21-27 NOVEMBER 1944 (RHINELAND CAMPAIGN)
By Captain Francis D. Linse
ACTION 21 NOVEMBER 1944
Company I reached the location of its forward assembly area about 202200 November after having been on the march since 1400 hours that afternoon. The distance covered was approximately six miles, but, owing to the poor roads and the congestion the move was very slow. Vehicular movement was exceptionally heavy causing the foot column to halt frequently. C C "R" 5th Armored Division, with its tanks and many vehicles, moving into assembly areas, was chiefly responsible for this congestion.
The night could not have been any blacker. After moving off the road, the troops had to grope and feel their way in finding a place to lie down. At once it became very evident that in order to prevent any one from getting lost the platoons would have to be kept very close together. Because of this, the company was kept near the road, and constant checks were made as to the location of each platoon. Enemy artillery was active all night. Fortunately for us, the target seemed to be our artillery positions far to the rear. However, the sound of these shells singing overhead all night was not a comforting one for troops just prior to making an attack. The officers were much concerned as the troops were bunched together and a few rounds of enemy artillery would have caused Company I a great many casualties. Some attempts were made to disperse the troops but it was not considered advisable to move around in the woods because of the mines. 22
Captain Melton, commander of Company I, returned from a meeting with the battalion commander about 0300 hours. The platoon leaders were quickly summoned to the company command post. The next hour or so was spent going over the final plans for the attack next morning.
Company I was to attack through positions now held by Company K, 12th Infantry, 4th Division, astride the main Germeter-Hurtgen Road. The line of departure being their present front lines. The company objective was the edge of the woods east of the road about 1000 yards to the front. Information of the enemy obtained from the commander of Company K was very little. The exact enemy position or strength was not known. Enemy artillery and mortar fire was very heavy and mine fields could be expected to be anywhere. Company K had been in their present positions about 15 days and after eight attacks had been unable to advance.
After considering the recommendations of the platoon leaders, Captain Melton decided to make a sneak attack. Due to the heavy artillery and mortar fire which assumed to fall with uncanny accuracy, he hoped to reach the objective before the enemy was aware of what was happening. The denseness of the woods, and the poor visibility during the early morning, were other factors that gave this plan good chance for success. 23
Plans were made for two different formations to be used in the attack the next morning. First, for the movement of the company from the assembly area to the line of departure it was decided to use a column of platoons. The first platoon leading, followed by the third and second. The weapons platoon and the heavy machine gun platoon were to follow the second platoon. This formation was adopted for ease of control, as no contact with the enemy was expected before reaching the line of departure. On crossing the line of departure the formation used by Company I was two platoons forward, echeloned to the right, with one platoon in support. The first and third were to lead, with the 2nd platoon in support. Because of the road on the left, first enemy contact was expected to come on the right, and Company I was formed to attack in that direction.
Initially there was little that a heavy machine gun platoon could do to support the attack, so the platoon leader gave instructions for the platoon to remain in the vicinity of a saw mill, which was near the line of departure. As the right flank and rear of the company were wide open, the platoon sergeant was ordered to watch these areas and to be prepared to fire on any enemy attack that might develop. The platoon leader with two runners planned to join Captain Melton just behind the leading platoon. 24
About 0500 hours the company was awakened and fed a hot breakfast. At the same time each man was issued a K ration. This was the last hot meal that Company I had for the next three weeks. A guide from Company K, 12th Infantry met Company I at 0600 and lead the company to the line of departure. The line of departure was reached without incident and the attack jumped off on time.
On crossing the line of departure Company I immediately went into an attack formation with two platoons forward, echeloned to the right, with one platoon in support. The first platoon was on the left guiding on the road and the third platoon on its right a little to the rear. Within the platoons, the formation was two squads forward and one in support. After covering a distance of about 600 yards the forward movement was stopped by a barbed wire entanglement extending just across the front. At the same time a few rounds of artillery fell near the 3rd Platoon and it was evident that something had to be done quickly. Captain Melton immediately ordered the two leading platoons to assault straight into the wire. 25
The first platoon, led by 2nd Lt. Stanley L. Schwartz, at once assaulted the wire with two squads. The going was tough. Before the scouts had advanced very far an enemy machine gun opened fire directly to their front. Pfc John W. Minick, one of the leading scouts, knocked this gun out with grenades single handed. The advance continued and the platoon succeeded in breaching the wire.
