in the Attack on Kesternich
30 January - 1 February 1945 - (Rhineland Campaign)
By Captain John H. Barner
GENERAL SITUATION
These dams influenced all planning north of their location.
By manipulating or demolishing them the enemy could make a crossing of the ROER RIVER impractical, or if a crossing had already been made he could interrupt the supply of forces on the eastern bank for a considerable period of time. 12
The first phase in the elimination of this threat to operation "Grenade" included XIX Corps directive to the 78th Infantry Division to seize the towns of EICHERSCHEID, IMGENBR0ICH, HUPPENBROICH, and KESTERNICH. 13 This attack was also planned to protect the north (left) flank of the First Army's drive to the river. 14
The terrain and prepared defenses presented many hindrances to successful operations on the southern flank of the XIX Corps zone now occupied by the 78th Infantry Division. Buildings and houses which commanded good fields of fire and provided observation were reinforced by the defenders. Many houses had fortress-like cellars and twelve-inoh concrete for roofs. 15 Recent snowfalls had left from six inches to six feet of crusted snow over all roads and fields. Deep draws along the western bank of the ROER RIVER provided excellent enemy mortar positions and assembly areas for reserves. Many concrete and steel-turreted pillboxes remained to the front. 16 During the period from 18 December 1944 to 29 January 1945 the 78th Infantry Division occupied defensive positions in a two mile deep salient which had been driven into the enemy lines during the attack prior to the German counteroffensive. The western edge of KESTERNICH laid at the point of deepest penetration. The 272d and 246th Volksgrenadier Divisions opposed the division. These divisions were reinforced with Volkssturm and Fortress Units (composite companies of miscellaneous personnel) of varying size and composition. These units appeared on the line from time to time and were then withdrawn. 17
Since its initiation into Combat on 13 December the 78th Division had experienced eight weeks of bitter winter fighting. The initial attack to secure the ROER RIVER dams had ended in failure and resulted in the loss of major portions of the 2d Battalion, 310th Infantry and the 2d Battalion, 309th Infantry in the town of KESTERNICH. During the time this illfated attack was made, the 311th Infantry had been detached from the 78th Infantry Division and attached to the 8th Infantry Division in order to provide relief for the low strength 13th Infantry of that division. Here in the HÜRTGEN FOREST numerous casualties resulted from mortar fire, anti-personnel mines, and enemy harassing action. 18 The morale in the 311th Infantry was lowered somewhat for the reason that offensive action was impossible at this time, however combat efficiency remained excellent. 19 On 27 December 1944 the 311th Infantry rejoined the 78th Division and occupied a portion of the division defensive sector. The division had entered the line without sufficient rubber overshoes for all troops; combat boots soaked up the water and mud like a sponge.
Very few camouflage snow suits were available therefore sewing machines were salvaged from ruins and bed sheets used to make these much needed suits. Morale among the Germans was good. Although some units were composed of sub-standard troops the Wehrmacht officers in command maintained a high state of discipline and there were no indications of mass surrenders or desertions. 20 The Volksgrenadier Divisions had proved that they were capable of holding a defensive line. 21
As directed by Field Order No. 29, XIX Corps, the division plans for the attack provided for the seizure of AM GERICHT crossroads, KONSEN, and IMGENBROICH by the 310th Infantry now located on the south (right) flank. The 311th Infantry was assigned the mission of capturing KESTERMCH and HUPPENBROIOH as well as assisting CCA, 5th Armored Division, which had been attached to the 78th Infantry Division, in the capture of EICHERSCHEID. The 309th Infantry, from its present positions on the north (left) flank of the division, was to hold In place and be prepared to repel counterattacks. 22
