By Captain Robert D. Moore, Infantry

ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

1. Many who were wounded on 19 November were not evacuated until 20 November. This resulted in much additional suffering for all of those persons and possibly in death for a few. This failure was due to four things:
   1. The extremely high number of personnel wounded not only in Company C but also in the remainder of the Battalion.
   2. The litter carry was long In that it involved a carry of approximately 1800 yards from the point where the majority of the men were wounded to the Battalion Aid Station.
   3. Since a path through the minefield had not been marked by other than tank tracks the litter teams were restricted to those tracks and were thereby slowed down.
   4. Even though additional litter teams were employed a greater number should have been secured since all units that had participated in this area had suffered severe casualties.
   
2. The plan of action of Company C did not include a widening or marking of any breach it was successful in making in the initial minefield. The tank tracks were deemed to be sufficient marking until Battalion further widened and marked the breach. This responsibility of Battalion was not performed on 19 November. This failure resulted in all who went to or from the rifle companies using only the tank tracks as a path for excessive distances since they did not know the depth of the minefield.
3. On 19 November the only actual assault Company in the Regiment was Company C. This allowed the defenders to mass their fires on this one Company. Had other units been employed in the attack probably less casualties would have been sustained and further advances may have been made.
4. Neither Company A nor Company E was actually committed until about 1430 hours 20 November. By this time Company C had lost the majority of its combat efficiency. Had these two, units been committed earlier it is felt that probably the Battalion objective could have been captured that day.
5. The attached heavy machine gun platoon did not fire all of the ammunition it had carried, and yet all members of the platoon, with the exception of approximately one squad, became casualties. The platoon fired in the attack on only one occasion. That occasion was the attack on the clearing on 19 November. Two guns did fire against the counterattack. On neither occasion was the fire very effective since adequate firing positions could not be found. Particularly in the attack on the clearing was this true since the guns could not be emplaced on the very edge of the clearing, and a position as much as five yards within the thick forest resulted in very limited fields of fire. It is felt that the support rendered by a heavy machine gun unit in the attack in woods of this type is not sufficient to justify the high loss of personnel.
6. Only one radio and one telephone, both on one tank, was provided for communication to control two platoons of tanks and one platoon of tank destroyers. This lack of foresight in providing more means of communication proved to be a great hindrance in rapid control of these units.
7. The company more or less stumbled onto the clearing in the forest. Had the existence of this clearing been known, plans to capture it could, have been made beforehand, and probably the loss of men and time in capturing it could have been materially reduced. No aerial photographs of the area were available, and since the square was cleared only shortly before the attack its existence did not show on a map. Photographs should have been available.
8. By far the majority of losses sustained was due to enemy artillery and mortar fire. This fire was particularly effective in that the majority of the rounds burst upon contact with the trees thereby creating air bursts. When the company was stopped the men attempted to dig in but found their digging was of little value since overhead protection could not be provided.

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