The Battalion Situtation

By Captain Armand R. Levasseur

On 3 September 1944 the 1st Battalion of the 26th Infantry was detached from the 1st Division and attached to the 3d Armored Division. Its primary employment involved security and mopping up missions behind the fast-moving armored spearheads. For this purpose it was attached to Combat Command Reserve. 21

Prior to this time the battalion had been committed in combat continuously since 6 June, D-day in Normandy, excepting for a two-week rest in July. Although it had suffered a large turnover in personnel, morale was high from successive quick victories. Its officers were seasoned, some having participated in four campaigns.

The men generally realized that the picnic, wine and flowers campaign of France and Belgium was at an end. Now, at last, the German was fighting on native soil, so resistance was expected to stiffen. However, the end now seemed within our grasp. Optimism was high., in fact too high in view of the tough battles that lay ahead. 22

Sound tactical doctrine dictated that the enemy's defenses, reached at the close of a pursuit which had turned into a rout, be penetrated as rapidly as possible. The enemy was to be given no breather to recover from the staggering blows struck in France and Belgium. For this reason no time was available for specialized training so valuable to the success of an attack on permanent type defenses. Also, at battalion level, little of value was known as to the nature of construction, strength or depth of the fortifications.

The Initial Penetration

On the 12th of September strong patrols from Combat Command "A" and Combat Command "B", 3d Armored Division, arrived on the German frontier in the vicinity of Walheim, Germany, approximately five miles southeast of Aachen, feeling for possible weaknesses in the defenses. 23 (See Map C)

Brigadier General Hickey, commanding Combat Command "A", formed two groups known as Task Force "X" and Task Force "Y", each composed of a battalion of armored infantry, a battalion of tanks, tank destroyers and engineers. These task forces assembled in a wooded area several hundred yards southwest of the Siegfried Line*s outer fringe during the night of 12 - 13 September, preparatory to attacking on the 13th. 24

The attack was delayed on the morning of the 13th to await bombardment by the Air Forces. The Commander of Task Force "X", realizing valuable time was being wasted and that results were doubtful, proceeded with the attack, notifying attached air-ground liaison personnel accordingly. Several attempts to effect a penetration during the day were stopped by heavy small arms fire from pillboxes and heavy mortar and antitank shelling from positions to the rear. The armored infantry was forced to retire to the woods but the tanks held their ground, firing on the pillboxes at point-blank range. In one instance, 50 rounds of shelling from a tank destroyer on a single enemy strong point failed to neutralize its fire.

At 1500 hours an attempt was made to cross an area in the dragon's teeth previously filled in with gravel, apparently for the convenience of civilians in the area. The attack was successful; twenty tanks were quickly rushed over the home-made ramp, followed by a battalion of armored infantry. Their mission was to take the German town of Nütheim, 2000 yards to the northeast. However, extremely heavy artillery and antitank fire soon disabled ten tanks and dispersed the infantry, requiring reorganization before the attack could be renewed. At 1715 hours the task force commander reported additional forces would be required to effect a breakthrough.

General Hickey chose this moment to commit his reserve, the 1st Battalion of the 26th Infantry, which had been attached to his command that morning. Their mission was to overrun the heavily fortified positions holding up the advance of the armor. The battalion was to attack Nütheim from the west in conjunction with an attack from the southwest by Task Force "X", now reorganizing. 25

Little time was available to the battalion commander for reconnaissance as the attack was to be launched as soon as the battalion could be moved from the assembly area. (See Map C) From the northeast edge of the woods the line of dragon's teeth antitank barrier could be seen several hundred yards to the front. Several of our tanks were burning just short of this barrier. Little could be seen beyond, as a gentle ridge running northeast and southwest masked further observation. A hasty map reconnaissance indicated gentle folds in open terrain offering little cover from small arms fire. The plan of attack most likely to succeed appeared to be a frontal attack through the barrier for 500 yards, then a change in direction to the southeast. This provided a flanking approach to Nütheim from the rear of the enemy's main defenses. The ridge running northeast and southwest would offer concealment from enemy observation to the north. Little was known of the enemy other than his determined resistance as evidenced earlier in the day.

