By Major John J Lavin

ANALYSIS AMD CRITICISM

In this operation the main route of advance of the division did not include an adequate main supply road or provisions for an alternate supply road. In the planning stage this was probably not considered a serious drawback. As the action of the 112th Infantry was the main effort of the division and plans included the use of M-29 Cargo Carriers for re-supply, it was evident some difficulty was to be expected in re-supply in this area. Had the overall plan of isolating the battlefield by artillery and air action succeeded the regiment may well have consolidated its gains and the engineers had time to construct a suitable road across the valley. The fact that the planned isolation failed to occur made the trail (the only one available) an item of paramount importance. It was essential that it be held opened, maintained and improved so that armor support, reinforcements and re-supply could be gotten to threatened area. With enemy patrols active in the KALL valley security forces should have been provided for the MSR trail. Had such forces been available, it is believed the engineers could have repaired and widened the trail so that it could be used for one-way traffic. Such action would hare allowed passage of anti-tank units, tanks and supply vehicles which were badly needed in the KOMMERSCHEIDT area. Evacuation of casualties would also have been facilitated. The strong enemy reaction to the advance of our forces south of the KALL River placed a heavy demand on all units for re-supply and replacement. This reaction indicated a particular need for anti-tank elements. The loss of two destroyers by "C" Company in the valley, the failure to re-supply them and get replacement guns to them, as well as the failure of the platoon of "B" Company to reinforce them was due in large part to the difficult situation on the supply route. Reconnaissance for an alternate route was made but none could be found. The failure to provide for, secure and maintain an adequate supply route resulted in the loss of critical terrain essential to the success of the operation.

2. WEATHER AND TERRAIN

Next to the enemy in importance, are the weather and terrain. These play the primary role in operation against our own force. In this particular operation plans appeared to have provided for all contingencies. Good weather which was evidently expected failed to materialize. Since isolation of the battleground was to be accomplished by artillery and air, both requiring good observation, the continued bad weather eliminated this possibility. Had the weather been good, the artillery and air would certainly have gone a long way in reducing the effectiveness of any reserves the enemy attempted to employ in the area. As it happened, the isolation failed to reach the level necessary, due primarily to the bad weather. The rain, sleet and snow also affected the terrain, particularly the roads and trails needed by the battalion. The few roads (except those which were hard-topped) and trails which were available were turned into quagmires. It was necessary to install grousers on the destroyers and chains on vehicles to push through the ever deepening mud. Brakes became useless on most vehicles in the battalion. The combined effect of the weather and terrain delayed the movement of all types of transport and hampered the operation. Observation was restricted by mist and rain as well as the dense woods. Critical terrain was held by the enemy and when observation was good his fires were accurate and heavy. The weather had other effects not materially visible. The cloudy days and black nights had a depressing effect on troops operating in the dense forest. There was no place to dry out wet clothing or gain temporary relief from the cold. Adding to these the almost continuous enemy artillery and mortar fire one can well imagine the ultimate effect on the combat elements. Had the weather been good, it is believed the isolation of the battleground would have been enough to turn this defeat into a reasonably successful operation.

3. REPORTS OF ENEMY TANK ACTIVITIES

Throughout the critical phases of the operation enemy tanks were reported frequently. Reports must be factual complete and accurate. False reports, unverified may lead to premature deployment of reserves and movement to areas they are not needed. In critical situations such reports tend to increase the tenseness on the part of all personnel and confidence is lost in the unit reporting. Reports of enemy tanks should include as a minimum the number and time observed, their location and direction of movement. Other-wise for example, the message '20 tanks' reported by one observer may be transmitted to the acting agency by several echelons of command at different times. Since tanks can move rapidly, time to verify each report does not often exist. In this operation the critical situation (due to heavy enemy fire, high casualty rate, the weather and the terrain) resulted in many erroneous reports and the expenditure of much artillery ammunition as well as the movement of anti-tank units and an increased strain on the already fatigued infantry.

4. THE ENEMY CAPABILITIES

'Never under estimate the capabilities of the enemy'. This is a phrase we all learned when we first donned a uniform in the army. For several months prior to the operation, the TD unit like many others, had seen the enemies defenses crumble. Heavy tattles were the exception rather than the rule. The over-all importance of the operation was not known initially. The fact that the control of the ROER Dams was the key to First Army's drive to the COLOGNE plain was evidenced by the strong enemy reaction which resulted in the loss of SCHMIDT. In spite of the fact the Germans were suffering many reversals, they demonstrated here that they ware not through fighting. Although faced with a need for conservation, this threat to his defensive scheme resulted in almost unlimited expenditures of troops and munitions. The number of enemy units engaged as well as the amount of fire placed on our forces proved this. Coupled with bad weather he was able to restore his loss of SCHMIDT and KOMMERSCHEIDT and inflict heavy losses on our forces.

5. RECONSTITUTING A RESERVE

The battalion in this operation always maintained a reserve.

The threat of enemy tank attacks on VOSSENACK from the North which were possible or the East which were improbable led to a belief that a reserve of some sort should be held ready at all times. Had the operation of Task Force Davis been carried out the battalion would still have had a platoon in reserve. Information received prior to the attack indicated that the enemy had launched tank-infantry attacks from the direction of HURTGEN to GERMETER. Should such an attack have been launched the enemy could have cut off our forces both in VOSSENACK and across the KALL Valley. Without a reserve to halt the tank advance a deep penetration could have been effected since our troops were all in the line. The make-shift platoon of "C" Company was a reserve, as well as the platoon of "B" Company which was retained in GERMETER in cover position almost throughout the entire operation.

