in the Attack on pillbox sector at Wahlerscheid, Germany
(Heartbreak Crossroads) - 13 - 16 December 1944
(Rhineland Campaign)
By Captain John A. Frye
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
In making a study of this operation the functioning of a typical Infantry battalion during an operation that became typical for many similar organized units during the winter of 1944 and 1945 in the European Theater can be seen.
Although the assault of this fortified sector was not accomplished in accordance with approved doctrines as taught in Service Schools, it has been shown that the method for doing the things the Battalion had control over were, for the most part, done in accordance to approved doctrines. In combat it is often necessary to attempt a mission wherein all the proper techniques cannot be used for many reasons. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the leaders concerned with the mission to do what is possible in accordance with known doctrines and principles.
After more than two months of defensive warfare, it seems the individual acquires a complex that makes it difficult to execute energetically an offensive mission. Working in a protected defensive position is definitely safer than assaulting such a position. If possible it would be a more efficient use of manpower to rotate units through defensive and offensive sectors more often than every two months. Had the 2nd Battalion been more offensive-minded in the initial assault, more success might have been realized the first day.
During the planning phase Battalion Staff Officers were required to assist the Battalion Commander in the usual duties of detail work concerning information and plans. Due to the lack of time, it was impossible to train and organize a battalion to attack a fortified position in the normal manner. There fore, a logical means was resorted to - - that is surprise. However, it should be pointed out that lack of time to organize, train, and make proper reconnaissance is more normal than abnormal in combat. Therefore, it is the duty of the Battalion S-3 to plan training and organization regardless of the present mission of the Battalion. Prior planning and training is vital in combat regardless of the present mission of the unit.
The fact that key leaders in combat units will usually become casualties at some time or other dictates that follow-up leaders or key men must at all times know as much about the situation as the present leaders or key men. Had the second In command of G Company known that a patrol from his unit had penetrated to the communication trench on the night of 13 - 14 December, an entirely different light might have been cast upon the entire operation. Again, the help of the Battalion S-3 could have been used to a greater advantage by this new Company Commander if the Battalion S-3 had checked more thoroughly on the disposition of G Company troops at the end of this day´s operation.
The ability of all unit leaders to lead their men into a night action and to have those men operate and conduct themselves in a most superior manner, after three days of the most difficult combat under the most severe weather conditions, is an example of the highest type of combat leadership. No replacements were available at any time.
The ability of the Battalion Commander to lead and personally supervise small units of the Battalion, without losing control of the Battalion, is an example of the superior combat leadership necessary to the success of any difficult operation.
The 2nd Battalion's loss of men, through exposure and sickness, caused a severe strain upon those that were left.
No doubt many men were sent back who could have stayed through the action had they been in the best physical condition at the beginning of the action. In an action of this type, under such weather conditions, personnel should be checked carefully for the ever present malingerer before being evacuated. The efficient use of medical personnel in a combat operation is very necessary, especially under severe weather conditions.
