in the Attack on pillbox sector at Wahlerscheid, Germany
(Heartbreak Crossroads) - 13 - 16 December 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)
By Captain John A. Frye
THE ATTACK cntnd.
Positions for direct fire weapons were reconnoitered and picked out, so that all direct fire weapons available to the Battalion could be brought to bear upon embrasures and other point targets. The use of direct fire weapons depended upon the ability of the engineers to clear roads in order to get them into firing positions. It was expected a road would be open by noon, 15 December. Enemy artillery and mortar fire continued to fall on the afternoon of 14 December and the night of 14 - 15 December until about 1000, 15 December. Suddenly all enemy mortar and artillery fire ceased falling. It was unbelievable, and it was quite some time before it was realized by the entire unit. Small arms fire from automatic weapons, however, continued to cover the wired sector in front of the pillboxes. (66)
About 1200, 15 December, the fact was reported that enemy mortar and artillery had ceased in the sector. A similar report was obtained from the 1st Battalion sector. Close reconnaissance was intensified and pillboxes, suspected heretofore, were definitely identified and located. The intense artillery bombardment was slowly defoliating the area. It was unbelievable that the German would pull out of his fortified position for anything other than a counterattack. Therefore, positions were rechecked and close-in mortar and artillery fire was registered. Rocket teams were placed on all tank approaches, which were few. An attack or a ruse of some sort was really expected. (67)
MG Shield
As the afternoon wore on and enemy mortar and artillery fire was still absent, the Battalion Commander decided upon a daring plan, come darkness. During the morning of 15 December, when inspecting G Company lines, it was learned from the Company Commander, who had taken over G Company when Captain Force was wounded, that he had had a squad through the wire into the communication trenches of the pillbox area. Sergeant Dunn and several members of his squad had gapped the wire on the night of 13 - 14 December, made contact with the enemy and were driven off. (68)
As a result, the Battalion Commander decided if enemy mortar and artillery fire continued to be silent, he would attempt an infiltration through the gap into the communication trenches and surround the pillboxes with whatever force he could filter through the gap. Once within the pillbox area, he felt it would be possible to reduce the pillboxes systematically. The artillery pounding had reduced the woods to a tangled mass of tree trunks and limbs which would provide excellent cover and concealment if It was necessary to continue the attack after dawn. Since the pillbox area was quite large and the strength of the 2nd Battalion was reduced to approximately 400 combat persons, it was decided to bring the 3rd Battalion through the gap, if the 2nd Battalion got through, and exploit the bridge-head as much as possible. (69)
After so many years, the trenches in the Wahlerscheid sector still exist.
Thus armed with all the latest intelligence and information, the Battalion Commander presented the above plan to the Regimental Commander. The plan was approved by the Regimental Commander and passed on to Division for approval. Division approved the plan and ordered the 2nd Battalion, 38th Infantry Regiment, to pass through the 9th Infantry Regiment as soon as the first row of pillboxes was reduced after daylight. (70)
At 1700, 15 December 1944, the Battalion Commander issued his order for the intended infiltration. The plan called for Sergeant Dunn, who had led the group from G Company into the communication trench on the night of 13 - 14 December, to take a reinforced patrol through the wire and establish an outpost at the communication trench, just Inside the wire, and surround the first pillbox. The patrol would take communication personnel, who would lay assault wire and take an EE 8A telephone for communication, as well as one SCR 300 and one SCR 536 radio. A demolition detachment from the Battalion A & P Platoon was to go along with the patrol to clear mines, wire and other obstacles necessary to get a path through. This path would be marked with engineer tape by the 2nd Platoon, G Company, who would follow the telephone wire laid by the advance party.
This 2nd Platoon from G Company would outpost the route of advance and act as guides. When the G Company Platoons were in position, F Company would follow, continue past the last elements of G Company and surround the next pillboxes encountered. E Company would follow F Company, cross the road or firebreak In the rear of the pillbox sector and protect F Company during the actual assault on the strongholds from the rear. G Company, less the patrol, would constitute the Battalion Reserve. (71)
The communication trenches referred to in the foregoing paragraph consisted of trenches 4 to 6 feet deep and 2 to 3 feet wide, running between the pillboxes and around them. The trenches offered cover and concealment for personnel necessary to guard the pillboxes from infiltration and to fight from when necessary. The trenches also served as excellent routes of communication from pillbox to pillbox. According to Sergeant Dunn, these trenches were around the pillboxes in the area he was in on the night of 13 - 14 December. (72)
If the 2nd Battalion was successful in getting E, F, and G Companies, less the route guides and security party, through the gap, the 3rd Battalion would follow on call. No effort would be made to reduce any of the pillboxes, surrounded by units of the 2nd Battalion, until the 3rd Battalion cleared the 2nd Battalion bridgehead. However, if it was necessary to reduce a pillbox in order to get the 3rd Battalion through, it would be done on order of the 2nd Battalion Commander. The 3rd Battalion would move through the bridgehead made by units of the 2nd Battalion on to the trail or firebreak in the rear of the line of pillboxes. They would continue down this trail and cut the Wahlerscheid-Dreiborn Road at the Junction. They would reduce any pillboxes within a 300 yard radius of the road junction. H Company would support the infiltration from its present position. Battalion Headquarters Company, less the communication and A & P detachments, would remain in its present position. (73)
This was a bold plan, with the element of surprise the most effective principle being relied upon. Friendly heavy and medium artillery fire continued to pound the pillbox sector, and fires were planned to box the area through which the Battalion planned to infiltrate. At 2000 the G Company Commander sent Sergeant Rivera to the Battalion Command Post to lead the reinforced patrol. Sergeant Rivera had been a member of the group who entered the trench previously and was in better physical condition than Sergeant Dunn. After approximately 45 minutes Sergeant Rivera reported in by telephone, stating he was lost and could not find the gap. He was told to follow the wire back to the outpost and return. Sergeant Dunn was sent for and arrived about the time Sergeant Rivera's party returned. Sergeant Dunn set out immediately and 30 minutes later reported he was in the communication trench ready to check the first pillbox. 15 minutes later Sergeant Dunn reported the pillbox appeared to be empty. He was ordered to hold what he had, and the Battalion Commander ordered F Company and the Battalion Command Party through the gap, to be, followed on order by E Company. F Company moved through the gap, and two more pillboxes were surrounded. Not a shot had been fired. E Company was ordered through immediately. By 2400 the 2nd Battalion had a 300 yard bridgehead within the pillbox sector. The 3rd Battalion was called for and started through the gap at 0100, 16 December 1944. After passing through elements of E Company on the trail, the advance party was fired on by pillbox guards. These were quickly taken care of, and the 3rd Battalion pushed out and cut the main road running through Wahlerscheid and Dreiborn. (74)