6. POSITIONS

In both VOSSENACK and KOMMERSCHEIDT the only positions available were exposed to direct enemy observation. Hull down positions existed in the rubble for only a few guns. Due to this factor our armor was subjected to heavy enemy fires both direct and indirect and as a result its effectiveness was considerably reduced. When armored units are required to occupy exposed positions the bulk of each units should be hold in reserve in covered positions ready to move to preselected positions on call. Adequate observation, liaison, communication and rehearsal in this type of employment are essential. At night or during periods of reduced visibility when early warning of a threat to our positions cannot be expected the armored units must occupy their preselected positions. In the case of VOSSENACK the occupation of exposed positions caused enemy fires to be directed at the destroyers with the resulting loss of personnel, and equipment and little gain. In KOMMERSCHEIDT it allowed enemy overwatching tanks and artillery observers to damage or destroy almost the entire company.

7. ROTATION OR RELIEF

The effect of continuous enemy fire and extended time in the line is cumulative. This applies more to the infantry soldier that it does to the armored force man in his mobile pillbox. However it does apply in the opinion of the writer. Continued exposure to adverse weather, subsisting on emergency type rations, lack of space to move, nervous tension due to enemy fire and other factors result in a dangerous psychological attitude. Different men are naturally affected in different ways and express this attitude in different ways. The weakest will wind up probably with a self inflicted wound, the stronger hold out until he loses his instinct for self preservation. Fatigue both physical and mental dulls the individual until he fails to follow his combat training and experience. The result is higher casualties. In this operation this point was not covered in great detail. The reaction described was observed and personally experienced to a limited extent. Some personnel in "B" Company and more so in "C" Companies exhibited the attitude that they may as well be hit as to go on under such conditions any longer. The 3rd platoon of "B" Company in carrying out its order to cross the KALL valley after it had been determined the trail was still blocked crossed the open will wind up probably with a self inflicted wound, the stronger hold out until he loses his instinct for self preservation. Fatigue both physical and mental dulls the individual until he fails to follow his combat training and experience. The result is higher casualties. In this operation this point was not covered in great detail. The reaction described was observed and personally experienced to a limited extent. Some personnel in "B" Company and more so in "C" Companies exhibited the attitude that they may as well be hit as to go on under such conditions any longer. The 3rd platoon of "B" Company in carrying out its order to cross the KALL valley after it had been determined the trail was still blocked crossed the open ground in column and failed to cover their advance by the overmatching principle they normally employed. It is believed in situations where enemy fire is extremely heavy and troops must hold their positions at all costs some effort to rotate or relieve them must be instituted. In VOSSENACK this was a easy matter, accomplished by the rotation of platoons in the town. However the GERMETER area was under almost the same amount of fire and the rotation did not provide rest for fatigued personnel. Their combat efficiency was therefore considerably reduced.

8. ARMORED UNITS IN RESTRICTED AREAS OF EMPLOYMENT

In areas where the use of our armor is restricted and normal fire and maneuver impossible we must have some heavily armored tanks which are capable of meeting the enemy on a comparatively equal basis. The employment of the tank destroyer battalion in this operation was in line with the usual method of employment of tank destroyers in the European theatre. Tank destroyers were not designed nor did their doctrine 53 adequately provide for this type of employment. However their gun (3" or 76mm) did excell that of our tanks and it was necessary to employ the gun in its primary mission, from exposed positions. Even the 3" gun however, does not normally penetrate the glacis (frontal) plate of a German Mark V or larger tank. It is believed by the author that two requirements must be met if we are to successfully destroy enemy armor in a future war. First, special ammunition must be developed (as was H.V.A.P.) and distributed in adequate quantities to all units engaging enemy armor. Second, we must have available and ready for mass production tanks capable of matching or excelling the best the enemy can put in the field. In this operation the thinly armored tank destroyer and medium tank proved no match for the Mark V and VI except when the latter tanks were hit in the side or with special ammunition.

LESSONS

1. An alternate main supply route should be available, particularly when there is a possibility that the main supply route may prove inadequate.
   
   
2. Evaluation of the weather and terrain must be as complete, as detailed and as accurate as possible, otherwise the operation may fail.
   
   
3. In critical situations, reports of enemy activities must be verified whan possible, since false reports tend to lower morale and result in unnecessary movement of troops or deployment of reserves.
   
   
4. In order to reduce to a minimum the unknown factors in an operation, the capabilities of the enemy must not be underestimated if success is to be insured.
   
   
5. Always reconstitute a reserve for no matter how critical a particular situation may appear, the lack of a reserve may prove disastrous.
   
   
6. When an armored unit is forced to hold an exposed position, the bulk of its forces should be in an adjacent covered position ready to occupy preselected positions when needed.
   
   
7. In areas of continuous heavy shelling combat troops including armor, must be relieved or rotated before their combat efficiency is adversely affected.
   
   
8. In areas where armored elements are canalized and normal maneuver impossible, our armor ( and its armament ) must be equal to that of the enemy if we are to succeed without undue losses.
   
   

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