While this action was taking place the third platoon, led by 1st Lieutenant Lawrence D. Grover, began its assault through the same wire about 100 yards to the right. Lt. Grover made his assault with two squads leaving one squad, led by Sergeant Walter E. Wheeler in the woods about 75 yards to the rear. Lt. Grover, too, succeeded in breaching the wire. 26
After crossing the wire both platoons were pinned down by machine gun fire coming from their right front. This fire put the first and third platoons in a very bad situation.
One of Lt. Grover's men volunteered to go back and carry a message to Sergeant Wheeler. On receiving this message, Sergeant Wheeler moved his squad to the right about 100 yards, crossed the wire and attacked these machine guns from the rear. In this maneuver a squad of 12 men knocked out two machine guns and captured 35 German prisoners. With this fire lifted the first and third platoons quickly overran the German position and in a very short time all enemy action had ceased.
Sergeant Wheeler by his initiative and courage had succeeded in turning what might have been a disastrous defeat into a great victory. Shortly afterward, Sergeant Wheeler was given command of the 1st Platoon when the platoon leader got in a mine field and had both his legs broken. Later, on 25 January 1945, he received a battle field promotion to 2nd Lieutenant, almost entirely for his actions in this attack.
The wire entanglements assaulted by the first and third platoons of Company I were heavily mined and covered by enemy machine gun fire. This wire had previously stopped five attacks of Company K, 12th Infantry, 4th Division. While passing through the wire, the Company I men could see some of the dead of Company K that still remained in the wire. Casualties to the first and third platoons in this assault were very heavy, each platoon losing between 12 and 15 men. 27
A check of this position showed that it controlled a narrow neck of woods astride the main road into Hurtgen. It was protected by mines on three sides and the road on the other. In addition to the mines and wire facing Company I in their attack, was a series of machine gun bunkers built of logs which were from eighteen to twenty four inches thick. The position was so organized that every man had a place with cover built of layers of logs so that he was protected from artillery tree bursts. Nothing less then a direct hit by a 105 or 155-mm shell would have been effective against these positions.
The third platoon in attempting to continue the attack ran into another mine field. Pfc Minick was killed by a mine and 2nd Lt. Schwartz shortly afterward had both his legs broken when he too got into the same mine field. The attack was then held up and word was sent to the battalion commander of the situation. Captain Melton soon afterward received orders to organize the position for defense and to hold it at all cost. Company I was soon to find out that to take a position is one thing, to hold it it is another. 28
The third and first platoons were assigned areas to the front generally along the edge of the woods. The mine field which they had been unable to penetrate served as a protective barrier against attack from the north. The second platoon was placed along the east side facing the wooded approach. This seemed to be the weakest flank, one from which any counterattack was likely to come. One section of heavy machine guns located so that their fire covered this approach. The other section was located to cover the rear of the company position. Existing enemy emplacements were utilized to good advantage. Enemy wire and mines helped protect the rear of the company. In a relatively short time Company I had established a strong all around defense. Concurrently with this organization the wounded and dead were evacuated to the rear. 29
The situation as of 1200 hours found Company I with a strong position controlling the main road into Hurtgen.
The company command post had been established in a house near the line of departure about nine hundred yards to the rear. Between the command post and the forward position was a stretch of woods with nothing to prevent the enemy from infiltrating in from the east and cutting Company I off. Captain Melton brought this to the attention of the battalion commander and requested something be done to protect his rear.
Enemy artillery which had been unusually light began to quicken in tempo during the afternoon to a point where it seemed to rain shells at times. the concentrations fired by the enemy were the heaviest experienced by the division since their first days of combat. The Germans used every caliber gun they had including big railroad guns. Duds measuring twelve inches in diameter and over three feet long fell in the company area. This artillery took a heavy toll in casualties the next six days. One near hit on a position occupied by one machine gun squad killed one man and injured two others. There was always the problem of evacuating the wounded. Men attending to the wounded always had to take their chances with the new concentrations as they started to fall. Due to the heavy casualties among our aid men we never had more than two or three available at one time. 30
After dark the artillery fire letup and most of the night few shells fell in our area. This lull was a godsend. The men were able to get out and stretch their muscles and to begin improvements on their positions.
The first supplies, including water, rations and ammunition, arrived about 2100 hours. In addition to this, engineer tools that had been asked for were brought in. This heavy artillery fire during the day made it mandatory that all work be carried on at night.
The other battalions of the 121st Infantry made little progress the first day. The first battalion, in the center, made only slight gains and the second battalion, on the left, was unable to advance. These units encountered extensive minefields and heavy artillery fire and suffered many casualties. Company L, attacking north on the left of the main road to Hurtgen, was only able to move about one hundred yards. Company I was the only unit of the 121st Infantry that succeeded in reaching its objective on the first day.
