10 - 15 December 1944 - (Rhineland Campaign)
By Major John F. Staples
INTRODUCTION
This monograph covers the operations of the 331st Infantry, 83rd Infantry Division in the battle of Gey, Germany 10 December - 15 December 1944.
The allied Armies, after making rapid advances during August and September, had been forced to halt by lack of supplies. By 21 October sufficient supplies had been moved forward to permit the planning of further attacks.
With the fall of Aachen, Germany on this date, preperations were begun for the Allied winter offensive. (1) (2)
The general plan called for an advance to the Rhine River toward the Ruhr and Saar Industrial areas. (3) (4)
The main objectives of the offensive were:
If successful in attaining these objectives the Allies would then be in position to launch a final offensive into the heart of Germany for the destruction of the remaining enemy forces. (8)
At this time the front lines of the First and Ninth Armies were generally along the Luxembourg, Belgian, Dutch and German borders. These were minor penetrations into Germany west of Prum and at Monschau. The deepest penetration into Germany proper, which had breached the Siegfried Line, had been made by the First Army in the vicinity of Aachen. This penetration included Schevenhutte, approximately ten miles from the Belgian-German border. (See Map A)
On 21 October Twelfth Army Group issued an order for an attack in which First Army was to seize the east bank of the Rhine river in the vicinity of Cologne and Bonn, and attempt to seize a bridgehead over the Rhine, in the event the bridgehead was not seized First Army was to clear the enemy from an area bounded by Cologne, on the north, and the Moselle River on the south. (9)
The Ninth Army was to attack in its zone and protect the left flank of the First Army. (10)
The Third Army was to continue its attack in the Metz area. (11)
Immediately upon receipt of the Twelfth Army Croup order, First Army issued a letter of instructions in which it directed that VII Corps would attack in the direction Duren-Cologne to the Rhine. V Corps, upon the breaching of the main defenses by VII Corps and upon Army Order, was to attack toward Bonn. The VIII Corps was to conduct a vigorous defense and be prepared to attack on order. (12)
The 5th of November or later was tentatively set as the date for the attack, depending upon the availability of ammunition and weather suitable for air operations. To support the attack, Operation "Q", the largest, close-support, air attack ever used, was planned. Operation "Q" was supposed to provide the necessary blow to permit a "breakthrough" of the German defenses. (13) (14)
The 16th of November was later designated as the day on which the attack would be launched regardless of the weather, the attack having been delayed previously by adverse weather conditions. The 16th dawned cloudy, but cleared sufficiently by 1100 hours to permit the air attack to begin. The VII Corps jumped off at 1245, and initially, met comparatively light resistance; but by mid-afternoon the enemy was recovering from the air and artillery assault and the attack was pushed against increasing resistance. The advance was resumed against a determined enemy fighting from fortified buildings in the towns and cities of the comparatively open terrain north of Aachen and Duren. South of Duren the enemy was defending from well dug in log emplacements in the heavily wooded and rugged terrain of the Hurtgen Forest. The positions facing the First Army were protected by extensive anti-tank and anti-personnel mine fields and supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire. (16) (17)
The enemy, using civilian labor, had prepared strongly fortified positions in rear of the Siegfried line which were still blocking the Allied advance. (18) (19)
The failure of Operation "Q" to deliver the necessary blow to permit a breakthrough of the German defenses and a rapid advance to the Rhine can be laid to two reasons:
- Failure of the planes to bomb close enough to our front line troops to weaken the defenses enough to permit a breakthrough.
- Failure of the ground units to push rapidly ahead and take advantage of the psychological effect of the bombing. (20)
These failures can both be attributed to excessive safety allowances used as a result of the bombing experience at Saint Lo. (21)
While the application of Operation "Q", as planned, was highly successful its failure to achieve a breakthrough of the German defenses resulted in a slow, hard, and costly fight to reach the Roer River.
By the end of November the enemy situation had definitely improved in the First Army Zone. Infantry divisions (reformed after being disorganized and disrupted by the rapid advance through France) fortress battalions, and Volks Grenadier Divisions had been used in the defense of this area. These inferior units had been highly successful in defending strongly fortified positions against heavy attack. (22)
The front line units which had suffered most from the determined Allied offensive received replacements of personnel from other branches and of men released from industry. (23)
Intelligence reports, during the latter part of November, indicated that several Panzer Divisions were moving from east of the Rhine to Aachen-Cologne sector; end by 30 November the front line units of the Seventh German Army, which was opposing the First Army, consisted of ten Infantry Divisions and one Parachute Division, while the reserve consisted of four (4) SS Panzer Divisions and three Panzer Divisions. (24)
