L and I Co followed by the 1st Bn who covered their withdrawal. By 1550A a new line was established tying in the entire regimental front with Co E on the left (North) flank F, G, B, C, A, L, I & K stretching to the south and east.

14 November1944

The day was spent regrouping. The 2d Bn was withdrawn to Regt’l reserve and the 1st Bn spread their forces to cover the sector thus vacated. Heavy artillery shelling throughout the day made the relief all the more difficult.

HORIZONTAL FLOURISH LINE



Source: N.A.R.A. Archives

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