in support of the 28th Infantry Division
in the vicinity of Vossenack, Germany
2-9 November 1944 - (Rhineland Campaign)
By Major John J Lavin
KOMMERSCHEIDT IS LOST - VOSSENACK REGAINED
At 0600 7 November the enemy commenced a coordinated attack on KOMMERSCHEIDT. It began with a 30 minute artillery preparation and was closely followed by infantry (estimated as one or two battalions) and 18-20 tanks (Mark V and VI) supported by direct fire of other tanks and SPs on the SCHMIDT ridge. 43
The Germans followed the barrage so closely that the enemy were firing at them from close range before they were noticed. In the ensuing battle which lasted until about 1030 hours, two more of the operational destroyers were knocked out along with four of the damaged guns. They had knocked out five of the enemy tanks and killed some 40 of the accompanying infantry. The second platoon leader knocked out a Mark VI at 30 yards before his destroyer was hit. This attack left "C" Company with one operational, one damaged destroyer, and no platoon leaders. The tankers of 707th Tank Battalion were reduced to one operating and 2 damaged tanks. The armor withdrew to the woods northeast of town and the infantry followed. The enemy did not press their success. Throughout the remainder of the day requests for artillery fire on enemy positions were relayed from "C" Company commander. Particularly on the woods east of their positions where the Germans seemed to be concentrating. Fire from enemy artillery and tanks poured into the area our troops held all afternoon.
At 1830 the enemy launched another Tank-infantry attack which was broken up 100 yards from our Infantry's position by artillery fire. 44
In VOSSENACK this same day the engineers launched an attack to retake the remainder of the town, the attack of the day before having reached the church. The attack was supported by a platoon of tanks with the 1st platoon of "B" Company 893d TD Bn. as overwatchers. Artillery and mortars fired a preparatory barrage and at 08l5 they jumped off. By 1500 they had retaken the town.
Meanwhile the TD battalion commander had received additional instructions relative to Task Force Davis and an order to send the third platoon of "B" Company across the KALL valley. This was the platoon which had been unable to cross with Task Force Ripple because of the infiltration and mining of the trail to KOMMERSCHEIDT. The Reconnaissance Platoon leaders attached to "B" and "C" Company took a half track early in the morning and checked the MSR entrance with the engineers. They reported still mined and blocked. The few engineers left had all they could do to repel German patrols. The Reconnaissance platoon leader attached to "C" Company had remained with the third platoon of "B" Company and was to guide them over. They departed from RICHELSKAUL at 1500 after taking on a load of small arms ammunition, machine guns, emergency rations and medical supplies. Efforts to secure an infantry escort or have the trail cleared first were unsuccessful since every available man was in the line. The platoon received only sporadic artillery fire going through VOSSENACK but when they trailed south and started across the 1800 yards of open ground direct fire and machine gun fire came at them from the southeast. Artillery blanketed the area. The two leading destroyers were knocked out the third received a hit on the left driving sprocket and the fourth was going so fast that it failed to stop on the mushy-ground until it crashed into the woodline near the entrance to the draw. 45 This was the last attempt to reach KOMMERSCHEIDT.
Reports of enemy tanks continued to come in from the air OP, from the infantry and from "C" Company. Enemy tanks were reported in increasing numbers in the HURTGEN-BRANDENBERG-BERGSTEIN-SCHMIDT and KOMMERSCHEIDT areas as well, as in the KALL valley itself. The 1st platoon of "B" Company in VOSSENACK could not however locate any targets within range.
In the remainder of the division sector the 12 RCT of the 4th Division had completely relieved the 109th Infantry in the north, the 2nd Battalion of the 109th relieved the remaining elements of the 2nd Battalion 112th Infantry and engineers in VOSSENACK and ordered to hold at all costs. The 110th Infantry (less one battalion with TF Ripple) made small advances in the south against stiff resistance. 46
On the night 7-8 November the battalion commander returned to the command post proper in MULARTSHUTTE at 2300 hours. Here they met the Division Anti-Tank Officer who issued instructions concerning the withdrawal of forces south of the KALL River. This was planned to start at dusk on the evening of the 8th of November. The MSR trail would be secured and held open by the third battalion 109th Infantry. These instructions were encoded in detail and relayed to "C" Company at 080155 November as Division had ordered. The assembly area for "C" Company was the forward battalion CP southwest of RICHELSKAUL. The nightly staff conference was concerned primarily with plans for receiving, resting and reconstituting "C" Company. Efforts to have "A" Company returned to the battalion had continued from the beginning to the end of the operation, but without success. "B" Company personnel were also badly fatigued. Division Intelligence Reports during the operation indicated 2000-3000 rounds of enemy artillery and mortar fire falling daily in the VOSSENACK-GERMETER area. 47
On the morning of 8 November final plans were drawn up for the reception of the remnants of "C" Company and the battalion commander departed for his forward CP at 0900. Reports of increasing numbers of enemy tanks continued to come in. A dismounted patrol led by the 2d Reconnaissance Platoon Leader was sent to determine the possibility of evacuating the destroyers of the third platoon of "B" Company which were lost the day before. About 1000 hours the tank platoon leader in VOSSENACK called for TDs to fire at some enemy tanks in the SCHMIDT area. The range was over 3000 yards and the 1st and 2d platoons which moved in fired several rounds per gun but could not identify the targets as tanks. Meanwhile the infantry battalion commander in VOSSENACK agreed to have the destroyers remain in cover positions in GERMETER during periods of good visibility when early warning of an enemy tank threat could be expected. At night and during periods of poor visibility the guns would remain in town.
The Reconnaissance platoon leader returned from his patrol at 1300 hours. He and two of his patrol members had been wounded. He reported that evacuation of the vehicles was not feasible, and further, the area around the guns was under small arms, mortar and artillery fire.
About this same time the tankers reported targets on the BERGSTEIN ridge. The first platoon of TDs moved back into town. The targets appeared to be pillboxes and the results of firing were unknown. At 1600 hours an Air O.P. reported enemy tanks and infantry north of KOMMERSCHEIDT and due east of the battered remnants of our forces. The 1st platoon moved to positions on a knoll south of VOSSENACK and spotted them moving west across the open ridge some 3000 yards southeast of their position. The first round fired was a miss, the second, a hit. The enemy crew bailed out only to be caught in a platoon salvo of high explosive shells. This was a Mark IV tank. The number three gun hit a Mark V and spun it halfway around. It burst into flames. The remaining two Mark V's were engaged by the four TD's. One caught fire and the crew of the other bailed out. They, along with some enemy infantry were caught by high explosive rounds. There remained one Mark VI, several others along with the infantry had withdrawn to the woods. The destroyers had been firing normal ammunition and now they switched to the few rounds of HVAP (High Velocity Armor Piercing) they had ready. They deceased the range to allow for the increased muzzle velocity and scored hits. The count was verified by the operations officer and it was believed that this action by the platoon of "B" Company had halted another attack on our forces that remained south of the KALL River.
In the division sector the 12th RCT continued to attack to the north where the 109th Infantry had battered itself for six days. It made some minor gains. In VOSSENACK the infantry (2d Bn. 109th Inf.) took the usual pounding from artillery fire. In the south of the sector the 110th Infantry consolidated gains. The 3d Battalion of the 109th Infantry had moved up and opened the MSR across the KALL for the withdrawal. 48 Fatigue, tension, trench foot, and the cold wet weather were also adding to the toll of casualties. The nervous tension can in some degree be shown through the number of enemy tanks reported in the area 8 November. During the day the tally kept by the operations officer of the 893d TD. Bn. indicated between 250 and 300 enemy,tanks had been reported.