Company commanders were issued the attack order from a vantage point at the edge of the woods, which would also serve as the line of departure. (See Map C)

Company A, with a section of machine guns attached, would lead the attack, followed by Companies B and C with a section of machine guns attached. The command group was to be located initially with Company B while the balance of Headquarters Company was to remain in the assembly area. Tanks were to support the attack by firing into pillbox embrasures from fixed positions until masked by the troops or terrain. Armored artillery and mortar support would be available through dismounted forward observers from Task Force "X" and the SCR 300 radio sets with each company commander. The 81-mm mortars, from positions in the assembly area, were to place harassing fires on Nütheim and be prepared to fire missions on call during the night by map. All organic transportation was to remain in the assembly area, including an attached platoon of 57-mm antitank guns, until ordered forward. 26

As the attack jumped off at 1830 hours, the troops were immediately taken under heavy mortar and machine gun fire from the front and right flank. Three platoon leaders in Company A became casualties and the formation was broken; word was passed along the line to keep moving and reorganize in the vicinity of a burning barn several hundred yards to the north. The momentum of the attack carried through the barrier and its covering pillboxes. Companies B and C, following behind Company A, suffered relatively light casualties as the enemy*s observation was becoming limited with the approaching darkness.

Company A reorganized and continued the attack to the north. Coming upon an unimproved road leading to Nütheim, the company commander believed it to be a country road not appearing on the map; accordingly, the column continued on several hundred yards to a hard surfaced road running to the southeast. Here the column turned southeast believing it was heading toward Nütheim, the battalion objective, wires observed along the road were out. Soon an enemy bicyclist came down the road searching for the break in the wire, and was taken prisoner.

Several minutes later a motorcycle patrol appeared, also looking for the break in the wire, and was in turn taken prisoner. Making an estimate of the situation, Captain Anderson concluded that artillery or mortar positions were located at the end of this wire, as lighter weapons were located in pillboxes which would have underground communications. Due to the appearance of two patrols in rapid succession, these positions were believed to be close by. Accordingly, the column deployed on either side of the road and proceeded to the edge of town. At this point a squad was deployed to the rear of the buildings on either side of the street and one squad worked down the street.

Soon the squads working in rear of the buildings came upon German positions. The Germans were having supper on the position without posting security. The squad on the left captured a 105 and two 120-mm mortars and the squad on the right captured two 88-mm guns. Surprise had been complete; the weapons were put out of action, interrogation of the prisoners indicated the enemy was aware of an attack developing toward Nütheim but believed they would receive ample warning of any penetration, either from the south or west.

At this time the company commander realized he had overshot his objective and sought the shelter of a hallway to check his map. Having determined his location, he gave the order to form rear guard action and retrace the route of advance. Now, however, the enemy had discovered the presence of Company A and suddenly opened fire from all directions with automatic weapons and hand grenades. Fighting its way out of town with the prisoners, the company retraced its route to the burning barn, arriving at 2100 hours. 27

Turning back to the start of the attack, the balance of the battalion was following Company A when concentrations of mortar fire on the dragon's teeth caused Company B to lose contact with Company A. Before contact could be regained Company A was lost under cover of darkness. Patrols were sent out but failed to locate Company A; radio contact could not be established. The battalion commander decided to continue the attack minus Company A.

As the advance progressed a number of pillboxes were encountered and some Germans in outside positions were taken prisoner without a fight. No attempt was made to investigate possible strong points and suspected areas of resistance were by-passed. Flank security was sent out to the limit of visibility to guard against ambush. No mines were encountered during this phase and the only barbed wire was found on pasture fences.

One thousand yards to the south a violent exchange of tracers between pillboxes and tanks of Task Force "X" was evident.

At 2100 hours radio contact was established with Company A. A patrol was dispatched immediately from battalion which contacted Company A and rejoined the battalion at 2200 hours. 28

At 23OO hours contact was made with elements of Task Force "X" which had been converging on Nütheim from the south. 29

At a commanders' conference it was decided that the attack would halt, troops would set up defenses for the night in present positions, and that the 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry would clear Nütheim of the enemy starting at daybreak, to permit a resumption of the attack beyond Nütheim by Task Force "X".

During the night engineers brought up welding torches and cut off the iron rails which had been cemented in the road block. (Map C) Shortly after dawn the first vehicles were pouring through the antitank barrier bringing forward rations and ammunition.

At daybreak Company B, with several attached tanks, was dispatched to mop up Nütheim. After clearing out minor resistance, road blocks were organized covering the key approaches to the town. These road blocks consisted of riflemen in a defensive perimeter centered on the road, backed up by attached 57-mm antitank guns. Shortly after the road blocks had been completed an enemy counterattack developed, attempting to break through the position. (Map C) This was driven off with heavy casualties to the enemy; 22 prisoners were taken. 30

Company A took up defensive positions south of Nütheim and sent a reconnaissance patrol into Walheim, 1000 yards to the southeast. As the patrol entered the town it received a large volume of small arms fire and retired after a brief skirmish.

An abandoned 88-mm gun with three antitank mines was found on Company A's position. Prisoners captured in the area stated that the gun had been placed on the position with only twelve rounds of ammunition and three antitank mines. When the ammunition was expended they were instructed to destroy the gun with the antitank mines if capture was imminent; no transport was available to withdraw the weapon. Our tanks had made destruction unnecessary by piercing the barrel with a round of 75-mm armor-piercing shell. 31

Company C was echeloned from Company A southwest to the barrier crossed on the previous night. Some of the pillboxes in this area were found to be occupied and offered stubborn resistance. Occupied strong points were not mutually supporting; however, where a pillbox contained two mutually-supporting embrasures, men attempting to close with hand grenades and bazooka were caught in a deadly crossfire. Various combinations of fire power and movement were attempted as squad teams experimented in assault tactics.

One successful method used was for the riflemen to cover all openings to deny fire from enemy individual antitank weapons while the tanks fired into embrasures at close ranges, killing or wounding those in the compartment and severely shaking those in adjacent compartments of the pillbox. A key position on the forward nose of a ridge was knocked out in this manner yielding 35 prisoners. 32

During the forenoon a 155-mm self-propelled gun was brought up to test its effect on fortified positions firing a new type concrete bursting shell. It was possible to safely maneuver the gun within close range of an occupied strong point due to the absence of enemy weapons in the area, other than small arms.

After firing several rounds a white flag was hoisted. Close observation revealed that penetration in the reinforced concrete had been only one and one-half feet. However, the concussion in the enclosed compartments had been powerful enough to cause blood to flow about the eyes, ears, nose, and mouth of the 35 prisoners taken. 33

By noon the area had been cleared and the battalion reverted to the control of Combat Command Reserve as other elements of the division continued the attack to the northeast.

On the following day, 15 September, a dangerous gap developed between the 3d Armored Division and the 1st Infantry Division on its left flank. To secure this flank a task force was organized from division reserve. This force was comprised of a battalion of tanks commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Hogan and the 1st Battalion of the 26th Infantry motorized. This task force moved from Nütheim approximately two miles northeast to the town of Dorff, immediately setting up road blocks covering all approaches to the town. No activity was reported during the night save for the shooting of two civilians who had attempted to circulate in the perimeter after dark.

The following day, 16 September, the task force was given the mission of clearing Büsbach, a town one mile to the northeast in which were located the outer defenses of the Siegfried Line's second belt. On the outskirts of town plunging machine gun fire from a church steeple was encountered. The 155-mm self-propelled gun was called forward and promptly neutralized the position by direct fire through the church steeple. Main resistance in the area consisted of three large pillboxes on a hill several hundred yards to the northeast. A company of tanks was attached to Company A for this mission. To cover the assaulting echelon, two platoons of tanks were maneuvered to hull defilade and a rifle platoon provided a steady stream of small arms fire. The position was taken from some frightened Germans without difficulty.

As the 81-mm mortars were being set up a fire mission was received. Overhanging branches from a large tree standing close by had not been considered, resulting in several casualties within the gun crew as the fuse was detonated in the branches overhead. 34

By 1500 hours positions were being consolidated on the north edge of town, several hundred yards short of the second series of dragon's teeth antitank barriers. The enemy was becoming increasingly sensitive to all observed movement and early in the evening laid down an artillery barrage on our forward positions.

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